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Foreword

M

ANY helpful studies of administrative law and
procedure have been brought to the light of day
in recent years. Many scholars have labored in
the vineyard, and the law review articles and monographs
produced by them have been legion. Many public and quasi
public groups have delved into the subject. A brief glance
will show the extent and seriousness of the interest.
In 1929 the British "Committee on Ministers' Powers"
was appointed by the Lord High Chancellor and was directed
to study delegated legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
England. The Committee filed its notable report in 1932-a
report regarded as a pioneer among contemporary cooperative
studies in the field.
Beginning in 1933 and continuing to date, the American
Bar Association has maintained a Special Committee on Ad
ministrative Law. This committee, confining its attention
to the Federal administrative system, has submitted a series
of annual reports containing a wealth of useful information.
After years of diligent labor the committee finally prepared
and, with the authority of the Association, sponsored before
Congress the much-discussed Logan-Walter Bill, a measure
which, after a stormy career, was passed by Congress, but
died by Presidential veto. The American Bar Association has
been active in yet another direction. In 1937 the Association
Section on Judicial Administration established a section Com
mittee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals, with direc
tion to study the administrative law of the forty-eight states
of the Union. This Committee prepared and filed two in
structive annual reports dealing with the subject matter under
its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Committee drafted a bill
vii
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designed to serve as a model act for use by the several states,
to be followed by them if desired in drafting statutes concern
ing state administrative procedures. This bill has now been
submitted to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws for consideration in the hope that it will
ultimat�ly be promulgated as one of the national Conference
Uniform Acts.
Still another manifestation of the current interest in the
subject appears in the recently filed report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, a com
mittee appointed by the Attorney General of the United
States on request of the President. For two years prior to
reporting, the Committee and its research staff studied in
detail the principal Federal administrative agencies. Its
report represents the culmination of these studies. Moreover,
the Report is destined to accomplish a more valuable result
than mere occupancy of shelf space in libraries. It is accom
panied by two proposed bills embodying notable legislative
recommendations regarding administrative procedure. The
bills have now been introduced into the United States Senate
where they are known as S. 674 and S. 675. S. 675 has the
support of the entire Attorney General's committee- S. 674,
on the other hand, was prepared and submitted by a minority
group, but it now bears the stamp of approval of the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association. It purports
to establish in legislative form a Code of Fair Standards of
Administrative Procedure, so far as it is possible to create such
standards by legislation.
From this brief review of some of the principal manifesta
tions of ferment in the field, it is apparent that administrative
agencies and their procedures are being subjected to a vast
amount of careful scrutiny by many well-qualified persons
and groups. Moreover, it is by no means an overstatement
to assert that all who have studied the subject objectively
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have found ample room for improvement. The end has not
yet been reached.
In the midst of all of the ramifications of this dynamic sub
ject, no single phase has proved of greater significance or
interest than the power and extent of the right of the courts
to review administrative action. No phase of administrative
law has produced a more extensive literature. None has oc
casioned more careful thought by members of the bench, the
bar, and the teaching branch of the profession. This intensity
of interest need not be deemed unusual or extraordinary, for
judicial review is one of the essential checks and balances.
Therefore, Mr. Uhler's monograph, comparing the his
tory and operation of the doctrine of separation of powers in
France with that in this country, so far as relates to judicial
review of administrative acts, penetrates to the heart of one
of the most significant areas of administrative law. The line
of demarcation between the power of administration and that
of the courts is, in the long run, determined not by immediate
case to case necessity, but by the broad proposition that a free
country can continue to be free in the best sense only if ad
ministrative usurpation is adequately held in check. With
this thought in mind, Mr. Uhler's sketch of F��ilch juristic
history compared with our own is most timely as well as most
illuminating. In French legal history, as he so carefully
points out, judicial review has passed from a stage, prior to
the Revolution, of potent judicial control over administration,
through a stage of minimized control, into the present regime
in which the rule of law is again generously employed in the
protection of private rights against administrative error-first
a high state of judicial control, then, for political reasons, a
low state of judicial control, and now again a relatively high
state. The pendulum swings to and fro, and in France it has
measured three half-strokes.
Compare French juristic history with that of this country.
In post-Revolutionary days, fear of legislative power domi-
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nated our political thinking. Consequently, when our theory
of government was formulated, the courts were placed on a
parity with the legislative and executive branches in order
that the checks and balances introduced thereby might neutral
ize the likelihood of disastrous consequences. Today, in the
midst of a dynamic program of world change and American!
social reform, judicial power is being severely criticized, and!
in many quarters efforts are being made with substantial
measure of success to subordinate the judiciary to the ad�
ministration, especially when legal questions arising uncle�
current programs of social reform are involved. Courts ar�
deemed by proponents of these efforts to stand in the way of
needed social and political progress. Fortunately, with us this ,
has taken place without revolution. With us the pendulum :.
has up to now swung just two half-strokes; but, if the teachings
of history are to be believed, in due course the pendulum
will swing back again, just as surely as it did under the French
Republic. The Courts will in the long run occupy a position
of equality and independence, exemplifying the supremacy of
the law in an orderly and balanced polity. Indeed, this must
happen if the country is to remain free. So, in thinking of
judicial review of administrative decisions, it is wise to regard
it as a most important feature of the theory of checks and
balances in our juristic and governmental scheme-a sub
stantial part of the swinging pendulum. We must continually
ask ourselves what is the proper degree of judicial review if
a wise balance is to be maintaint!d. That should be our guid
ing star.
Mr. Uhler has given us a careful and scholarly discussion
of judicial review under the French administrative system.
Today judicial review in this country is in a state of flux. The
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of The Railroad Commission of Texas v. R owan and
Nichols Oil Company1 leads us to anticipate a substantial re-

·
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striction of the doctrine that has been current since r 920 con
cerning judicial review of constitutional facts. Statutes stipu
lating that judicial review of facts shall be precluded when
"substantial evidence" is found to support administrative de
cisions are being interpreted variously but with increasing re
strictivity. Some of the legislation now before Congress seeks
to deal with the ever-present and all-important question of
the power of the courts with respect to administration. The
end is not in sight. The last word has not been said. Mr.
Uhler's comparative study comes at a peculiarly appropriate
time.
E. BLYTHE STASON

Preface

T

HE present study was originally inspired by the wide
spread interest in the doctrine of the separation of
powers stimulated by current discussions of vital prob
lems of administrative law. Frequent reference to this doctrine
occurs especially in recent legal literature concerned with the
relation between the administrative and judicial departments
of government. Particular mention may be made of the
attention which has been given the doctrine by the Special
Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar As
sociation. However, the allusions to the doctrine in these dis
cussions to prevalent separation of powers in the organization
of government have not always been sufficiently discriminat
ing. Mirabeau's warning in the constitutional debates of I 789
in France not to invoke the formula without first carefully
ascertaining its true meaning is as timely today as it was
then.
It is the object of this study to investigate the �ntent of
the doctrine of the separation of powers with a view to es
tablishing the nature and extent of its bearing upon the prob
lem of review of and relief from administrative acti § Ulti
mately, this inquiry seeks to disclose the measure in which
the doctrine has become a screen more or less effectively
concealing the forces which actually determine the function
of judicial control of administrative action.
The plan adopted necessitates an introductory analysis of
the doctrine of the separation of powers. In order to fix its
meaning, Montesquieu's ideas, so often relied upon, will be
briefly reviewed. This will be followed by an examination
of the functional value of the doctrine, that is, the historically
conditioned place which it came to occupy at an early date
xiii
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as a factor in determining the relation of the judiciary to
the administration. Particular care has been taken to give a
clear presentation of the political conditions preceding the
inauguration of a representative government in France. The
historical facts of that time are of special interest for an
understanding of the different significance of the separation
of powers in the France of 1 789-1 940 and in the United
States. The full understanding of that difference in signifi
cance, in turn, is indispensable for correct appraisal of the de
velopments during this century and a half, as well as for
intelligent comparison of the French and American systems
of reviewing administrative acts.
The phase of French public law selected for comparison
presents many points of uncommon interest at the present
time. The droit administratif, developed while France was
an outstanding exponent of the doctrine of the separation of
powers, has repeatedly been the subject of consideration from
the viewpoint of administrative law in this country. How
ever, it has not as yet been explored sufficiently to be capable
of serving as a guide in the United States. The large part
of this study dealing with the pertinent problems as they
present themselves in French law is intended to afford a
closer view of the droit administratif, and it is hoped that
what has proved an extremely interesting task will indirectly
throw fresh light on American administrative law.
One more observation should be made at this time con
cerning the general nature of the droit administratif. Much
of French administrative law is embodied in a long succession
of statutes, the first of which were enacted in 1 789. But there
has also been an impressive body of "common law," developed
by the three distinguished courts of the country, the Cour de
cassation, the Conseil d'Etat, and that great umpire, the
Tribunal des conflits. Their decisions reflect important flue-
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tuations and trends, particularly in respect to the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts over administrative action. Indeed, the
phase of French public law which is the subject of the present
discussion is almost entirely governed by rules having their
origin in judicial decisions.
In concluding this introduction, allusion is briefly made
to the events which have abruptly terminated the evolution
of what was until so recently the French administrative sys
tem. But the destruction of institutions expressive of demo
cratic ideas cannot impair their enduring intrinsic value.
The author desires to acknowledge his appreciation for the
invaluable assistance and encouragement he has received from
Dean E. Blythe Stason and Professor Hessel E. Yntema of
the University of Michigan Law School. The author also
expresses his gratitude to Professor Hobart R. Coffey, Uni:..
versity of Michigan Law Librarian, for his assistance in se
curing foreign material, and to Miss Katherine Kempfer,
Associate Editor of the Michigan Law Review, for her cooper
ation in the preparation of the final draft of the manuscript.
The Michigan Law Review has courteously consented to
the republication of that part of the study which appeared
in volume 3 7 of the Review, at page 209, under the title of
"The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass in French Law;
an Analogue of Due Process."
ARMIN U H LER

Ann Arbor, Michigan
September, 1940
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PART I
THE DOCTRINE
OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS

"The doctrine of the three powers, when care
fully analyzed, perhaps shows the readiness of the
human mind to take words for things, formulas for
arguments, and to accept a certain set of ideas without
ever reexamining the intelligible definition which it
has taken for an axiom." Mirabeau, in the Con
stituent Assembly of z789 (July z6).'

1 Quoted by Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. (1 897), Vol. I,
p. 3 9 ; Moreau, Le reglement administratif ( 1 9oz) , p. 1 79, note 1 . The trans
lation of the passage in White, James, Speeches of M. de Mirabeau, the Elder,
Pronounced in the National Assembly of France (London, 1 792.) , pp. 1 3 3-34,
is slightly different.

CHAPTER I

Development of the Doctrine of the
Separation of Powers in France

I

N

A. THE IJOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AS CONCEIVED BY MONTESQUIEU

order to appraise the influence of the doctrine of the sep
aration of powers1 upon the formulation of certain con
cepts of administrative law, it is indispensable to review
its historical evolution. Only complete awareness of the his
toric political environment attending its reception into a given
governmental scheme can insure the requisite definiteness of
meaning. Abstract theory ever since Aristotle, to be sure, has
had no difficulty in distinguishing various functions of the state,
i. e., functions in the sense of differing forms of state activity
1 Out of the great mass of general and topical treatments of the separation of
powers doctrine, the following deserve especial mention in connection with the
subject at hand:
For an excellent general survey of the doctrine as conceived at various times
by well-known writers of the English- and non-English-speaking world, see
Fairlie, "The Separation of Powers," 2.1 Mich. L. Rev. (1923) 393· See also
Ghose, Comparative Administrative Law (1919), p. 75 ff.

For an equally noteworthy treatment of the 'Subject, primarily devoted to its
significance in the United States, see Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine
of 'The Separation of Powers,'" 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 385. See also The
Federalist, Nos. 47, 48 and 51 ; Erlick, La separation des pouvoirs et la

Convention Fidirale de 1787 (1926).

Of primary importance for France are the pertinent chapters in Duguit,
Traite du droit constitutionnel [2d ed., 1921-1925], and Esmein, Eliments du
droit constitutionnel franfais et compare [7 th ed., 1921]. Jacquelin, Les
pl<incipes dominants du contentieux administratif (1899) and 11 rtur, De la
separation des pouvoirs et de la separation des fonctions de juger et d'administrer
(1905) [first published in 13 R. D. P. (1900) 214, 470, 14 ibid. (1900) 34.
236,436, 17 ibid. (1902) 78, 234, 439, 20 ibid. (1903) 415], are especially con

cerned with the interpretation of the doctrine in the light of French administra
tive law.
Topical expositions will be found in the various treatises on administrative
law referred to in the text and notes. See Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire tle
tlroit administratif, 1 3th ed. (1933), p. 9 ff.
3
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designed for the accomplishment of a variety of state pur
poses. But the doctrine of separate powers in the modern
sense of a working mechanism is not an abstract code of law.
Nor does this doctrine of the separation of powers spring
from a theory of higher law comparable to the familiar con
cept of natural law. In every instance where its offices are in
voked, it is made to serve the practical governmental exigen
cies of the moment. In every such instance its invocation is
the immediate consequence of given political situations for
which some remedy or improvement is sought.2 And although
the political theorists who, up to the middle of the eighteenth
century, had concerned themselves with problems of govern
mental powers3 may not have expressly admitted it, they
were undoubtedly and invariably influenced by the prevail
ing ideas and conditions of their times.
When Montesquieu wrote his book, L'Esprit des lois,
France was dominated by the absolutistic regime which nur
tured the elements of the Revolution. Montesquieu's extended
travels ultimately had brought him to England, and during
his soj ourn there he found inspiration in the institutions of that
country.4 In Book XI of his well-known work, in the chapter
(VI ) headed "Of the Constitution of England," he says that
liberty depends upon and can exist only if a particular prin
ciple of government is applied, i. e., if t � e powers of govern
ment are exercised by separate agencies. \!'he principle so ex
pounded was novel in its emphasis upon the distribution of
governmental powers, and in this form it was destined to at• See Fairlie article, 2 1 Mich. L. Rev. 393· Cf., e. g., Jellinek, Allgemeine

Staatslehre, 3d ed. (1929), p. 595 ff. ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, pp. 5 1 4 ff, 534 ff.
Vol. 3, p. 29 ff. ; Duguit, Etudes de droit public ( x 9o3), Vol. 2, p. 28r. ff. ;
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2d ed. ( 1 92 3 ) , p. sn ff. ; Moreau,
Le reglement administratif (x9o2) , p. 252 ; Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungs
recht, 2d ed. ( r 9 14), Vol. x, p. 57, note 2 ; Stein, Grenzen und Beziehungen
zwischen Justiz und Verwaltung ( x 9x2) , p. 1 ff.
8 See Fairlie article, 2 I Mich. L. Rev. 393·
' See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Nugent translation ( r 823 reprint of
1 766 ed.), p. v ff.
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tract the minds of the contemporary statesmen of the two
liberty-seeking peoples of the United States and of France.
The principle, as variously interpreted at the time, found its
way into the respective constitutions of these countries}' Since
then, uninquiring tributes and references to Montesquieu
have been without number and are still frequent today. In
stead of indulging in more tributes, it is proposed first to re
examine6 objectively Montesquieu's ideas, and then to ascer
tain the respective evils sought to be remedied by applying
his precept. This procedure is indispensable to the correct ap
praisal of the interpretations of the doctrine of the separation
of powers and of its consequent effects upon the relation be
tween administration and j udiciary.
In the examination of Montesquieu's theory, three obser
vations are of particular significance. First, it is not open to
serious doubt that Montesquieu, in keeping with many writ
ers, including John Locke/ recognized only two primary powers of the state, the legislative and the executive. 8 An
analysis by d'Alembert introducing Montesquieu's book
confirms the view that then prevailing thought envisaged but
these two governmental powers. Thus, d'Alembert says,
"There are in the constitution of every state two sorts of
powers, the legislative and the executive ; and this last has
• See the French constitutions of September 3, I 7 9 I ; sth Fructidor, year III
(Aug. :u, 1 795) ; November 4, I 848.
8 Without claim to originality or novel treatment. For a drastic illustration of
the dangers lurking in hastily formulated or preconceived notions, see Professor
Georg Jellinek's critique, "Eine neue Theorie iiber die Lehre Montesquieu's von
den Staatsgewalten," 30 Zeitschrift fur das Privat und Ojfentliche Recht der
Gegenwart ( 1 90 3 ) I ff. ; and Professor Rehm's reply, ibid. 4 1 7 ff.
7 Locke, distinguishing three powers corresponding to the legislative, execu
tive, and federative tasks of the commonwealth, concludes that "Though
the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in
the hands of distinct persons. . . ." Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Govern
ment ( 1 7 7 3 ) , p. 7 8 ; also in Two Treatises of Government ( 1 69 8 ) , p. z8o.
8 Montesquieu, L'Esprit des lois, Book XI, chap. VI [Pourrat ed. ( I 834),
Vol. 1, p. Z93]. For an English translation, see that of Thomas Nugent made in
1 766 and reprinted in 1 8z3.
•
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two objects, internal affairs and foreign relations."9 This pas
sage is particularly helpful because Montesquieu's use of
terms is conveniently loose and has lent itself to differing
interpretations. In the first paragraph of chapter VI
Montesquieu himself opens with the well-known statement
in which he distinguishes "three kinds of powers ; 10 the
legislative power, the power to regulate the affairs depend
ing upon the law of nations,11 and the power to regulate
those depending upon the civil law."12 This might seem
to indicate that the author conceived of two powers, the
legislative and the executive, and of three functions, one
coinciding with the legislative and the other two falling
under the executive power. Nevertheless, the succeed
ing paragraph again leaves one at sea. There is no difficulty
about the first power, but the second is described as that con
cerned with the external matters of "peace and war, the send
ing and receiving of ambassadors, security, prevention of
invasions." The third power extends to the "punishing of
- crimes, and the adjudication of the differences of individuals,"
and is called "the power to adjudicate." What has become of
the management of internal affairs? Is administration em
braced in the second or third? Apparently what seemed im
portant to Montesquieu was that two powers should be
recognized, one of which, the executive, envisaged two dis
tinct obj ects. There is very little indication, if any, of an intent
to classify the "power to adjudicate" as an independent co
ordinate power. On the contrary, in another place in the text1 3
"the three powers" forming "the fundamental structure of
•

Pourrat ed., Vol. x, p. 9 (Nugent translation, p. xx) .
In the first part of the sentence the word "pouvoir" is used, while "puis
sance ligislative" and "puissance exicutrix'' appear after the colon.
11 Both of these powers are termed "puissances executrices," i. e., powers "for
the execution" of the law of nations on one hand, and of the civil law on the
other hand.
u Montesquieu, Book XI, chap. VI (Pourrat ed., Vol. x, p. 293) .
38 Ibid., p. 307.
10
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the government of which we have spoken" expressly refer to
the two houses of the legislature and to the executive. And
again, another passage14 states that "of the three powers [puis
sances] which we have mentioned, the judicial power is some
how nonexistent [nulle] . There are in fact but two." u;
Secondly, what appears to be of the foremost interest to
Montesquieu is the distribution among separate agencies of
the functions to be exercised. This emphasis upon the differ
entiation of agencies, which is generally recognized as orig
inal with Montesquieu, is expressed in clear terms at the
beginning of chapter VI. It is further accentuated in the clos
ing chapter of the book/6 where it is said that the degree of
liberty possible under any government is determinable ac
cording to the distribution of the governmental "powers." 17
The third proposition to which attention should here be di
rected is the placing in Montesquieu's theory of the judicial
"power." The opinion has already been expressed that ju
dicial power was considered but one phase or branch of the
executive, and a separate "power" only in the limited sense of
a function to be exercised by distinct officials or agencies.18 It
u Ibid., p. 300.
"" The question whether two or three powers had been envisaged by
Montesquieu was the subject of a great deal of discussion in the constitutional
assembly of I 789. Most prevalent seems to have been the viewpoint defended
by Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. ( I 8 9 7 ) , Vol. I 1 p. 3 7 ff.,,
i. e., that there are but two powers and that the judicial "power" was part of
the executive, because "all j ustice emanates from the Crown."
Cf. Aucoc, ConfCrences sur l'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed.
( I 88s), Vol. 11 p. 55 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, p. 5 3 8 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti,
p. I I . Cf. also the modern doctrines as to the basic legislative and adminis
trative functions. Mayer, Vol. I , p. 5 7 ; Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslekre,
p. s s 8 ; Kelsen, p. S I I · See also the American authorities cited incidentally in
Beutel, "Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases," 43
Harv. L. Rev. ( I 93o) I 24 9 at I 25 7, note 22.
10 Montesquieu, Book XI, chap XX (Pourrat ed., Vol. I, p. 347 ) .
11
"Je voudrois rechercher, dans tous les gouvernements moderes que nous
connoissons, quelle est la distribution des trois pouvoirs, et calculer par la les
degres de liberte dont chacun d'eux peut jouir.
."
m cf. Appleton, Traiti ilimentaire du contentieux administratif (I 9 27),
p. 1 8.
•
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must also be noted that Montesquieu advocates that the power
and influence of the judicial authorities be minimized/9 and
that they be not treated as a coordinate branch of the government but as entirely subordinate to the legislature and the ex
ecutive.20 It is important to bear in mind Montesquieu's con
ception of the judicial branch of the government, for it had
its roots in the very conditions of the times. It will be shown
that this conception was well adapted to the objectives of the
ensuing revolution, whose leaders it must have prompted in
seizing upon Montesquieu's ideas for guidance.
B. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FRENCH LAW

It is clear that in France, as in this country, the separation
of powers had a definite function to perform when it was
made an integral part of a new regime. The separation of
powers was intended to make secure the achievements of a re
cent revolution. Conseqtiently the conditions preceding the
revolution are elementary factors in determining the true
meaning of the doctrine and they must be recalled if the lat
ter is to be fully understood.
I.

The King and the Parlements

A monarchy of the absolute type, like that of prerevolu
tionary France, combines in one person, the monarch, all
powers re<Juisite for carrying on the functions of the state.
However, the complexity of the affairs of the state necessi
tates a division of labor. Thus, in the middle of the eighteenth
century governmental power in France was vested in the king
Montesquieu, Book XI, chap. VI (Pourrat ed., Vol. 1, p. 296) .
Ibid., pp. 296, 3oo-3o6. Referring to impeachment of public officers,
Montesquieu suggests (p. 306) that the lower house of the legislature "can
be but the accuser ; but before whom shall it make its accusation? Shall it
stoop before the ordinary courts which are its inferiors? "
19
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and exercised by him nominally through his council and his
intendants with the cooperation of the parlements. Actually,
the latter had entered into competition with the Crown.21 The
king, from whom all power was held to emanate, governed
through the Conseil du roi22 ( embracing four principal and
distinct conseils ) and intendants,23 to whom power was dele
gated primarily for the administration of the royal finances
and taxation. On the other hand, a considerable amount of
governmental authority, coupled with political power, rested
with the parlements. Indeed, we find that in addition to their
judicial powers, the parlements claimed and exercised im
portant legislative and administrative powers24 which came
into direct conflict with governmental action originating in
the Crown. This conflict derived from the very fact that what
ever powers the parlements possessed were delegated ones.
At the outset the king dispensed justice personally with the
aid of his council, the same council that advised him in matters
of state. It was this council from which the Parlement de Paris
first detached itself as an independent body, while similar
provincial parlements were later formed throughout the
land. 25 In theory these courts continued to owe their authority
to the Crown, which might revoke and exercise it personally
at will. However, in time these j udicial bodies began to assert
their independence. And even though they came to use their
n Out of the old curia regis had developed first the Parlement de Paris. Pro
vincial Parlements were then added, all of which in turn became the highest
courts of j ustice in the land, although they continued to participate in the ex
ercise of legislative, and administrative functions. Esmein, Cours etimentaire
d'histoire du droit franfais, uth ed. ( 1 9 1 2 ) , p. 409 ff. ; Laferriere, Traiti
de la juridiction administrative et des recours contentieux, zd ed. ( 1 896),
Vol. 1 , p. 1 39 ff. ; Hauriou, Pricis de droit administratif, 1 oth ed. ( 1 9 Z 1 ) ,
p . 5 ff., uth ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p . 4 ff. ; Brissaud, A History of French Public Law
(translated by James W. Garner, The Continental Legal History Series, 1 9 1 5) ,
p . 3 7 8 ff.
.. Esmein, Cours ilimentaire, p. sz8 ; Brissaud, p. 3 78.
"" Esmein, p. 658 ; Brissaud, p. 406.
"' Esmein, p. s8z ff. ; Brissaud, p. 43 Z ff.
111 Esmein, p. 434 ff. ; Brissaud, p. 43Z ff.
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growing influence to obstruct the central administration, it
had now become impossible to divest them of their powers.
The j udicial offices-parlements and inferior tribunals alike
-in the course of time had become venal and hereditary.
With the constantly increasing needs of the royal treasury,
the sale of these offices had become a substantial source of rev
enue, to the obvious detriment of royal sovereignty. In turn,
the j udicial officers found themselves compelled to "sell jus
tice" in order to reimburse themselves and to get a return on
their investment.26 When, under Louis XIV, reforms were
proposed, it was found that the evil was too firmly rooted to be
eradicated. A class of public officials had come into existence
whose tenure would no longer yield to ex parte revocation.
Crown and judiciary alike depended on the established sys
tem for income.
i
2.

Judicial Interference with the Executive

The various forms of interference by the judiciary to which
the administrative was henceforth exposed affected both the
legislative and the administrative prerogatives of the king.27
In the first place, under their general jurisdiction the parle
ments could take cognizance of matters of political conse
quence. Thus they could, and frequently did, prosecute high
public officials for crimes imputed to them with or without
factual foundations. Their most powerful weapon, however,
consisted in the requirement that all acts resulting from the
exercise of legislative power by the Crown be registered in
parlement, i. e., "verified" after deliberations.28 Registration
could be refused in whole or in part, with power to make
modifications, and by way of "remonstrance" the reasons for
the action taken were transmitted to the king. This power of
"" Esmein, p. 45 I ff. ; Brissaud, p. 45 8
.., Esmein, p. 5 8 2 ff. ; Brissaud, p. 445 ff. As to the legislative powers of the
Etats generaux, cf. Esmein, p. 539 ff.
"" Esmein, p. 5 85 ; BrissauJ, p. 445 ff.
•
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"registration" belonged equally to the Parlement de Paris,
to the twelve provincial parlements,29 and to the other sover
eign courts.
Against all these sources of friction the Crown maintained
the position that all governmental power, though delegated
to some extent, remained ultimately in the king, and this prin
ciple was not entirely devoid of sanctions. On the theory bf
justice retenue,S0 the king could withdraw from the courts
(by way of evocations) controversies over which they had ac
quired jurisdiction, in order to have them disposed of in his
council.31 Where legislative powers were involved, the king
again relied on the theory that all powers of the parlements
rested solely upon concession from him. Hence he might send
a written command to the parlement demanding registration
of his royal ordinance32 or, where this failed to enforce obedi
ence, he could proceed by what was known as lit de justice,S3
i. e., he could appear personally in the parlement and direct
the immediate inscription of the ordinance in his presence.
The parlements in turn had a further effective means by which
they could obstruct the Crown if their hands had been forced
by a lit de justice. Acting as courts, or their individual mem
bers as judges, they might retaliate by refusing to take
notice of or to enforce ordinances so registered against their
will.
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS 'IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY FRENCH LAW

1 . The Basic Principle
The acute lack of synchronization of the executive and judicial machinery under the ancien regime in France had
10

Esmein, p. 436.
Esmein, p. 484 ff. ; BrissauJ, p. 428 ff.
11 Esmein, p. 485; BrissauJ, p. 430.
11 Lettre de iussio-Esmein, p. 591 ; BrissauJ, p. 449 •
11 Esmein, pp. 59 1-592 1 BrissauJ, P· 44 9·
10
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caused serious frictions which could not fail to have disastrous
consequences. After the revolution had swept over France,
the leaders of the new regime were greatly concerned with
devising means to prevent the recurrence of similar condi
tions. To this end they incorporated Montesquieu's theory of
free government 34 in the legislation of 1 78 9 and in the sub
sequent constitutions, hoping to accomplish two things: ( I ) to
secure a new form of monarchical government in which popu
lar sovereignty was reflected, and political liberty established,
through a legislative body which was independent of the ex
ecutive; ( 2) to insure a system under which the administration
could fulfill unhampered the tasks which the revolution had
entrusted to it. These objectives were to be attained by the
separation of the legislative and executive powers, and by a
differentiation of the administrative and j udicial agencies.
Thus, the doctrine of the separation of powers in France
carries a two-fold meaning. It denotes,� the divorce of
the two recognized powers of the legislative and executive,
commonly referred to as separation des pouvoirs, and,�oo.d,
the distribution of the judicial and administrative functions
among separate agencies. This latter aspect of the doc
trine is usually termed Ia separation des autorites administra
tive et judiciaire or, more briefly, Ia separation des autorites.35
It is this second meaning w�ich will be the exclusive subj ect
of the following analysis, and in order to preserve the essen
tial distinction it will be designated as "differentiation of agen
cies."36 It was felt that the government could not effectively

"' Many of the prominent · members of the Assemblee Constituante of I 789
were familiar with Montesquieu's writings. They extolled, discussed, but also
criticized extensively in the constitutional debates his theory of the separation
of powers. See Ducrocq, Vol. I, p. 3 7 :ff. ; Aucoc, Vol. I1 p. 47 :ff. ; Jacquelin, Les
principes, p. I 4 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. S I 4 :ff.
"" Berthilemy, Traite pp. 9 :ff., zo ff.
88 The terminology employed in France is generally consistent in observing
the distinction. Nevertheless there are occasional instances in which separation
des pouvoirs is used by courts though the intended reference is to the differen-
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pursue its new policies if the courts were permitted to conto exercise any direct or indirect influence or control
tinue
I
t over administration. Montesquieu's theory, according to
which the judicial "power," though given to a separate body
of officials, was to be a subordinate branch of government
without political power, lent itself admirably to the accom
plishment of this purpose and to the dispelling of existing
fears that the political and administrative unity of the cen
tralized government might be disturbed by a j udiciary pre
sumed to be always reactionary. From the differentiation of
the administrative and judicial agencies in this sense, high
hopes were held for the efficacy of the new regime. Through
it evils flowing from class distinctions, differences in custom,
and even differences in nationality might be overcome. 37
The principle · of the differentiation of agencies found ex
pression in a series of constitutional and statutory enactments,
all of which provide in substance that the judiciary shall not
in any manner whatever interfere with administrative action.38
tiation of agencies, and in translating quotations it will be necessary here
and there to adopt the less accurate term.
37 Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 8 2-8 3 ; Jacquelin, Les principes, p. 22 ff. ; Esmein,
Precis elimentaire de l'histoire du droit franfais de 1 7 89 a 1 8 1 4 ( 1 908) ;
Esmein, Elements de droit constitutionnel, Vol. 1, p. 5 3 1 ff. ; Jeze, Les principes
generaux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( 1 925), p. 265 ; Duguit, "The French
\dministrative Courts," 29 Pol. Sci. Q. ( 1 9 1 4) 3 85 (translation) .
88 Sec. III, art. 7, Law of December z z, 1 7 89 : "The administrations of the
departments and districts shall not be hampered in the exercise of their func
tions by any acts of the judicial power." Tit. II, art. 1 3, Law of 1 6-24
August, 1 790: "The judicial functions are distinct and shall forever remain
separated from the administrative functions. The judges may not, under
penalty of forfeiture, interfere in any manner whatsoever with the operations
of the administrative agencies ; nor shall they summon before them adminis
trative functionaries on account of their official functions." Tit. III, chap. V,
art. 3, of the Constitution of Sept. 3, 1 79 1 : "The courts shall
not as
sume any administrative functions or summon before them administrative officers
on account of functions exercised by them." Law of the 1 6th Fructidor, year III
(Sept. 2, 1 795) : "The courts are again prohibited from taking cognizance of
all acts of the administration of whatever nature." See Laferriere, Vol. r , pp.
1 8 1-83 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 3 1-32 ; Appleton, p. 20 ; Duguit et Mon
nier, Les Comtitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1 7 89,
4th ed. ( 1 925) .
•
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Penalties and forfeitures were provided for transgressions by
courts and judges,89 while administrative officials were equally
enjoined not to encroach upon the judicial domain.40 The
principle thus established ultimately led to the administrative
system now in force, which is characterized by its alleged
freedom from interference and control by the judicial branch
of government, and which has developed its own independent
courts.
2.

Evolution of the Administrative System

At the outset, before administrative courts had come into
existence, the prohibition against interference by the judicial
·· ·-courts resulted in making the administrative hierarchy judge
in its own cause, in the fullest sense of that expression.41 The
individual citizen depended entirely upon the several admin
istrative agencies for the hearing of his complaints. For obvi
ous reasons, at this stage of development protection of the
individual was not the main objective. Concern with adminis
trative self-protection stood in the foreground, and only
gradually did considerations of private interest gain momen
tum as a force contributing to the evolution of modern ad
ministrative law concepts.42
Up to I 849 the Conseil d'Etat, which was to become so
prominently identified with the dispensation of administra
tive justice, was but an advisory council48 of the chief execu
..

Tit. II, art. 1 3, Law of 1 6-24 August, 1 790, supra.
Tit. III, chap. IV, sec. II, art. 3, Constitution of Sept. 3, 1 79 x : "The
administrative functionaries ..
may not encroach upon the domain of
the judicial authorities." Art. 1 89, Constitution of the sth Fructidor, year III
(Aug. 22, 1 795) : "The administrative authorities
shall not interfere
with matters of judicial competence."
11 Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 3-14.
41 Duguit, Les transformations tlu droit public ( 1 9 2 1 ) ; Hauriou, Precis,
1 oth ed., p. 874, nth ed., p. 344·
'" Although in 1 806 the first Commission tlu contentieux was formed within
the council for the adjudication of administrative controversies. See Appendix,
pp. 1 6-1 8, for a detailed description of the Conseil d'Etat and other administra
tive courts.
40

•
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tive. The latter, on the theory of justice retenue, retained
power finally to decide all administrative controversies. In
I 849 the principle of justice deleguee was adopted with the
creation of an administrative court (section du contentieux)
within the Conseil d'Etat with final and exclusive j urisdiction
in administrative matters. Still later, in I 8 52, due to changing
political fortunes, the "court" once more lost its independence,
justice retenue was restored, and administrative justice once
more had its nominal source in the chief executive.
Nevertheless, the Conseil by way of precedent gradually
expanded its jurisdiction. By decree of November 2, I 8 64,
recourse to the Conseil d'Etat against acts of administrative
agents who had exceeded their powers was deliberately en
couraged, with the enactment of a statute reducing to an
almost negligible sum the costs connected with filing protests.
While political reasons had first begotten the postulate of
differentiation of administrative and judicial agencies, the
necessity for a central judicial control within the administra·
tive now made itself felt. This need was expressed by Leon
Aucoc, an outstanding writer and member of the Conseil, in
these words : "The government, upon which falls the respon
sibility for the mistakes of its agents, has a great interest that
all complaints which they may cause be brought before it ; for
the most minute grievances, when increasing in number, may
lead to serious discontent. There is then a sort of safety valve
which must ever be open."44 It should be observed that the
question whether this judicial control should be given to the
ordinary courts was at one time a subject of dispute.45 How- 
ever, the traditional doctrine of the differentiation of agencies,
aided by the weighty argument of the special fitness of ad
ministratively trained officials, caused the pendulum to swing
46
..

Aucoc, xst ed. ( x 869), Vol. x , p. 394, quoted by Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 258
Jacquelin, Les principes, p. 1 3 9 1 Duguit, article, 29 Pol. Sci. Q. 385 at

39Q-3 9 1 ·
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far toward administrative courts for the adjudication of con
troversies involving administrative acts.46
With the enactment of the law of May 24, r 8 72, the Conseil
d'Ihat47 became definitely established as an administrative
court, with plenary power of adjudication delegated to it.
Original jurisdiction has been conferred upon the court, as
well as appellate jurisdiction in the case of decisions of the
Conseils de prefecture48 and of other inferior administrative
courts49 which had original j urisdiction under various statutes.
It is an interesting fact that in the earlier stage of this de
velopment the decisions of the highest administrative agents,
the ministers, were exempt from the original jurisdiction of
the Conseil d'Etat. Under the doctrine of the ministre-juge
certain determinations of the ministers were deemed to be in
the nature of judicial pronouncements and therefore subject
only to appellate review in the Conseil d'Etat. Thus for some
time, these administrative officers continued to have combined
administrative and judicial powers, notwithstanding the ac
complished separation of functions within the administrative
organism.50
46 Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 8 7o H., 8 8 6 ; Bannard, Le Controle furi
dictionnel de I'administration ( r 9 34) , p. r 53 H. (Bibliotheque de l'institut
international de droit public, No. VI) ; Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. r,
p. 535·
•• See Appendix, below.
48 First established in the year VIII.
411 Appendix, below ; Lafe"iere, Vol. r, p. 2 1 5 H. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 2 7 ;
Duguit, article, 2 9 Pol. Sci. Q . 3 8 5 a t 3 89.
00 Lafe"iere, Vol. r, p. 450 H. ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes
de la puissance puhlique ( r 9 14), p. 54, note 2 ; Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp.
405, note r, 8 8 7, note ; Berthilemy, Traiti, pp. I I 07-I I 09·

APPENDIX
The most important administrative courts, under the system in force, are
the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseils de prefecture. The former is a court of
general jurisdiction and the latter are courts of limited j urisdiction. Waline,
Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif (1936), p. 5 9 H. ; Berthilemy,
Traite, p. 1 1 07 H.
The supreme administrative court is known as the Conseil d'Etat. But that
name has a far broader significance, which it may be well to sketch briefly. (For
a more detailed description, see Waline, pp. 5 9-7 2 ; Berthilemy, Traite,
pp. 1 47-1 5 6.)
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The Conseil d'Etat is also the administrative advisory council of the ministers.
In this capacity it advises the administration at the voluntary or statutory re
quest of the latter. Although the government is generally not bound by the
advice of the Conseil, this must be obtained preceding the promulgation of all
regulations/required under a statute. There are a certain number of other in- !.{.J·
stances where the obligation to request the advice of the Conseil is specifically
prescribed. On the other hand, in a few matters the law does not permit the
administration to take action contrary to the advice of the Conseil, as for in
stance in connection with the refusal of naturalization papers (under the special
conditions of art. 8, Civil Code) . Furthermore, the Conseil may be called upon
to give its advice or to prepare a draft of a statute which the administration in
tends to introduce. However, Waline (Manuel, p. 67) regrets that the Conseil
in fact is no longer consulted on proposed legislation. And again under specific
statutory provisions, the Conseil hears administrative appeals from determina
tions of inferior authorities.
For the performance of these administrative functions the Conseil d'Etat util
izes a large1 well-trained personnel. There are thirty conseillers en service
ordinaire, and thirty conseillers en service extraordinaire. The latter belong to
the various departments of the ministers and have a voice only in the delibera
tions concerning their respective departments. The ministers themselves may
participate in the discussions and deliberations of the affairs concerning their
individual ministries (departments), though actually they do not make use
of that right.
All matters coming before the Conseil (officially presided over by the "Keeper
of the Seal," who is also the Minister of Justice, but actually presided over by
the Vice-President) are prepared by the lower personnel, consisting of thirty
nine maitres des requites and forty-four "auditors." The latter are subdivided
into twenty auditors of the first class and twenty-four of the second class.
Beginning at the bottom, the second class auditors are selected by members
of the Conseil through competitive examinations of applicants twenty to twenty
six years old. They must be well trained in the law and are to form the "juristic
element" in the Conseil. (Waline, p. 61.) Auditors of the first class are ex
clusively taken from among the former, not less than twenty-five nor more
than thirty-four years of age. Three-fourths of the "masters," at least thirty
years old, must be recruited from among the first class auditors, and the re
mainder from administrative functionaries with at least ten years' service (thus
forming an element of mixed origin, scholars and practitioners) . (Waline,
p. 6z.) The thirty "ordinary councilors" must be at least forty years old and
must retire at seventy-five. Two-thirds of them must have been masters, and the
remaining third preferably former high officials of the administration. They
are nominated by the Council of Ministers. The thirty "extraordinary coun
cilors" are active high officials (directors) and are ex officio representatives
of their ministries in the Conseil. (Waline, p. 6z ; Berthtflemy, Traite, p. I 5I .)
The administrative work of the Conseil is assigned to the three administra
tive sections into which it is divided according to subject matter. (See the "de
cree" of July z4, I 934, modifying the organization of the Conseil d'Etat.) In
some matters two of the sections may act jointly, and again, other matters
(for example, matters of special importance, or at the request of a minister)
may come before the plenum (Assemblie genera/e) of the Conseil.
In addition to the administrative functions and the corresponding divisions
of the Conseil d'Etat, it has separate judicial functions; the latter are given to a
special judicial section known as the section du contentieux. It is this administra
tive court which is commonly and indiscriminately referred to as the Conseil
·
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d'Etat. The section comprises a presiding member and twelve Conseillers d'Etat
to these may be added four councilors from the adminis
trative sections. Twenty-eight masters and thirty auditors serve as commissaires
du gouvernement and rapporteurs to the eight subsections into which the section
is divided. According to importance, the cases will be heard and decided by
( I ) the assemblie pliniere du contentieux, i. e., the vice-president of the
Conseil d'Etat, the president of the judicial section, the presiding members of
the subsections, and three councilors from the administrative sections; ( z ) the
judicial section, i. e., its president and the presiding members of the subsections ;
( 3 ) one of the senior subsections {five to eight in number, and each composed of
two councilors and a master or an auditor) which specialize in routine mat
ters (pensions, elections, fiscal affairs, etc.) ; {4) two of the subsections com
bined. The individual subsections, having one to four members, have no power
of decision and hence only prepare a case for judgment. A subsection, or the
section, of its own motion or that of the vice-president, the section-president,
or the commissaire du gouvernement, refers the case before it to the judicial
section or the plenary assembly.
The reorganization of I 9 34 is criticized because of the reduction of the
judicial personnel, which is unfavorable to the expeditious handling of cases.
Also it admits the cumulation of administrative and judicial functions in case
of the four members which are recruited from the administrative sections.
However, no councilor may participate in the adjudication of a matter in
which he acted previously in an administrative capacity.
As to tenure, the members of the Conseil d'Etat are nominated and removable
by decree of the Council of Ministers. But actually they seem almost irremov
able. Waline {p. 66 ) refers to an attempt to recall the vice-president in I 9 z4
which the government abandoned under the pressure of public opinion.
The Conseils de prefecture have changed in structure materially with the
recent reforms. (Waline, p. 76. ) The laws ("decrees") of September 6 and z 6,
I 9z6, May 5, I 9 34, and July I 91 I 9 351 contributed greatly to improve their
standing as judicial bodies. Changes in the selection and a substantial reduction
of the administrative element in the personnel aided the purposes of their reor
ganization. The prefects are no longer members of these tribunals, which are
now composed of four councilors and a president, nominated by the Minister of
the Interior. The number of these Conseils has been reduced so that there is now
one to every three or four dipartements, instead of one for each. Since this tended
to place the courts at a greater distance from those seeking their protection,
the new law makes provision for a conseiller ditegue who goes from one de
partment seat to the other to adjudicate matters of lesser importance.
The councilors are divided into three classes. The third class is selected
through competitive examinations of law graduates. Three-fourths of the
second and first class members are recruited by advancements in the respective
lower classes.
The jurisdiction of these "inter-departmental councils of prefecture" is
limited by statute to specific controversies ; for instance, controversies arising
in connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation of public works,
direct taxes, etc.
There are a number of other administrative courts of special jurisdiction
(Waline, p. 8o ff.) : the judicial councils for the colonies ; the court of ac
counts, which audits and adjudicates all public accounts ; the special courts
for Alsace-Lorraine ; the Superior Council of Public Instruction, and the Coun
cils of Revision, determining the duty to do military service.
en service ordinaire;

CHAPTER II

Comparative Significance of the Separation
of Powers for Jurisdiction to Review

HE

Administrative Acts

doctrine of the separation of powers, like govern
mental theory in general, is subject to qualification
in its application. Conceivably, those who first ex
tolled its merits hoped that they had found a solid and im
movable foundation upon which an enduring form of govern
ment might safely be built. But if they did so h ope, they
misjudged the texture of their precept. In fact, the doctrine
has proved to be of extraordinary elasticity, giving way easily
to pressure and capable of ready adaptation to political, eco
nomic and social needs.
In France, the absolute separation of powers, as well as its
corollary, the attempted strict differentiation of the admin
istrative and judicial agencies, almost at the very beginning
were recognized as neither practical nor wholly desirable.
Moreover, the immediate political need for differentiation
vanished into a more and more remote past. C_ooperation,
rather than separation, of the departments of government
became a watchword.1 It is therefore not astonishing that
both the process of formation and the outline of the area in
which judicial and administrative action meet and overlap are
of a complicated pattern.

T

1 Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel fran�ais et compare, 7th ed.
( I 9 Z I ), Vol. x ., pp. 467-701 Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, zd ed.
( x 9 z 3 ) 1 Vol. z, pp. 514-4Z1 Vol. 31 p. z9ff. ; Duguit Etudes de droit pub
lic ( 1 9 0 I ) , Vol. z, p. z 8 x ff. ; Jeze, Les principes giniraux du droit adminis
tratif, 3d ed. ( x 9zs), pp. z s 7-58, z64-68, 309-x o ; Bertkilemy, Traiti
ilimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. x s-x6.
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The enactments of the revolutionary government embody
ing the postulate of absolute freedom of the administrative
agencies from interference by the courts left the administra
tive to judge its own actions.2 At the beginning this principle
was unaccompanied by the idea of administrative courts, but
in the course of time "judicial"3 protection against adminis
trative action emerged. The administration active, with a sys
tem of appeals within its hierarchy, became distinguished from
the juridiction administrative, i. e., the administrative courts.
It should be observed here that the 1 938 Report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American
Bar Association,4 citing Professor Bannard's treatise on the
droit administratif,5 does not do justice to the historical reason
for the "spirit of hostility [ of the civil courts] to administra
tive action." 6 The explanation offered in the committee's re
port seems to rest upon a misconception. For the French sys
tem, with now fully developed "judicial" review by special
courts, is not apt to arouse the "jealousy of courts manned by
judges" because "of any falling short of hearing both sides
fully." 7
With the development o f the new system of adjudicating
administrative controversies, and particularly under the in
fluence of the Conseil d'Etat, the principle of differentiation
2 Laferriere, Traite de Ia juridiction administrative et des recours conten
tieux ( 1 896) , Vol. 1, pp. 14, 1 85.

8 The use of the term "judicial" in connection with the administrative courts
is necessary to distinguish the judicially conducted review by these courts from
administrative review at the instance of the various administrative agencies them
selves. "Judicial review" under the French system therefore denotes not only
the reviewing function of the ordinary courts, but that of the administrative
courts as well. However, in order to avoid confusion, "judicial review" will be
used hereafter only in the sense in which it is understood in this country, i. e.,
review by the ordinary courts.
' 63 Rep. A . B. A . ( 1 9 3 8 ) 3 3 1 ff.
1 Bannard, Precis de droit administratif ( 1 9 3 5 ) , pp. I I o-I I (the American
Bar Association citation to pp. 79-80 is apparently to a different edition).
• 63 Rep. A . B . A . ( 1 9 3 8 ) 3 3 1 at 341 .

� Ibid.
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of agencies became attenuated. The forerunners of a changing
attitude have been dated as far back as I 8 o 6. 8 The memory
of prerevolutionary conditions gradually lost its force in
shaping policies, and this resulted directly in a relaxed inter
pretation of the separation of powers and its corollary. Conse
quently, the administrative determinations in some instances
ceased to be binding upon the ordinary courts, and in several
classes of cases cognizance of administrative acts has been
restored to those courts. The area of administrative jurisdic
tion contracted, and its contours became less rigid, as it came
to be recognized that the fact that an act was administrative
or originated with an administrative agency or had been per
formed in the public interest was not sufficient ground to with
draw that act completely from the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts. 9 Other factors must be present before the doctrine
of differentiated agencies becomes operative and reserves the
act for the administrative courts.
In its outward appearance the resultant French regime ad
ministratif differs materially from the administrative system
that has developed in the United States. In France fear of the
recurrence of prerevolutionary experiences caused an adop
tion of Montesquieu's idea of the separation of powers with
especial emphasis upon a strict differentiation of the adminis
trative and judicial agencies. Under the fundamental law, all
administrative action henceforth was exempt from inquiry by
the judicial courts. In time, a separation of the judicial from
the administrative functions took place within the administra
tive branch of the government through the organization of
administrative courts and the consequent distinction of the
8 See Hauriou, Precis /de droit administratif et de droit public, I oth ed.
( I 9 Z I ) 1 p. 8 741 uth ed. ( I 9 3 3 ) , p. 344·
• Aucoc, Confirences sur l'administration et le droit administratif, 3 d ed.
( I 8 8 s ) , Vol. ·l, pp. 4731 48q Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 4 7 I f£.; Hauriou, Precis,
1 oth ed., pp. 464-65, note 2, p. 874 ff. ; nth ed., pp. 459-60 ; Bertkilemy,
Traiti, pp. 23, I 09!)"" I I o6 ; Bannard, Precis, p. 1 50 ff. ; Waline, Manuel
ilimentaire de droit administratif ( 1 936), p. 42 ff.
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adminis·tration active from the juridiction administrative.

The decisions of the latter in reviewing the acts of the former,
however, are ''administrative acts" in the sense that they can
never be subject to attack in the ordinary courts. In other
words, the pronouncements of both sets of courts have iden
tical force and the same degree of finality.
In the United States the evolution of administrative law,
in so far as it depends upon the influence of the separation
of powers, looks back upon a different history. At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, its framers were apprehen
sive, not of past experience, but of the dangers lurking in the
"novel experiment of popular rule on a large scale."10 In the
-debates of the Federal Convention of r 7 8 7 great stress was
laid upon the doctrine of separated powers as expounded by
Montesquieu. But the proponents of the doctrine extolled its
merits as a means of protection against legislative encroach
ments upon fundamental rights of liberty and property. Thus
the separation of powers, though derived from the same philo
sophical source, was endowed with a meaning divergent from
that attributed to it contemporaneously in France. Removed
from its native environment, no difficulty was encountered
in giving it a construction favorable to the postulate of equal
dignity of the . three powers. The judiciary could be erected
into a coordinate branch of government in order that it might
- function as a check upon each of the other branches. The in
cidental power of the ordinary courts in this country to re
view administrative action became as necessary and inevitable
a constitutional mandate as the principle of judicial noninter
ference in France.
10 See the comprehensive treatment by Malcom P. Sharp, "The Classical
American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Powers,' " 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. ( 1 935)
3 8 5; Professor Sharp very clearly demonstrates that the main objective was to
guard against legislative tyranny (pp. 393, 396, 3 9 7, 408, 420, 434-43 5 ) .
See also Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Theory," 4 7 Yale L. ]. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 5 3 8 at 541 ff. ; Report of the Special Commit
tee on Administrative Law, 63 Rep. A . B. A. ( 1 93 8 ) 3 3 1 at 3 5 2 ff.
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The basic considerations, therefore, which led to the adop
tion of Montesquieu's theory in the two countries envisaged
the solution of widely differing political problems. In Francei
one of the most pressing concerns was to make the adminis- 1
trative independent of the judiciary, while this country felt \
the need of an independent judiciary to check legislative ex-: ; )
cesses.11 In each instance the adoption of the doctrine of the �.
separation of powers was accompanied by an interpretation j
which fitted it to the particular demands. In France this re- 1
sulted directly in a denial to the ordinary courts of all power ,
to interfere with administrative action. Conversely, in the •
United States a nominally coordinated, and in fact supreme,
judiciary was assigned a task which of necessity carried with it
the power to scrutinize the acts of all administrative agencies.-'
'
However, comparison does not for this reason come to an
impasse. In the constant flux of political conditions, the orig
inal content of the doctrine of the separation of powers,
both here and in France, has changed imperceptibly.
Through the formulation of exceptions and the devising of
distinctions it has been modified and readapted to changing
conditions. The intended strict differentiation of the adminis- •
trative and the judiciary in France very soon became attenu
ated. Gradually the ordinary courts, even though only in a
limited sense, returned to the adjudication of acts originating
with administrative officials and agencies, as will be demon
strated in detail later. Similarly, the rigid conception in the
United States of three independent departments, exercising
the functions named after the three corresponding powers, also
had to give way to more workable compromises. Aided by
strict interpretation, "we had carried to the extreme a system
of judicial interference with administr tion. Something very

/

11 At the same time a strong executive was favored, not in regard to the ju
dicial power, but to serve with the latter to counteract the power of the legis
lature. Sharp, article, z U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 8 5·
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like a paralysis of administration by judicial order or judicial
review was an everyday spectacle."12 Paradoxically a situa
tion was thus created which was closely analogous to the very
conditions which the differentiation of agencies in France had
been instituted to combat. A reaction proportioned to the in
creasing needs for administrative handling of new social and
economic problems was inevitable. In turn, the ensuing in
crease in administrative activity has brought forth insistence
upon a reinterpretation of the separation of powers doctrine
in regard to administrative agencies so as to require "a segre
gation of their judicial functions." 13 Unmistakably, divergent
forces are constantly at work which necessitate sporadic inter
pretative readjustments in order to balance accrued surpluses
or deficiencies in administrative and judicial powers. These
competitive forces are the interests of the public, on one hand,
and private interests, concerned with the protection of per
sonal liberty and property rights, on the other.14 In the
United States the separation of powers in its constitutional
setting has placed the collective interest represented by the
administration at a disadvantage. In France the basic situa
tion is reversed, and indeed the French courts have continued
to reaffirm the differentiation of judicial and administrative
agencies as originally conceived. But neither the privileged
position of the administration in France nor the far-reaching
powers of the constitutional courts in this country have with
stood the pressure of certain identical political and social
forces. Jurisdiction to review administrative acts has had to be
lll Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Rep. A. B. A.
(1938) 3 3 1 at 353-·
lll Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61 Rep. A . B. A.
(1936) 720 at 725, and quotation at 7Jo: "In this situation the committee
feels justified in looking beyond the particular turn given to the doctrine by the
Supreme Court decisions, and in appealing to what seem to be its underlying
implications and its natural corollaries for the sound and efficient administra
tion of justice."
u Fuchs, article, 47 Yale L. J. 538 at 559·
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redefined, and it will be the object of the following chapters
to sketch the evolution and to survey the meandering course
of the imaginary line of demarcation separating the spheres
of administrative and judicial action in France.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the jurisdictional
details themselves, it is necessary that an account be taken of
the machinery which has been devised for the enforcement of
the constitutional mandate of separated powers. Perhaps the
thought of an independent mechanism for maintaining the
differentiation of judicial and administrative authority does
not so readily occur in the United States. The constitutional
scheme which appointed the courts its guardians thereby sub
jected not only legislative but also administrative acts to the
scrutiny of those courts with respect to all constitutional in
consistencies. The limits of their own powers in regard thereto
are consequently self-determined. Not so in France. There
the prohibition "to interfere in any manner" with the ad
ministration rendered the ordinary courts wholly unfit to en
force administrative independence. Still, a mechanism for
safeguarding it was essential.
The Conftit. At the outset of the new regime, the solution
of the problem of securing the administrative against antici
pated usurpations by the judiciary was fashioned after the
procedure which formerly had served the Crown. The latter
could, and often did, withdraw from the courts15 controversies
in which it was interested. Thus, the administrative was em- powered by legislation to 'divest the courts of matters al
legedly falling within the administrative jurisdiction.16 The
power was first lodged in the executive, although at various
times it was coupled with a requirement of concurrence by the
111

By way of evocations, supra, chap. I, at note 3 1 .
Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif et de droit public, 1 oth ed. (1911),
p. 879, uth ed. (1933), p. 336 ff., and bibliography there; Berthilemy, Traite
elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. (1933), p. 1 086 ff. ; Bannard,
Precis de droit administratif (1935), p. 1 64.
18
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legislature, or of advice by the Conseil d'Etat, which later
became the sole judge of j urisdictional conflicts.17 Further
developments, in which abuses of this power by the govern
ment 18 played a part, ultimately led 19 to the organization of
a neutral agency with exclusive jurisdiction to determine such
conflicts.
The Tribunal des conflits. The Tribunal des conflits, which
has thus been entrusted with the resolution of jurisdictional
controversies, has the appearance of an impartial tribunal,
being composed of judges recruited in equal numbers from
among the members of both the administration ( Counseil
d'Etat) and judiciary (Cour de cassation), and presided over
by the Minister of Justice. Nevertheless, it continues to rest
on the theory of a unilateral protection of the administration
against the civil courts. This is evident in the fact that the
Tribunal des conflits acts only at the instance of certain ad
ministrative officials, the prefects. These officers alone can
elever le conflit, i. e., resort to the Tribunal for the purpose
of divesting � judicial court of jurisdiction. There is no cor
responding right in favor of the judicial authorities. 20
The unilateral right to assert a conflict of jurisdiction and
the ensuing judicial determination of the limits of competency
of the respective judicial or administrative agencies are the
primary safeguards afforded by the French system for the
principle of the differentiation of agencies. Protests by the
17 Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten
tieux, 2d ed. (I 896), Vol. I, pp. 2I-2 5 ; Aucoc, Conferences sur /'administra
tion et le droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 8 8 s), Vol. I, p. 709 ff. ; Ducrocq, Cours
de droit administratif, 7th ed. (I 89 8), Vol. 3, p. 296 ff. ; Jacquelin, Les principes
dominants du contentieux administratif (I 899), p. 54 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite,
p. I08 7 i Laroque, "Les conflits d'attributions" 49 R. D. P. (I9J2) 5 ; Appleton,
Traite elimentaire du contentieux administratif (I 9 2 7), p. 5o ff.

"' Infra, chap. VIII.
19 ln I 849 and again in 1 872.
"" Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., pp. 879-88o, uth ed., pp. 336-3 7 ; Berthilemy,
Traite, p. 1088. Cf. also Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. (1923 ),
Vol. 3, pp. 53-58.
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prefects concerning jurisdiction over controversies pending in
the ordinary courts give rise to what are known as "positive
conflicts."21 A second sanction of the differentiation of agen
cies exists in the requirement that the highest j udicial and
administrative tribunals, i. e., the Cour de cassation and the
Conseil d'Etat respectively, must of their own motion annul
the acts of inferior agencies of the respective hierarchies when
ever the acts of the one constitute encroachments upon the
jurisdiction of the other. Furthermore, the j urisdiction of the
Tribunal des conflits may be invoked by the parties to a suit
for the determination of "negative conflicts." This type of
conflict arises when both the administrative and the judicial
courts have declined to take cognizance of a controversy.22
In such cases the office of the Tribunal des conflits is to pro
tect litigants against a denial of justice. In deciding in these
circumstances to which court its "mandamus" should be ad
dressed, the Tribunal again acts as the custodian of the differ
entiation of agencies, the principle by which its decisions must
be guided. Comparatively recently,23 the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal des conflits has been extended to conflits de decision.
The enabling statute confers power upon the Tribunal to
make an independent decision on the merits of any case in
which an administrative and an ordinary court have rendered
inconsistent decisions. Previously, such situations actually re
sulted in a denial of justice. 24
The foregoing analysis presents three aspects of the doc
trine of the separation of powers which are of primary im••

Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 472 ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. Io8 8 ; Bannard, Precis,
Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif { I 936), p. 36.
.. Appleton, p. 79; Berthilemy, Traite, p. I 096; Bannard, Precis, p. I 6S ;
Waline, Manuel, p. 40.

p. I 62 ;
08

Law of April 20, I 932.
Bannard, Pricis, pp. I 66-67 ; Bannard, Le controle juridictionnel de
!'administration (I 934), p. I 751 note I {Bibliotheque de l'institut international
de droit public, No. VI) ; Waline, Manuel, p. 40 ; Appleton, Supp., pp. u-I 3·
See Matter of Rosay D. H. I 933·336.
••
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portance from the viewpoint of jurisdiction to review ad
ministrative acts. First, the historical and political atmosphere
determining the original content of the doctrine of separate
powers ; second, the resultant relation of the administrative
and judicial departments of government ; and, thirdly, the
mechanism designed both to maintain and to adjust the con
stitutional scheme under changing conditions. The review
powers of the French courts will now be developed in the
light of these factors.

PART II
THE REVIEW POWERS
OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE

COURTS

IN

RRANCE

CHAPTER III

Recourse for Excess of Power
A. HISTORY OF ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN THE
CONSEIL D'ETAT

I

N France the Conseil d'Etat alone has power to annul
administrative acts ; 1 it alone can dispense the remedy
known as the recours pour exces de pouvoir,2 which, if
successfully prosecuted, leads to the setting aside of the administrative determination of which complaint is made.3
Among the available methods of obtaining relief from ad
ministrative action/ this method of direct attack5 is peculiar
to the French system.
The fact that petitions for annulment of administrative de
cisions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the highest
administrative court is significant, not only in the light of the
doctrine of differentiated administrative and judicial agen
cies, but also in view of the evolution of the remedy itself.
The recours pour exces de pouvoir is not, as might be sup'French law commonly distinguishes four different objects with a view to
which the administrative courts may exercise their jurisdiction : annulment
(contentieux de l'annulation) , (2) review on the merits (contentieux de pleine
juridiction), ( 3) interpretation of administrative acts (contentieux de l'inter
pretation) and (4) application of penal sanctions (contentieux de la repres
sion) . See the analysis of this classification by Professor Waline in article, 52
R. D. P. (1935) 205.
" There is one unimportant exception under the law of May 5, 1934. See
Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif (1 936) , p. I I4.

• Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten
tieux, 2d ed. (1 896), Vol. 2, p. 391 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif,
r oth ed. (1921), p. 420 ff. ; uth ed. (1933), p. 401 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti
elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. (1933), p. x u6 ff. ; Bannard, Le
controle juridictionnel de l'administration (1934), p. 167 ff. (Bibliotheque de
l'institut international de droit public, No. VI) ; Bannard, Precis de droit
administratif ( 1 9 35), p. 1 9 2 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. I 1 5 ff. ; Appleton, Traiti
elimentaire du contentieux administratif (1927), p. 525 ff., Supp. (1936) ,

p. 8 6 ff.
' See Dareste, Le voies de
( 1 9 1 4) .
• Dareste, p. 288 ff.
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posed, a method of attack originally created by statute as an
integral part of the post-revolutionary scheme of public ad
ministration. On the contrary, it was essentially developed
through precedent in the Conseil d'Etat, proceeding much
like a court of equity.6 In a sense, the evolution of the remedy
was completed in I 872 with the passage of article 9 of the
law of May 24th of that year giving legislative sanction to
the jurisdiction of the Conseil over petitions for annulment.
On the other hand, there are several earlier enactments which
had mediately influenced and contributed to the development
of the recours.1
Before the Revolution, the theory of justice retenue per
mitted the chief executive to set aside acts of subordinate ad
ministrative officers, and in doing so he often relied upon the
advice of his council, the Conseil du roi.8 It has been observed
in an earlier chapter that the theory of justice retenue, with
one exception,9 prevailed until I 8 72, and it must also be re
membered that the Conseil d'Etat did not become an inde
pendent court until several decades after the Revolution.
Thus, in its capacity as an advisory body, it could in the name
of the chief executive invalidate acts of inferior agencies which
had exceeded their powers. During this period the Conseil
d'Etat, as the appointed guardian of the differentiation of
agencies, was therefore equipped with a double-edged
weapon. Through the exercise of its jurisdiction over con
. flicts 10 it could abate usurpations by the ordinary courts, and
at the same time it possessed the power to annul the acts of its
own subordinates, primarily in order to keep them within the
limits constitutionally set to their powers.11
• Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 7-1 8, Vol. z, p. 40:t ff. ; Bertkilemy, Traite p.
Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 9 z ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, nth ed., p . 406.
• Laferriere, Vol. z, pp. 4oz-4o6.

1 n6 ;

Supra, chap I, p. 9·
Supra, chap I, p. 15.
10 Supra, chap II, p. z6.
u As to technique, the Conseil d'Etat has largely paralleled the Cour de
cassation in matters of excess of power by the judicial authorities. Laferriere,
Vol. z, pp. 397-402.
8

•

RECOURSE FOR EXCESS OF POWER

33

Strictly speaking, annulment by the Conseil d'Etat, prior
to its establishment as an administrative court, was not a ju
dicial appraisal but an administrative disapproval12 by the
highest administrative body of the determinations of inferior
officials. The original character of the recourse for excess of
power was that of a nonjudicial, administrative appeal, a re
cours hierarchique.13 Even at the present time, where the
recours is taken to a judicial body, i. e., to a modern adminis
trative court, it still partakes of some of its former nature.
However, it differs from the recours hierarchique14 in that it
can lead only to the annulment, not to the reformation, of the
act attacked. In this latter respect the recourse for excess of L.
power is a judicial appeal as it is understood in this country.15
B.

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF THE
RECOURSE FOR EXCESS OF POWER
I.

Grounds for and Nature of the A ppeal

A recourse to the Conseil d'Etat demanding the annulment
of an administrative determination can be validly formulated
by anyone whose· legitimate' interests are directly and ad
versely affected thereby. The Conseil d'Etat, through con
tinued extensive interpretation, has gradually broadened the
availability of the remedy.16 The grounds upon which it may
12

For the specific reason of excess of power.

"' Laferriere, Vol. z, p. 4 1 3 ; Dareste, p. 304 ff.
" Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 446 ff. ; Dareste, p. z89 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed.,
p. Io6 ff., uth ed., p. So ff. Hauriou (ibid.) further distinguishes the recours
hierarchique from the recours gracieux. The latter is the complaint lodged with

an authority regarding its own action, and the term emphasizes the discretion of
that authority to reconsider its action.
"' Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., (I 9oS) :ti I U. S. :t i O ; Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., (I930) z8I U. S. 464.
"' Waline, Manuel, p. I 2o ff. See also Laferriere, Vol. z, p. 436; Hauriou,
Precis, Ioth ed., p. 436 ff., nth ed., p. 4z4 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. Io3o;
Appleton, p. 554 ff., Supp., p. 87 ff. ; Bonnard, Precis, p. zo2 ff.
Although a mere interest nominally will not support a direct attack upon
an administrative determination in this country, some of the asserted proprietary
rights which have sufficed for the judicial invalidation of zoning ordinances
present a fair analogy. Cf. Nectow v, City of Cambridge, ( I 9:t8) z77 U. S. I 8l•
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be prosecuted are collectively designated as "excess of power"
and are classified as : (a) want of statutory authority (incom
petence) , (b) disregard of statutory formalities (vice de
forme), (c) violation of rules of law (violation de la loi),
and (d) abuse of power (detournement de pouvoir) .17
The control over administrative acts through the power
to annul, although judicial in form and effect, must neverthe
less be viewed as exercised chiefly in the interests of adminis
trative efficiency. In the hands of an administrative court it is
not a control in the sense of a check upon the power of one
branch of government by another. The administrative de
partment itself finally adjudicates the validity of determina
tions which its agents have made. If they have exceeded their
powers, the actions of the administration active are censured
by way of annulment.18 The dual purpose of the recourse for
excess of power, envisaging both the promotion of adminis
trative efficiency and the safeguarding of private interests,
has interesting consequences. Even though the proceeding can
be instituted only by a private party seeking protection against
an allegedly injurious act, the annulment which may ensue
operates erga omnes.19-!� proceeding is directed against the
act itself, thus being in rem and not against a person.20 Indeed,
the adversely affected interest which is required to support
a recourse is not the primary concern of the administrative,
although this prerequisite serves to eliminate from considera
tion complaints not made in good faith.21 The relief afforded
by an annulment is incidental.
17 Lafe"iere, Vol. 2, p. 496 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 448 ff., 1 2th
ed., p. 424 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 1 1 36 ff. ; Appleton, p. 591 ff., Supp.,
p. 90 ff. ; Bannard, Precis, p. 2 1 6 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 140 ff.
18 There is a marked trend to broaden the use of the recourse for excess of
power as a means of judicial censure by the highest administrative court of
illegal acts of the administration active. See Appleton, p. 596; Alibert, note
accompanying two decisions (Plet and Perignon) of the Conseil d'Etat re
ported in S. 1936·3·97, condensed ii{54 R. D. P. (1937) 146.
"' Laferriere, Vol. 2, pp. 568, 573 ; Hauriou, Precis, IOth ed., p. 462 .
.. Dareste, p. 307 ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 414, 1 2th ed., p. 394 ;
Berthilemy, Traite, p. I 1 3 8.
11 Berthilemy, Traite, p. I IJ I .
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In keeping with the "impersonal" nature of annulment pro
ceedings, an informal written protest by the party prosecuting
the recourse is sufficient, representation by counsel is dispensed
with, and the costs are negligible. 22 On the other hand, the
recourse for excess of power is not available to an interested
party to whom a concurrent remedy, a "parallel recourse," is
open.23 Administrative appeals (recour;);,{e;;;i;-;h q;es) are
not concurrent remedies in this sense, and therefore annul
ment by the Conseil d'Etat and strictly administrative relief
in respect to the same determination are not mutually ex
clusive.24 Conversely, a recourse for excess of power may be
had without first exhausting the administrative appeals ; or,
as the principle is usually stated, the former remedy is open
omisso medio. In other words, the recourse for excess of
power may, but need not, be an appeal from a decision re
viewing the original determination of an inferior administra
tive agency.25
22 Berthelemy, Traite, p. 1 1 3 8 ; Hauriou, Precis, xoth ed., p. 414, nth ed.,
p. 394·
"" The recours paraltele must he a complete remedy in an administrative court
other than the Conseil d'Etat, or in a civil court; a mere possibility of collateral
attack by way of defense to a prosecution is insufficient. In this respect there has
also been a growing tendency to enlarge the use of the recourse for excess of
power. The obstacle of a concurrent remedy has been minimized by requiring
that it must afford relief at least equivalent to that flowing from annulment.
The rule is obviously comparable to the principle by which equity may interfere
where there is no adequate remedy at law. Waline, Manuel, pp. q6-4o. See
also Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 474 ff. ; Dareste, p. 423 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, xoth ed.,
p. 444 ff. ; Berthelemy, Traite, pp. 1 1 3 2-3 3 ; Bannard, Precis, pp. 209-I I .
.. Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 443, note 2 .
.. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 45 1 ; Dareste, p. 3o6 ; Hauriou, Precis, nth ed.,
p. 409·
The recourse for excess of power must be begun within two months from the
date of actual or constructive notice of the determination sought to be annulled
by the interested party. On the other hand, administrative appeals are not limited
in point of time. However, the latter must be entered within the two-month
period if the right to the former is to be preserved. In this case judicial annul
ment may he applied for within two months after the disposition of the hierarchic
recourse. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 468 ; Bertnelemy, Traiti, p. I I 33 ff. ; Hauriou,
Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 442, uth ed., p. 429 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 1 32 ff. See also the
note by Alibert, accompanying a decision of the Conseil d'Etat of January 1 0,
1 930, S. 1 930·3·41, 48 R. D. P. (193 1 ) 1 63, concerning certain methods of ,�
1f:
circumventing the two-month limit for the recours en annulation.

36

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

2.

The Subject Matter of the A ppeal

An attack in the form of a recourse for excess of power can
be directed only against an administrative determination or
decision. French doctrine, insisting that administrative agen
cies having determining powers26 must always proceed by way
of "decisions which are susceptible of immediate execution,"27
has developed the concept of decisions executoires.28 This
term is but an expression of the synthetic understanding of the
administrative process. It embraces expressed or implied find
ings and conclusions preceding the determination,29 notice of
which must be given to all interested parties.30 Hauriou31 in
familiar language explains the decision executoire as ( 1 ) re
quiring administrative agencies to deliberate before taking
action and ( 2 ) furnishing the necessary foundation for court
review. These decisions executoires, as manifestations of the
sovereign power by which "the administrative publicly as
serts its right and its intention to proceed in a stated man
ner,"32 are administrative acts par excellence. In other words,
they are declar�!i_<:>_ns_ of policy, which, under the principle of
differentiatecC;gencies, ar� pr-otected against any interference
by the ordinary courts. The recourse for excess of power, es
sentially designed for the annulment of administrative de
terminations, thus falls peculiarly within the exclusive
province of the administrative courts.
28 These include the chief executive, the ministers, prefects and underprefects;
departmental councils and commissions; municipal councils and the mayors.
111 Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 393 ff., uth ed., p. 371 ff., and cases cited
.. Hauriou, ibid. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 439 ff. See also Laferriere, Vol. z,
p. 4Z7 ff.
•• The usual form of decision is a written order, although it may be verbal
only and transmitted by telephone. Waline, Manuel, pp. 44o-41, and cases
cited.
80 Notice must be personal or by publication; constructive notice is rarely
deemed sufficient. Waline, Manuel, p. 131 and cases cited.
81 Precis, 1oth ed., p. 393 ff., uth ed., p. 371 ff.
"" Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 394·
•
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It should be observed, however, that even annulment by
the Conseil d'Etat is in a sense considered as judicial inter
ference with administration. Recourses for excess of power
therefore ordinarily do not operate as a supersedeas. Prompt
administrative action must not be impeded, and only in ex
ceptional situations in which administrative expediency and
private interest coincide are annulment proceedings per
mitted to stay the execution of the order attacked.33
83 Waline, Manuel, p. 448. In time it was found that administrative officials,
in order to escape the censure implicit in the annulment of their acts, avoided
the formality of issuing executory orders. To safeguard against this subterfuge,
the requirement of the decision executoire has been fortified with a double sanc
tion. ( I ) Administrative officials taking affirmative action without observing
the prescribed formality have been made personally liable for the consequences ;
of the act. Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 393, uth ed., p. 3 7 1, and cases cited.
(2) If in case of action solicited by a private party the administrative agency
disregards the application, petition or complaint, such inaction is deemed
equivalent to an express rejection, provided it has continued over a period of
four months. Art. 3 of the law of July 1 7-1 9, 1900 ; see also art. 7 of the de
cree of Nov. 2, I 864. The implied negative decision then becomes subject to re
course for excess of power without any limitation in point of time. Laferriere,
Vol. 2, pp. 429, 469 ; Berthelemy, p. I I 2 J ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed.,
p. 408 ff., 442, uth ed., p. 386 ff., 430 ; Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 89�0. The
effect of the latter provision is particularly salutary where a hierarchic appeal
has been taken after the expiration of the two months within which a recours
pour exces de pouvoir might have been instituted. Except for the statute, inaction
by the administrative agency to which the appeal has been addressed would
leave the aggrieved party without remedy, since neither mandamus nor manda
tory injunctions are possible under the French system. On the other hand, if the
hierarchic superior confirms the action complained of, no new recourse lies
to the Conseil d'Etat. However, if the order appealed from is revoked or
modified, the disposition made constitutes a new decision which may be at
tacked for excess of power. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 462.
Compare the situation in this country where the aggrieved party has a remedy
in the federal courts if administrative relief is deliberately delayed or withheld,
as in the case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, ( 1 923) 261 U. S. 290,
making an exception to the rule of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., (1908)

2 I I U. S. 2 I O.

CHAPTER IV

Review of Administrative Acts on the Merits
THE ORDINARY RECOURSE

A

THOUGH the recourse for excess of power is an
outstanding feature of the French administrative
system, the most common method of obtaining relief
from administrative action is the prosecution of an ordinary
action against the particular agency, with inquiry by a court
into the law and facts, and adjudication on the merits of the
case. Unlike the former remedy, the latter has no character
istics which automatically limit jurisdiction to the adminis
trative courts, and only a rigid interpretation of the differ
entiation of agencies could entirely oust the ordinary courts
from entertaining such actions. This form of attack upon the
acts of administrative agencies, generally known as the recours
de pleine juridiction/ resembles closely a civil action, and it
is therefore often referred to as the recours ordinaire.2 A mere
interest is no longer sufficient, and the violation of a righe
must be shown if the recourse is to be successful. Moreover, a
judgment for the plaintiff may carry reformation of the act of
which complaint is made, as well as indemnity or restitution.
1 Laferriere, Traiti de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten
tieux, 2d ed. ( I 896), Vol. I, p. I S fi., Vol. 2, p. I I S fi. ; Hauriou, Precis de
droit administratif et de droit public, x oth ed. ( I 92 I ) , pp. 463 fi., 8 7 5, uth ed.
( I 9 3 3 ) , pp. 458 fi., 345 ; Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit admin
istratif 1 3th ed. ( I 9 3 3 ) , p. n 2o fi. ; Bannard, Precis de droit administratif
{ I 9 3 5 ) , p. I 83 fi. ; Waline, Manuel ilimentaire de droit administratif ( I 936),
{l. I I 3 fi•
• Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., p. 464, uth ed., p. 459·
• Berthilemy, Traiti, pp. I I 2 1-1 1 23.
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A. THEORETICAL BASIS OF JURISDICTION
1.

Authoritative A cts and A cts of Management

It was inevitable that a complex situation should have
arisen as soon as the doctrine of exclusive administrative ad
judication was abandoned. In other words, the recognition
that the differentiation of agencies did not, or should not, re
quire the indiscriminate exclusion of the ordinary courts wher
ever action originating with an administrative agency was in
volved, immediately called for a basis upon which j urisdiction
could be predicated. A solution was found in construing the
legislation of 1 790 and the year III as comtemplating nothing
more than that the judicial courts should be barred from tak
ing cognizance of acts performed in the exercise of delegated
sovereign power.4 It has been said that the administrative,
representing sovereignty, acts by commanding, regulating or
prohibiting, as a superior would in his relations with subordi
nates. To this extent the judicial department, itself repre
senting sovereignty, might be the equal of the administrative
but not its superior. 5 Acts of this type, but for the existence
of administrative courts, could not under the French system
be subj ect to "judicial" review.6 However, not all actions of
administrative officials are of this kind. In performing their
duties administrative officials must often resort to forms of
action which are common to private intercourse. This is the
classical distinction which the French have made between au
thoritative acts (actes de puissance publique or actes d'auto
rite), and acts of management ( actes de gestion) .7 The notion
prevailed that the ordinary courts should be left competent
• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 477 H.
• Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, :zd ed. ( I 92 I ) , Vol. I , p. 441 H.,
Vol. :z, p. 5 2 1 H.
• Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 1 00.
• Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 484 H. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. I I oo.

-
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. to adjudicate controversies arising from transactions which do
not differ from similar dealings between private individuals.
In the case of a recourse for excess of power, the act attacked
is always of the authoritative type. 8 On the other hand, an
ordinary recourse may involve one or the other form of ad
ministrative action, so that the question of jurisdiction be
comes acute. In dealing with the question, the basic jurisdic
tional rule, whose foremost exponent was Laferriere,9 seemed
clearly indicated by the classification of administrative acts
as authoritative acts and acts of management. Accordingly
'all actes de puissance publique should belong to the adminis
trative courts as a matter of right, while all actes de gestion
automatically would come within the cognizance of the ordi
nary courts. In other words, in case of the former, jurisdiction
can only exceptionally be given to the civil courts, while juris
diction over the latter cannot be withdrawn from these courts
except by statute.10 These principles have retained much of
their fundamental importance, although later doctrine, under
the pressure of the increase in volume and complexity of ad
ministrative tasks, has drifted away from them in search of
new criteria. However, the old mode of determining jurisdiction has never been wholly abandoned, and even contem
porary writers defend it rigorously as the only logical line
of demarcation, notwithstanding divergent developments
over a long period of time.11

.__

2. The Public Service Criterion
With the modern expansion of governmental activity and
its growing importance in the solution of social and economic
Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 87 s, uth ed., p. 344·
Laferriere's treatise on administrative jurisdiction continues to have great
authority and is frequently referred to by the courts in modern times, even
though it is out of date and does not reflect the developments since I 8g6.
]J) Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 484-485 ; cf. Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif,
7th ed. ( I 897), Vol. z, p. I O ff.
n See Bertkilemy, Traiti, pp. 24-25, note I, I I oo, note I ; Waline, Manuel,
P· 43·
•

•
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problems, the concept of service public12 became a factor
in determining the limits of the administrative and ordinary
jurisdictions. It was introduced in the latter part of the last
century, and, without superseding the former line of de
limitation, it has had a dominating influence on the interpreta
tion of the differentiation of agencies until the most recent
times. The public service factor modifies the older rule hyi
claiming for the administrative jurisdiction not only all acts
of authority13 but also all acts of management in so far as
they are directly connected with the performance of a public :
service.14 This reinterpretation of the principle of differenti:
ated agencies in France runs closely parallel with the tend
ency to enlarge administrative finality in this country, and
the real reason must be looked for in the greater aptitude of
an administratively trained personnel 15 to deal with technical
administrative problems.16
10 The term "public service," as used in France, is a collective mode of
reference to the various governmental functions or duties to the public which
must be performed through the administrative machinery for the maintenance
and furtherance of public safety and security, public health and order, and pub
lic welfare in general. Appleton, Traite elementaire du contentieux adminis
tratif (I 9 z 7 ) , p. I I 4, gives the following concise definition : "U n service public
est done un moyen, organise par les pouvoirs publics, de satisfaire socialement
un besoin general par des procidis propres au droit administratif." This
may be translated : "A public service, therefore, is a method provided by the
state for the satisfaction of general social needs through proper administrative
channels." Berthilemy ( Traite, p. z66) classifies the services as ( I ) essential
services, comprising the police for the maintenance of public health and order,
national defense, and the management of state-owned property (p. z67 ff.) ;
( zd) optional services, supplementing nonexistent or insufficient private initia
tive, including regulation of transportation, mining, forestry, agriculture, in
dustry and commerce, public schools, encouragement and conservation of art
and art treasures, social security (p. 760 ff.) . Finances (budget and taxation)
are treated as "ways and means" under a separate heading (p. 1 029 ff.) .
Cf. Hauriou, Pricis, 1 0th ed., pp. 25, 467 ff., uth ed., p . 64 ff.
"' Cf. the decision of the Tribunal des conflits, in Sagot du Vauroux v.
Fazuilhe, Rec. I9o6.8o3.
,. Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 54-x ss.
u See Appendix, pp. I 6-x 8, supra.
18
Bannard, Pricis, p. 1 5 2 ; cf. Landis, "Administrative Policies and the
Courts," 47 Yale L. J. 5 1 9 at 529, 5 3 5 ; Dickinson, Administrative Justice and
the Supremacy of the Law ( 1 92 7 ) , pp. q-x 5 ; Freund, Administrative Powers
over Persons and Property ( I 9 2 8 ) , p. n ff.
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Since the inj ection of the criterion of public service into the
jurisdictional issue in France, the guiding principles have been
formulated thus : ( I ) The adjudication of all controversies
arising from the performance and functioning of the public
services must be left to the administrative courts, irrespective
of whether the administrative acts involved are authoritative
or managerial. ( 2) All acts of management not connected
with the functioning of a public service come under the juris
diction of the ordinary courts. These rules have become sub
ject to exceptions founded on both statute and precedent.17
However, it is interesting to observe that the late Professor
Hauriou/8 who often anticipated future trends, adopted a
new terminology in the I 933 ed,ition of his treatise. Relin
quishing public service as the pivotal factor, he distinguished
gestion publique from gestion privee, i. e., public management
from private management. This may well be taken to indicate
a return to the classical juxtaposition of puissance publique
and gestion. Or perhaps this latter distinction has always
dominated. It would indeed be possible to say that so-called
acts of management, through intimate connection with the
performance of a public service, become impregnated with
soveretgn power.
B. J UDICIAL INTERPRETATION
I.

The Rule of the Blanco Case

The line intended to separate the administrative from the
judicial sphere of influence, and developed by the courts on
the basis of the foregoing distinctions, is marked by a number
of important decisions.
11Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 875 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 1 00 ff. ;
Bannard, Precis, p. 1 54 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 47 ; Appleton, p. 1 1 4 ff., Supp.,
p. 1 6.
18 Precis, nth ed., p. 345 ff., 1 064 ff..
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The first milestone in the survey is the famous decision
in the Blanco case/9 decided by the Tribunal des conflits in
1 8 73. Agnes Blanco, a minor, had been seriously injured by
a wagon pushed from a government tobacco warehouse into
the street by four employees. The father of the minor insti
tuted an action for damages in the civil court against the four
employees and against the state. The prefect of the district
asserted the existence of a conflict, denying the j urisdiction
of the civil court in a matter of responsibility of the state for
mistakes of its agents20 in connection with a public service.
The opinion 21 of the commissaire du gouvernement (David)
pointed out that, up to the time of this conflict, the Conseil
d'Etat, representing the attitude of the administrative, and the
Cour de cassation, representing that of the judiciary, had per
sistently and firmly adhered to contradictory views. The opin
ion then proceeds to give a minute and excellent analysis of
the principal issue at stake and of the applicable doctrines. It
had been conceded by the Cour de cassation thae2 the ordi1" Blanco v. l'Etat, (Feb. 8, I 8 7 3 ) D. I 8 7 3 ·J.2o, S. I 8 73.2.I 53 ; see also
subsequent proceeding in Rec. I 8 74.4 I 6. See Laferriere, Vol. I , p. 68 I ; Berthi
lemy, Traiti, pp. 25-26, note 2, I I O I ; Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 5 i Waline,
Manuel, p. 45 ff. Cf. Dekeister v. Administration des postes, {C. d'Et.) S.
I 8 62.2 . I J 9 ·
The court was divided o n the issue involved and it required the vote o f the
Minister of Justice to resolve it in favor of the administration. The decision
has recently been attacked by J. Luchet in a thesis mentioned in 52 R. D. P.
( I 935) 3 85.
"" See chap. VIII, infra.
21 Regardless of their importance, the decisions of the French courts are ren
dered in an extremely concise form. It is necessary to consult carefully the
opinions (conclusions) of the commissaires du gouvernement (government at
torneys), which are usually incorporated in the reports of the decisions. These
conclusions go into detailed analyses of the principles involved and, in many
cases, the courts adopt them although they are by no means hound by them.
The commissaires du gouvernement are maitres des requites {see chap. I, Ap
pendix, supra) specially appointed upon recommendation of the vice-president of
the Conseil d'Etat. It is for them to defend the viewpoint which appears to
them as conforming most accurately to the law in force. Berthilemy, Traiti,
p. I I I 7. These opinions are frequently relied on in subsequent cases and carry
a great deal of weight, particularly if the author is a j urist of especial renown.
02 Under the laws of Dec. 221 I 7 8 9 ; Jan. 8, I 790 {Dec. 22, I 789) ; Aug.
I 6-24, 1 790, tit. II, art. 1 3 ; and Fructidor I 6, year III {Sept. 21 1 795),
embodying the differentiation of the administrative and judicial agencies
{supra, p. 1 3, note 3 8 ) .
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nary civil courts were without jurisdiction over suits against
the state in the case of damages resulting from the acts or
omissions of administrative agencies. But the court main
tained that in the case of damage caused by the mistakes or
negligence of the employees of the state the civil courts were
the proper forum.
In the Blanco case the plaintiff insisted that the proceeding
was governed by article I 3 84 of the Civil Code, regulating
the liability of a master for damage caused by his servants,
and that consequently the civil courts were competent to
take cognizance of the matter. The state, on the other hand,
invoked ( I ) the doctrine of differentiation of agencies, which
reserved to the administrative courts complaints against the
state involving its responsibility on account of the perform
ance of a public service, and ( 2) the laws of I 790 and the
year III, according to which the administrative jurisdiction
alone could "declare the state debtor." The representative
of the state did not concede the applicability of the article
of the Civil Code relied on by the plaintiff. After reviewing
the origin and the development of administrative justice
from the time of the Assemblee Constituante, he pointed out
that the original interdiction addressed to the j udiciary "de
troubler, de quelque maniere que ce soit, les operations des
corps administratifs" 23 was intended in the last analysis to
deny to the judicial courts all power to adjudicate claims
against the state whenever a public service was involved.
Moreover, the commissaire emphasized that this was meant to
apply not only where an action tended to cause the annulment,
reformation, or interpretation of an administrative act by those
courts, but also where the complaint simply called for pecu
niary reparation for damages caused by the act. Citing Thou
ret's report on the law of August I 6-24, I 790, and a dictum by
the famed jurist, Henrion de Pansey, as authorities on the
respective domains of the administrative and judiciary, the
• Law of August I 6-z4, I 790, tit. II, art. I 3·
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commissaire concluded that the state, as puissance publique
charged with carrying on the various services administratijs,
could not be subj ect to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
He conceded, however, that wherever the state acts as a
private person, as owner of property or as party to a con
tract, it is amenable to those courts. This rule, he insisted,
applied in all cases in which a demand was made upon the
state on account of torts committed by its agents in the per
formance of a public service. He said: 24
"For the state cannot-in justice or reason-be likened to
private persons in respect to liability for acts done by its
agents. The part played by the state in carrying out the public
services is not voluntary but obligatory; these duties have
been imposed upon it not for a private purpose but in the in
terest of all. We must also consider
.
the enormous
number of agents of all sorts which the extent of these serv
ices necessitates ; as well as the manner of their appointment
and advancement. The latter are often determined by general
laws or regulations, rather than left to the free choice of each
agency.
Consequently, the responsibility of the
state for the mistakes of these employees cannot be taken to
be general or absolute ; it must vary so as to be in harmony
with the laws and regulations governing each service, and
with the individual requirements or nature of the employ
ment. The judicial courts are inherently ill suited to give due
consideration to these factors.
Their appraisal
naturally belongs to the administrative courts, which are in
a much better position to interpret administrative laws and
regulations, to evaluate the requirements of each service, and
finally to reconcile the essential interest of the state with pri
vate rights, this reconciliation being the foremost mission of
the administrative courts."
After some elaboration of the various points, the commissaire
finally emphasized the irrelevance of the fact that the em
ployees involved were ordinary laborers, and concluded : 25
.. D. I 8 73·3·20 at 2 I :3.
25

Ibid. at 2 I-22.
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"What is certain is that the acts complained of are directly
connected with an administrative public service, a circum
stance which is the very foundation upon which the demand
against the state rests. This is all that is necessary to bring
the complaint within the general rule that demands upon the
state growing out of a public service belong to the jurisdiction
of the administrative courts ; a rule which is but the applica
tion in practice of the doctrine of the separation of powers."
The decision of the Tribunal des conflits affirming the
jurisdiction of the administrative courts emphasized espe
cially that the responsibility of the state in circumstances such
as those before it "is neither general nor absolute," but "is
subject to special rules varying with the requirements of the
different services and with the necessities of reconciling the
interests of the state with private rights."26 The Tribunal
held that these matters can be passed upon only by the ad
ministrative courts.
2. Extension and Modification of the Rule of the Blanco
Case
The principle established in the Blanco case was applied
only to actions against the state. Strangely enough,27 the
civil courts were left to take cognizance of similar actions
against districts ( departements) and municipalities. This con
dition persisted unchanged until I 903. In that year the Con
seil d'Etat, and in I 908 and I 909 the Tribunal des conflits,
in decisions which are frequently quoted, extended the rule
so as to give it general application. In the Terrier case,28 the
Conseil d'Etat in a somewhat inconclusive manner held
itself competent to pass on the liability of a departement.
.. Ibid. at :.u : I .
See the historical review by the government attorney i n the Feutry case,
infra, note z9.
28 Terrier v. Departement de Saone-et-Loire, (C. d'Et. 1 903) D. 1 904·3·65.
See Berthelemy, Traite, pp. z6, uoz ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 4641 uth
ed., p. 459 ; Bannard, Precis, p. I S S ; Waline, Manuel, p. 46.
07
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The logical extension of the principle to all the political sub
divisions of the state was, however, definitely brought about
by the decision of the Tribunal des conflits in the Feutry
case. 29 This was an action for damages against a departement
prosecuted in the civil courts on account of the destruction
of private property through fire caused by a lunatic who had
escaped from an asylum. The decision in this case is partic
ularly interesting because of the accompanying opinion of
another outstanding authority, G. Teissier, who acted as com
missaire du gouvernement. 30 The opinion reviews in an illu
minating and instructive manner the doctrinal developments
and the adjudications of the three highest courts, which cul
minated in the firm entrenchment of the rule that the juris
diction of the administrative courts is exclusive in all actions
against the state or its political subdivisions on account of in
juries resulting from the functioning of the public services.
The rule can be stated more precisely thus : ( I ) Regardless
of the nature of the act causing the damage, if action is
brought against the state, a departement, colony or munici
pality, i. e., against a body politic representing the puissance
publique, the judicial courts have no power to determine
either the fact or the extent of injury; ( 2) if, on the other
hand, action is brought against an individual officer or agent,
a distinction must be made between "administrative errors"
and "personal errors." 31 Administrative mistakes concern.. Feutry v. Departement de l'Oise, S. I 9 o 8 . 3 .9 7· See Berthelemy, Traite,
pp. 26, I I o 2 ; Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 4 I 1 465, uth ed., pp. 46o, I o65 ;
Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 5 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 49·
80 The report of the decision is also accompanied by an important note by
Hauriou, S. I 9o8.3.97· Cf. the collection of the numerous notes of this author
in Hauriou, La Jurisprudence administrative de I 8 9 2 a I 9 2 9 ( I 9 29 ) , Vol. I ,
P · 5 7 3 at 5 84.
81 Fautes de service and fautes personnelles, see chap. VIII, infra ; Laferriere,
Vol. I 1 p. 646 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 0 ff. ; Aucoc, Con/irences sur l'adminis
tration et le droit administratif, 3 d ed. ( I 8 8 5 ) , Vol. I 1 p. 7 5 8 ff. ; Teissier, La
responsabilite de la puissance publique ( 1 906 ) , passim ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth
ed., p. 3 6 3 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 8 2 ff. ; Appleton, p. 2 3 2 ff., Supp.,
p. 3 3 ff. ; Bannard, Precis, pp. 9 2, 99 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 7 6 ff.
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ing the functioning of public services are subject neither to the
canons of the civil law nor to the scrutiny of the civil courts.
Personal mistakes, however, are deemed to deprive the act
in question of its administrative character altogether, thereby
eliminating the very foundation for administrative jurisdic
tion.
In three contemporary cases, one of which 32 was decided
shortly before and two33 within three months after the
Feutry decision, the Tribunal des conflits was confronted
with similar jurisdictional problems. Hauriou 34 extracted
from the holding in the Feutry case and the three other
cases the following principles : If a public service is involved
( I ) the jurisdiction belongs to the ordinary courts provided
the damage is due to a faute personnelle "separable from the
exercise of official functions" ;35 ( 2) the jurisdiction is admin
istrative36 in case of faute de service; (3 ) in the event of
damage attributable neither to official nor to unofficial con
duct of administrative agents, but to a public works itself,
the administrative jurisdiction 37 must be invoked.
The tendency to broaden the administrative jurisdiction,
reflected in the foregoing precedents, was critically com
mented upon by at least one of the experts in the field. Pro
fessor Berthelemy38 at the time pointed out interestingly
that the Conseil d'Etat, in exercising jurisdiction over con
troversies arising from fautes de service, did not administer
j udicial relief; no violation of a right being involved, favor.. Gillet v. Panier et l'Etat, S. I 909-3-49.
De Fonscolombe v. Ville de Marseille, and Joullie v. Assoc. Syndic. du
Canal, both also reported in S. I 909.J.49·
.. See S. x 9o8.3.9 7, Jurisprudence, Vol. x, p. 5 8 8 ff. ; 25 R. D. P. (x 9o8)
69 1-92·
.. Infra, chap. VIII.
86 Conseil d'Etat.
87 Conseil de prefecture.
38 Traite de droit administratif, sth ed., p. 8 9 1 , disapprovingly referred to by
Jeze in a note on the Feutry decision in 25 R. D. P. ( x 9o8) 266 at 269 ff.
33
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able action by the Conseil was essentially executive in that
it granted voluntary indemnity. This construction is not alto
gether surprising if one considers the history of the Conseil
d'Etat as an administrative body, and also the adminis
trative aspects of judicial annulment, by the Conseil, of ad
ministrative acts.39 It is arguable that in matters of state
responsibility, arising from public service operations, the ad
ministrative department cannot be relied upon to be suffi
ciently impartial in granting indemnity. Furthermore, it is
true that to require all private claims, even those against
municipalities, to come before a single court, such as the
Conseil d'Etat, constitutes a hardship upon claimants.
It should be remembered, however, that the one-time
movement which favored the ordinary courts for the adjudi
cation of such claims, even though based on the ground that
the claims arose from actes de gestion, was intimately con
nected with the absence of independent administrative courts.
As these courts were developed and improved, and as con
fidence in their impartiality and especial familiarity with ad
ministrative law problems grew, the general sentiment be
came actually reversed.40 Jeze41 has gone so far as to remark
that today, "one must take into account that in France the
ordinary courts have little prestige and are afraid of displeas
ing the administrative." If this is true, it must seem natural
that claimants prefer to come before the administrative
courts, which, although distant, have no hesitations in grant
ing indemnity, "rather than to resort to the ordinary courts,
[which are] nearer, but traditionally known to be reluctant
to condemn the administrative, fearing to be accused of ob
structing the acts of its agents." 42 Viewed in this light, the
89

Recourse for excess of power, supra, pp. 3 1-33.
"' Jeze, note 25 R. D. P. ( 1 908) 266 at 2 69 ff.
41 Ibid., p. 2 7 2 ; cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 300
.. Jeze, p. 2 p. .
•
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differentiation of agencies would seem to have succeeded far
beyond securing the administrative against judicial inter
ference, by enveloping the judiciary in a more or less trans
parent veil of subservience, thereby enhancing the popularity
of, and confidence in, administrative justice.43 However,
statements to this effect are extreme and should be received
with caution. It can be demonstrated44 and it is highly impor
tant that in other respects the contrary is true.
3·

The Public Service Criterion A pplied to Contracts

(a) The Therond Case
The concessions to the administrative jurisdiction in con
troversies arising from public service, beginning with actions
against the state involving its liability for injury or damages
to private persons, and extending gradually to the similar
liabilities of the departements and municipalities, culmi
nated in the decision of the Conseil d'Etat in the case of
Thh·ond v. Ville de Montpellier.45 Although the public
service criterion had long since become an important limita
tion upon the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over actes
de gestion, it had not as yet been applied to litigation involv
ing contracts. Despite the countless instances in which the
agents of the government, for the accomplishment of various
administrative purposes, must needs resort to the contractual
form of action, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over
all contract disputes with the administrative agencies re
mained intact.46 Only where the contracting agency clearly
acted as puissance publique, and where the contractual aspect
of its action was purely incidental, did the administrative ju.. Cf. Appleton, p. 9 ff., Supp., pp. 7-8.
" Chaps. IX and X, infra.
46 S. 1 9 I I .J.1 7, decided in 1 9 1 0
.. Jeze, comment on the Therond decision, 2.7 R, D, P. (1 9 1 0) 249·
•
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risdiction prevail. This rule was subject only to express stat
utory exceptions.47
In the Therond case, for the first time, extended but logical
use was made of the public service concept for the purpose
of determining jurisdiction in contract cases. The city of
Montpellier had entered into a contract with Therond for
the capture of stray dogs and the removal of dead animals
in the city. A dispute arose over the agreement and action
was brought in the Conseil d'Etat. 48 Discharging the duty
of determining its own jurisdiction, the Conseil found that
the contract was intended for the performance of a public
service, i. e., the protection of public health and safety, and
that therefore the case was properly before it. With this im
portant step in the interpretation of the differentiation of
agencies,49 the Therond decision seemed to terminate the
development which was marked by the earlier cases discussed
in this chapter.
Retracing the entire development, we observe that at the
initial stage all acts of the administrative were indiscrimi
nately withdrawn from the cognizance of the ordinary courts.
Later, acts of management were restored to the j urisdiction
of these courts, and ultimately public service, i. e., perform
ance of strictly governmental functions, was accepted as a
unit of action and a basis of jurisdiction.50 The result of the
holding in the Therond case, subjecting all contracts made
in connection with governmental functions to administrative
j urisdiction, was to make the special technical fitness of the
administrative courts available for the adjudication of all
disputes where it might be desirable.
•• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 5 8 7 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. I IOI.
48 The contract granting Therond a monopoly was held ultra vires and
consequently rescission and restitution were awarded to Therond.
48 Cf. Hauriou's note accompanying the Tberond decision-S. I 9I I .3.1 7 and
Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, pp. 679 at 685 ff. See also his Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 465,
1 2th ed., p. 460.
00 See the comment by Jeze in 27 R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 0) 249.
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However, it soon became obvious that the latest extension
of the administrative jurisdiction involved a noticeable dis
advantage in engaging the administrative court machinery
with countless trivial matters, which unnecessarily taxed their
limited facilities. Quite naturally, therefore, the evolution
ary process which had its beginning in the Blanco decision
did not terminate abruptly with the Therond case. It is
noteworthy that only a few months after the Conseil d'Etat
had asserted its jurisdiction over the contractual relation in
that case, on the ground that the contract pertained to public
service, the Tribunal des conflits, in Compagnie d'assurances
ccze Soleil" v. l'Etat/1 signified its adherence to the older
doctrine, expounded by Laferriere,52 according to which juris
diction over controversies founded on contract belongs to
the civil courts "even if the object of the contract is the func
tioning of a public service."53
(b) Qualification of the Rule of the Therond Case
The rule announced in the Therond decision, which seems
to have been ignored by the Tribunal des conflits, was modi
fied by the Conseil d'Etat itself when, two years later, it de
clined to take jurisdiction in the case of Societe des granits v.
Ville de Lille.M The plaintiff corporation there sought to
recover a sum of money under a contract for the furnishing
11 Rec. I 9 I 0.446
.. Vol. I, pp. 5 8 7-8 8, 595·
.. The contract in the "Le Soleil" case was not one of a private person with
the government, but one between a city and the military for the temporary
occupation by troops of a city-owned building. A fire occurred and the insurer
of the premises, as subrogee of the city, filed suit against the state in the Court
of Appeals of Paris.
In this case the commissaire du gouvernement, whose conclusions the Tri
bunal adopted, was the attorney general, i. e., a member of the judiciary. Jeze,
in a critical comment, z 7 R. D. P. (I 9 I o) 468, suggests that had the commissaire
brought the Therond decision to the attention of the Tribunal, the latter would
have followed the principle announced by the Conseil d'Etat.
" D. I 9 I 6.3.35 ; S. I 9 I 7·3· I S · See Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 1 0 3 ; Bonnartl,
Precis, p. I 5 6 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 48. Cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 3 9 ff.
•
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of paving material to the defendant city.55 Leon Blum,56 act
ing as commissaire du gouvernement, inj ected into his opinion
a new distinction. He insisted that while precedent had over
come the former interpretation of the principle of the dif
ferentiation of agencies, it was not the purpose of the new
doctrine to withdraw indiscriminately from judicial cogni
zance all claims sounding in contract to which an administra
tive agency is a party. He argued that even though the object
of the contract is related to a public service,57 the question of!
jurisdiction should be determined by establishing whether
the contract is an "administrative contract" or an "ordinary
common-law contract." The government attorney said that
a contract is administrative if it is so in form and context ;
in other words, the contract must be one which can be made
only by a personne publique, and which creates a definite,
continuing relationship between the private party and the
municipal corporation or the public. Conversely, according
to M. Blum's definition, the contract is a private one whenever
these conditions do not obtain, and when the contractual re
lationship does not persist, as in the case of an executed sale
of paving material. He concluded that the administrative
in this case had contracted as a private party and any subse
quent litigation, therefore, was for the determination of the
ordinary courts. The Conseil d'Etat adopted this opinion and
the resulting solution.
The holding in the last case seems to be tantamount to a
return to the old distinction between "authoritative acts"
"" The case concerns, and is of importance in connection with, similar con
tracts of dipartements and municipalities only. As to the state, the administrative
jurisdiction had been £xed at an early date by statute .(Decree of June u, 1 8o6,
art. 1 3) in regard to contracts coming within the category of supply contracts
(marchis de fournitures) . Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 79z. ff., nth ed., p. 953
ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 593·
"" Later Premier of France (1936-19371 1 93 8) .
M Particularly, as in the instant case, the furnishing of material for the
pa'\oing of streets.

54

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

and "acts of management" in so far as the contracts of ad
ministrative agencies are concerned. Applied to contracts, the
doctrine of public service, carefully developed as an expedi
ent mode of determining the bounds of administrative juris
diction, failed to show the supposed qualities of an open
sesame.58 The solution adopted in the Societe des gramits
case is in keeping with the generally pragmatic rather than
strictly doctrinal tendencies of the Conseil d'Etat. The cri
teria proposed by Commissaire du Gouvernement Blum for
determining jurisdiction yield a rule sufficiently elastic to
permit the sifting of the mass of contractual disputes and to
guard the Conseil d'Etat against having to pass on countless
unimportant matters.59 Nevertheless, it is equally true that
the rule complicates the determination of jurisdiction and
precludes the latter from being predicted with much accu
racy, thus working hardship upon private litigants. Just when
a contract is or is not administrative is by no means easily
determined under all circumstances. It is evident that both
the doctrine of the Therond case and the more flexible rule
of the Societe des granits decision are apt to produce unde
sirable results.60
This situation presents the problem of a difficult choice
between the overcrowded docket of a high court and the
uncertainty attending the selection of the competent forum
by private parties dependent upon judicial interpretation
of their contractual rights; Under circumstances such as those
which prevail, it would seem that the interests of litigants at
large would be best served by maintaining the quality of the
88 The Societe des granits decision was cited and followed by the Tribunal des
conflits in Boyer et Jullian v. l'Etat, (1930) D. 1931.3.33 ; 48 R. D. P. (1931)
807.
10 This view has been aptly illustrated by Berthilemy ( Traite, p. uo4),
who refers to the possibility of "having to settle a bill for the purchase of a bottle
of ink or a box of pens because they were purchased to be used by a public
school." See also ibid., p. 615 (and 1 oth ed., p. szs, note 3 ) .
10 Jeze, in a comment in 3 I R. D. P. (1914) 145, attacks the latter decision
on the score that "the organization of the courts is designed for the convenience
of the parties and not for that of the judges or lawyers." Ibid., p. 1 5z.
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court's work by reducing the class of cases cognizable by the
Conseil d'Etat, so long as additional court machinery is not
available.
In 1 934, by a decret-loi,61 original jurisdiction was in
fact conferred upon the Conseils de prefecture in a number of
matters which had been cognizable in the Conseil d'Etat.
The statute applies to four specified types of cases, including
contract and damage claims other than those against the
central government.62 However, this measure is largely in
effectual for the purpose of unburdening the Conseil d'Etat.
It merely leads to a changed system of appeals, since the
Conseil d'Etat is still open for the review of these same con
troversies.
However, the ultimate significance of the decision in the
Socihe des granits case lies in that it questions the adequacy
of public service as the only criterion by which to determine
jurisdiction over contracts, and that it stresses the necessity
for making other distinctions. In this connection it is important
to note the statutory solution in case of contracts made by the
central government for supplying its public services.63 The
statute, which expressly classifies these contracts as "adminis
trative contracts" and subjects them to the jurisdiction of
the Conseil d'Etat, antedates by many decades the recogni
tion of public service as the primary factor in the determina
tion of j urisdiction. It may well be assumed that the statute
is declaratory of a principle, and that the making of con
tracts of this type by the state was deemed an "act of author
ity," in view of the importance of the marches de fourni
tures.64
81

Decret-loi of May 5, 1 9 34
.. See the critique of the statute in 51 R. D. P. (1 934) 3 1 8.
83 Marches de fournitures, supra, note 55·
• • See Berthilemy, Traite, pp. 593-94 ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 793,
uth ed., p. 954· There is an apparent inconsistency in Hauriou's relating this
instance of administrative jurisdiction to the public service concept. 1 oth ed.,
p. 8 7 6, note 1 (a) .
•
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The rule of jurisdiction concerning contracts was further
qualified in 1 928, when the Tribunal des conflits, deciding
the case of Templier v. Commune de Sempigny,65 adopted a
new distinction which was not in any way related to the pub
lic service notion. Radically departing from the former line
of approach, the Temptier decision makes the administrative
j urisdiction dependent upon expt.ess clauses appearing in
the respective contracts. This not only permits a choice of
j urisdiction in advance of litigation, but it forces adminis
trative agencies to proceed by way of contrat administratif
rather than by contrat judiciare, if they desire the contract
to be subject to interpretation in the administrative courts
exclusively. The holding seems to signify the abandonment
of the service public criterion in favor of puissance publique
as the primary basis of the administrative jurisdiction in the
matter of contract.66 This indeed had already been suggested
by Commissaire Blum in the Societe des granits case. 67
4· Later Developments-Commercial and Noncommercial
Public Service
The most recent developments concerning the jurisdiction
of the administrative courts had their basis in the holding of
.. s.

1928.].12.9·
See the note by Hauriou accompanying the decision, summarized in 46
R. D. P. (1 929) 1 54. Hauriou, Precis, uth ed., pp. 954-55, argues: "Conse
quently the administration is enabled to determine the jurisdiction at will by
inserting into, or omitting from, the contract stipulations manifesting the ex
ercise of sovereign power." Cf. Hauriou's note accompanying the earlier de
cision of the Conseil d'Etat in Commune de Monsegur v. Lalanne (S. 1921.3·49)
where he takes issue with }eze, who insists that service public is the basic concept
underlying all administrative law theory.
01 As to "administrative contracts," see Jeze, Les contrats administratifs
(1927 ) , and by the same author "Theorie generale des contrats de !'administra
tion," 47 R. D. P. (1930), 8z, z6o, 4261 68o ; 48 R. D. P. (1931) 701 245,
496, 681 ; 49 R. D. P. (193 2) 244, 581 ; s o R. D. P. (1933) 51, 371, 573 ;
51 R. D. P. (1934) 70, 570; 52 R. D. P. (1 935) s, 237, 482, 7 1 2. ; 53 R. D. P.
(1936) 41, 239·
08
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the Tribunal des conflits in the Feutry case.68 The immedi
ate effect of the decision was to give general validity to the
concept of public service, initiated by the Blanco case, as a
limitation upon administrative competence in respect to
claims for damages against the state and its political sub
divisions. Indirectly this resulted in a corresponding redistri
bution of jurisdiction over contracts, although the ultimate
solution concerning the latter is marked by a reversion to
the older distinction of authoritative and nonauthoritative
acts. It may be granted that the chronological sequence of
events has been largely coincidental. Nevertheless, it was not
until preoccupation with jurisdiction over contracts subsided,
following the Templier decision, that interest became focused
again upon the jurisdictional problems arising from admin
istrative torts and quasi-torts. Conflicting considerations gave
impetus to varying solutions.
In 1 934 the Conseil d'Etat, in the matter of Mabille v.
Ville de Paris,69 declared the juridiction administrative, rather
than the ordinary courts, competent to pass on the liability
of the municipality for injuries and damages resulting from
the collision of a taxi with a truck operated by the street
cleaning department, a public service. The particular sig
nificance of the decision lies in the fact that it seemed to "over
rule" a decision of the Tribunal des conflits rendered a few
months earlier in the Melinette case.70 In that case the Tri
bunal was divided and, contrary to the opinion of the com
missaire du gouvernement, 71 in the face of almost identical
facts, declared the judicial courts competent to hold the city of
Paris liable in damages. It must be noted, however, tha:t the
plaintiff, Mme. Melinette, within her statutory rights, had
88 S. 1 908.3·97> supra, note 29.
89 Decided February 9, I 934· D. 1934-3-9 ; see the note in 51 R. D. P.
(1 934) 1 3 0·
70 (July I I , 1933) S. 1933 - 3-9 7 ; note by Jeze, s o R. D. P. (1933) 426 .
71 Cf. the accompanying note by Alibert [analyzed 5 1 R. D. P. ( 1 934) 140].
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simultaneously instituted an action ex delicto against the
driver of the city truck and an action against the
city. The decision of the Tribunal des conflits therefore pro
duced the desirable result that the same court could hear both
actions, instead of subjecting the plaintiff to the inconvenience
of having to seek relief before different tribunals. In order
to avoid the implicit deviation from the principle of differ
entiated agencies as previously interpreted,72 the court re
sorted to the expedient of distinguishing industrial or
commercial public services 73 from other public services.74 De
claring the service involved to be of the first type, i. e., "con
ducted by methods similar to those which a private industrial
enterprise would employ,"75 the court decided the Melinette
conflict in favor of the ordinary jurisdiction.76
A better view of the jurisdictional situation subsequent to
the Melinette decision may be gained from the resolution of
the conflict77 in Verbanck v. Le Beguec/8 reported conj ointly
with the Mabille case. Apparently the alarm caused by the
Melinette decision was not j ustified. In the first place, the
contrary holding by the Conseil d'Etat in the Mabille case
"' Jeze, so R. D. P. at 427.
"' Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 5 6, 1 69 ; Waline, Manuel,

pp. so, 5 8 7 .
A similar distinction seems to have been rejected by the opinion in the
Blanco case.
'lli See note by Waline, D. 1 9 34·3·9 ; 5 1 R. D. P. ( 1 934) 458. An analogy
may be found in the American state cases holding that a municipality is subject
to suit for damages in the civil courts if the performance of a governmental
function is coupled with an incidental profit-Foss v. City of Lansing, ( 1 92 7 )
2 3 7 Mich. 63 3-or if the public service is partly of a commercial character
Haley v. City of Boston, ( 1 906) 1 9 1 Mass. 2 9 1 at 293.
•• This sub-classification of public services furnished the basis for the criticism
which the decision provoked. It was severely attacked in the conclusions of the
commissaire du gouvernement upon which the Conseil d'Etat subsequently de
cided the Mabille case, supra, note 69.
77 The accidental death which was the cause of action came about through
the negligent operation on a highway of a truck of the state highway depart
ment.
78 D. 1 9 34 · 3 · 9• S. I 934·J·3 3, so R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 3 ) 6zo ; see particularly the
accompanying note in Dalloz by Professor Waline, analyzed 5 1 R. D. P. ( 1 934)
458, and that by Alibert in Sirey, analyzed 5 1 R. D. P. ( 1 934) 457·
••
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seemed to indicate that the Tribunal des conflits had not
intended to establish a new principle ; for, ordinarily, the
Conseil d'Etat respects rather than disregards the holdings
of the Tribunal. In the second place, it is possible to reconcile
the two decisions because of a differe�ce in the facts. In the
earlier matter (Melinette) the driver had left the truck un
guarded in the street, while in the second case ( Mabille)
at the time of the accident the employee was driving and was
in control of the vehicle. It was, therefore, possible to con
sider the injury in the Melinette case as having resulted not
directly, but in a manner independent from the operation of
a public works. In the Verbanck case, where the truck was
again in the control of the negligent driver, the opinion sug
gested further that "it would scarcely occur to anyone to as
similate the bridge and highway department to a commercial
enterprise." The Tribunal upholding the administrative
jurisdiction borrowed language from the Blanco decision.
One cannot read the comments elicited by the Mabille and
Verbanck cases without the impression that considerable re
lief was experienced over the apparent return to the estab
lished principle of administrative competence in all matters
pertaining to public service. 79
Nevertheless, the spectre of the vaguely defined distinc
tion between industrial or commercial and other public serv
ices continued to thwart the ready determination of jurisdic
tion. 80 The distinction actually was not a new one. Originally
used in connection with controversies between governmental
services and customers, it came to be progressively applied first
to relations between these services and their personnel and
.
79 See the note by Alibert, S. 1934·3·33, 51 R. D. P. { 1934) 457, pointing
out the return in the Verbanck case to the principles :first established by the
Blanco decision and also characterizing the Mabille decision as "a return to sound
traditions."
80 Cf. the similar objection advanced by Jeze concerning the differentiation
of contracts affecting a public service in Societe des granits, supra, note 6o.
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then to relations between the services and other administrative
agencies. Finally, the distinction caused concern when the
Melinette decision extended its application to controversies
between a public service and a third party.81 It was
deemed desirable therefore to limit the term "industrial or
commercial public service" to those services whose perform
ance, according to their legislative design,82 conforms to the
methods which would be employed if they were rendered to
the public by private enterprise. Thus indemnity cases, very
similar to contractual disputes, if occasioned by the public serv
ices, must be litigated in the ordinary courts whenever the man
ner in which the administrativ� conducts its business gives rise
only to questions of private law. 83
The general tendency, however, is to favor the adminis
trative courts. This is evidenced by two recent decisions of
the Conseil d'Etat holding, for the first time, that contro
versies between two independent contractors engaged upon
the same public works, fall within the administrative juris
diction of the Conseils de prefecture. The reason given was
that even though damage to an independent contractor was
directly caused by another contractor, it must nevertheless
be deemed to have resulted from the execution of the public
works upon which both were employed, i. e., from a public
service.84
81 See the note by Waline in D. 1934·3·9• 5 1 R. D. P. { 1 934) 459 ; Bonnard,
Precis, pp. rs6-s 7· In an earlier case (Colonie de la Cote d'lvoire, D. 1 92.1.3.1)
the commissaire du gouvernement proposed that the differentiation of agencies
required that the administrative courts be competent only in regard to "essen
tially administrative functions" and not to acts which are outside these
"natural functions," even though they are in the public interest.
82 A typical instance is the law of July 15, 1 845, art. 2.2., concerning the oper
ation of railroads. See the later decision of the Conseil d'Etat of July z6, 1 92.9
(Commune de Chailly-en-Biere, D. I 930·3·I• D. H. I 92.9.51 2., 47 R. D. P.
(1 930) 773), particularly the accompanying note ( z ) in Dalloz by Professor
Appleton as to restricting the distinction in this sense.
83 See Waline's note, D. 1 934·3·9; Waline, Manuel, p. s o.
84 Matter of Chauveau and Matter of Societe des Eaux de Deanville, (Dec.
I 6, 1 93 2. ) D. 1 934 · 3·1 · s o R. D. P. (1933) 2.46, 51 R. D. P. (1 934) 314·

CHAPTER v
A Comparison of Administrative Review

T

HE

and Judicial Review

main object of the jurisdictional concepts whose
formulation accompanied the development of French
administrative law was to permit, as far as possible,
a distribution of jurisdiction which would be not only logical,
but workable and readily ascertained. Before the Conseil
d'Etat had become well organized as a court of j ustice, ad
ministrative adjudication was limited to actes de puissance
publique, i. e., to acts which, because of their authoritative
nature, clearly could not be . interfered with by the ordinary
courts without violating the differentiation of agencies. As
the administrative courts gained prestige, and as the modern
demands upon the administration increased, the classic dis
tinction between authoritative acts and simple acts of man
agement lost some of its usefulness. It had to be realized that
although some of the administrative business often paralleled
and closely resembled private business, these acts of adminis
trative agencies in many instances were inseparably connected
with and indispensable to the performance of essential gov
ernmental functions. If the ordinary courts were permitted
to take cognizance of such acts, they might, without difficulty,
obstruct administrative action in the sense of the constitu
tional prohibition. Thus service publique came to supplement
puissance publique. Both the narrower sphere of administra
tive jurisdiction over actes de puissance public and the larger
area covered by all acts pertaining to public service were sus
ceptible of fairly clear definition. But watchfulness on the part
of both courts and legal critics has prevented the rigor mortis
of a fixed line of demarcation. Conflicting considerations
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forced the maintenance of flexibility. In response, subclassifica
tions, such as the distinction of administrative from ordinary
contracts and the distinction of commercial or industrial serv
ices from all other public services, emerged.
Viewed in the light of the separation of powers, the rela
tionship between administrative and judiciary in France is
unique. After the establishment of administrative courts, there
has been no problem of judicial review in the Anglo-American
sense. Review and relief administered by courts are guaran
teed, and the sole question which arises is concerned with the
allocation of jurisdiction to two independent sets of courts.
On the other hand, the actual distribution of jurisdiction
between the administrative and the ordinary courts in France
reveals ideas and preoccupations quite familiar to the Ameri
can lawyer. So far as the administrative courts are concerned
today, any tendency to enlarge1 their competence usually ex
presses the desire of making, or rather keeping, the expert
ness and special training of a carefully selected personnel2
available in all matters which are essentially and intrinsically
administrative. The French system offers few obstacles in this
respect, and it has been relatively simple to formulate con
cepts which have satisfied this general trend.
The corresponding situation which presents itself in this
country seems on the surface to be radically different. In
truth, however, this is only a first impression caused by the
basic constitutional arrangement. As has been pointed out
earlier/ one of the immediate obj ects of the adoption of the
separation of powers was to create a strong judiciary. It was
1 Admittedly, the word "enlarge" is not entirely accurate in this connection.
The jurisdiction of the French administrative courts, with their inherent power
over all administrative acts, is theoretically not susceptible of enlargement.
However, the term "administrative" has required reinterpretation from time
to time with corresponding shrinkages or enlargements in the actual scope of
administrative jurisdiction.
• Supra, chap. I, Appendix.
" Chap. II, p. zz.
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inevitable that judicial power should be defined broadly since
interference with either legislative or administrative action, whenever necessary under the Constitution, was intended. In
order, therefore, to elicit the facts which are pertinent to the
present comparison, the question must be asked, "What have
the courts of the United States done? ", while the inquiry as to
the French system was, "What may the ordinary courts do? " J.

Separation of Powers
Interpreting the constitutional separation of powers, the
United States Supreme Court at an early date, in connection
with Rayburn's Case/ rejected a congressional assignment
to the federal judiciary of "duties" not "properly j udicial."5
In a consistent line of subsequent decisions the court perpetu
ated the rule that the constitutional courts cannot exercise ad
ministrative functions. 6 Thus in the recent case of Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.7 the Supreme
Court held that § 1 6 of the Radio Act of 1 9278 conferred
upon the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia "purely 
administrative" powers in directing it to "hear, review and
' (I 792) 2 Dall. (2 U. S.) 409.
• The act of March 23, I 792, I Stat. L. 243, imposed upon the federal circuit
courts the duty of passing upon petitions of persons who wished to be put on the
pension list of the United States. The determinations of the courts were made
subject to revision by Congress and by executive officers. The judges of the
circuit courts for Pennsylvania, New York and North Carolina had expressed
opinions against the validity of such legislation. See Rayburn's Case, (I 792)
2 Dall. (2 U. S.) 409 at 4Io, note.
• Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., (I930) 28I U. S. 464
[cf. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., (I933)
289 U. S. 266 at 276-277] ; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co.,
(I927) 272 U. S. 693 ; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., (I 929) 279 U. S. 438 at 449 ;
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., (I923) 26I U. S. 428 at 444 ; see the
dissenting opinion in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
( I929) 279 U. S. 7 I 6. Cf. Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, (I938)
368 Ill. 425, noted 3 7 Mich. L . Rev. (I 939) 639.
7 (I930) 28I u.s. 464.
• 44 Stat. L. u 69, providing for the granting of and renewal of licenses
to radio stations (italics added in quotation) .
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determine" appeals from the Federal Radio Commission, and
to "alter, or revise the decisions appealed from and to enter
such judgment as to it may seem just." Consequently, the Su
preme Court could not review the judgments of the court of
appeals without assuming to perform an "essentially adminis
trative function." The Radio Act was then amended9 by limit
ing the review powers of the court of appeals to "questions of
law." Passing on the amended statute/0 the Supreme Court
decided that the "limitation manifestly demands judicial, as
-- distinguished from administrative, review.'m Hence the de
cision of the court of appeals had become susceptible of re
vision by the highest constitutional court.
This development is of interest for the present purpose.
For to the extent of the established doctrine, the constitu
tional courts cannot, no more than can the judicial courts of
France, participate in determining purely administrative ques
tions,12 although the American courts by the same constitu
tional principle may exercise a large amount of control over
the acts by which administrative policies are carried into effect.
On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the type
8 (1 930) 46 Stat. L. 844 ; now superseded by the Communications Act of
1 934, 48 Stat. L. 1 064, 4 7 U. S. C. ( 1 934) , § 1 5 1 et seq.
10 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., ( 1 93 3 )
289 U. S. 266 at 276.
u So far as the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is concerned,
Congress may confer administrative (as well as legislative) functions upon the
court, since it is a legislative and not a constitutional (Art. III) court. See
Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 9 30) 8 94.
The subsequent action of the Supreme Court, holding that the courts of the
District of Columbia have a dual status as legislative (Art. I) and constitutional
(Art. III) courts did not deprive those courts of the power to exercise other
than judicial functions. O'Donoghue v. United States, ( 1 9 3 3 ) 289 U. S. 5 1 6 at
s so-5 5 1 . But compare the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes, ibid.
at 5 5 1 .
:Ill The situation under the several state constitutions is not so clear. In many
instances state courts exercise statutory review functions which would be con
demned under the doctrine of Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Co., supra, note 7· But compare the extreme case of Borreson v. Department
of Public Welfare, supra, note 6, where the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated
an assignment of "executive functions" to the judiciary.
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of acts which under the rule have been held to involve only
non-judicial questions. Past interpretations of the term "ad
ministrative" reveal considerable judicial temperament.
There has been much emphasis upon the relative directness or
indirectness of affectation of vested rights as a criterion. Other
important considerations for holding acts administrative, and
therefore not subject to judicial revision, have thereby be
come obscured. This has been particularly evident in the so
called "negative order" doctrine, which has recently received
disapproving analysis by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the case
of Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States.13 The
doctrine, whose origin is associated with Procter & Gamble
Co. v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the review provisions of the act of Congress creating the
Commerce Court,15 requires that administrative orders to be
reviewable must be a:ffirmative.16 One of the chief illustrations
of the doctrine discussed in the opinion is the familiar decision
in United States v. Los A ngeles & S. L. R. Co.17 There the
final valuation of railroad property was held not to present a
justiciable question because the order under the Valuation
Ace8 was made solely for the purpose of information to be in
corporated into the records of the Interstate Commerce Com18 (I 9 3 9) 307 U. S. 1 25. See "A Redefinition of Judicial Review of Ad
ministrative Orders," 48 Yale L. J. ( I 9 39) 1 25 7 ; see also 3 8 Mich. L. Rev.
(I 940) 682.
" ( I 9 1 2 ) 225 u. s. 282.
"' ( I 9 Io) 3 6 Stat. L. 539, later § 207 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, I9I I,
36 Stat. L. I 08 7 at I I 48, and as amended now 2 8 U. S. C. ( I 934), § 4I
(27, 2 8 ) .
18 Three groups of orders which are not affirmative are distinguished and
illustrated : ( I ) orders which do not have the effect of forbidding or com
pelling conduct without further action by the administrative body ; (2) orders
denying exemption from a statutory command ; (3) orders declining to forbid
or compel conduct by a third person. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United
States, ( I 939) 307 U. S. 1 25 at 1 29-I 30.
17 ( I 927) 273 u. s. 299·
18 Sec. I 9a of the Act to Regulate Commerce of Feb. 4, I 8 87, 24 Stat. L. 3 79,
as amended ; now 49 1?'· S. C. ( I 934), § I 9a.
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mission. The order was not made with a view to immediate
further action, as for the establishment of rates of transporta
tion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, quoting language from the
opinion, 19 explains the nonreviewability of the order in the
L os A ngeles case by the absence of a "case or controversy'' in
the sense of Article III, section 2 of the United States Consti
tution, as elaborated in the Muskrat case.20 It is believed, how
ever, that the clue is furnished by the separation of powers
doctrine and the reasoning which connects Rayburn's Case
with Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. The
valuation function, taken as an example, particularly if wholly
disconnected from further action, such as rate-making, is so
peculiarly administrative in a technical sense that "judicial
abstention"21 seems no more than the realization of a logical
division of work.22 Thus "the impelling consideration" which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter feels actually underlies the decision
in the Procter & Gamble case must apply with equal force
to the Los A ngeles case. The passage quoted by him/3 as well
"' Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 9 3 9 ) 307 U. S. 1 2 5 at
quoting from United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., ( 1 927) 2 7 3
U. S. 2 9 9 a t 309-3 1 0 : "The so-called order here complained of i s one which
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, anything; which
does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license ; which does not
extend or abridge any power or facility ; which does not subject the carrier
to any liability, civil or criminal ; which does not change the carrier's existing
or future status or condition ; which does not determine any right or obligation."
"" Muskrat v. United States, ( 1 9 1 1 ) 2 1 9 U. S. 346.
21 307 U. S. 1 25 at 1 3 1 .
"" In fact, Mr. Justice Frankfurter also classifies Rayburn's Case with the
Muskrat case. However, it seems quite clear that the constitutional background
of Rayburn's Case is the separation of powers, while that of the Muskrat case is
the narrower principle of § 2 of Art. III of the Constitution.
28 307 U. S. 1 3 7, note q ., quoting from Procter & Gamble Co. v. United
States, ( 1 9 1 2) 225 U. S. 2 8 2 at 296-2 9 7 : "·
we have learned of no in
stance where it was held or even seriously asserted, that as to subjects which in
their nature were administrative and within the competency of the Commission
to decide, there was power in a court, by an exercise of original action, to enforce
its conceptions as to the meaning of the act to regulate commerce by dealing
directly with the subject irrespective of any prior affirmative command or ac
tion by the Interstate Commerce Commission. On the contrary, by a long line of
decisions, whereby applications to enforce orders of the Commission were conI J o-I J 1,
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as other parts of the opinion in the Procter & Gamble case,
clearly recognizes the importance of leaving all purely ad
ministrative matters to be dealt with by technical experts.
This aspect of nonreviewability has many times been empha
sized.24
The orders of nonjudicial tribunals, however, much more
frequently are not strictly confined to the disposition of tech
nical administrative matters. In many instances they are
coupled with the simultaneous creation of rights and duties,
and it is at this juncture that, under the American administra
tive system, they are deemed to lose their constitutional im
munity and to fall within the area of reviewability in the
courts. Unhampered by any recognized implications of the
separation of powers, the courts have only their own dis
cretion to guide them in the circumscription of their review
functions. But once an administrative order has been classi
fied as not strictly administrative and therefore reviewable,26
it becomes all the more important that the benefits of primary
expert administrative determination should be retained. Acsidered and disposed of or where requests to restrain the enforcement of such
orders were passed upon, it appears by the reasoning indulged in that it was never
considered that there was power in the courts as an original question without
previous affirmative action by the Commission to deal with what might be
termed in a broad sense the administrative features of the act to regulate com
merce by determining as an original question that there had been a compliance
or non-compliance with the provisions of the act."
"' "A Redefinition of Judicial Review of Administrative Orders," 48
Yale L. J. ( 1 9 39) 1 257 at 1 2 5 8 ; Cooper, "Administrative Justice and the
Role of Discretion," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 38) 5 7 7 at 6oo; Landis, The Adminis
trative Process ( 1 9 3 8 ) , p. 14z ff. ; Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of the Law ( 1 9z 7 ) , pp. 6 1 , 7 1-7z, Z 3 3-z35, Z54·
"' Compare the "Classification of Judicial Functions Exercised by Federal
Administrative Agencies," attempted by the Special Committee on Adminis
trative Law of the American Bar Association, 6 1 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 9 36) 7zo
at 745· Observe that licensing is quite commonly thought to be administrative,
while the revocation of a license is deemed a judicial act, leaving considerable
doubt as to the nature of the renewal of licenses, particularly when renewal is
denied for the concealed purpose of revocation. Cf. Piedmont & Northern
Ry. Co. v. United States, ( 1 9 30) z8o U. S. 469, and the critique of this de
cision in the opinion of Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939)
3 0 7 U. S. u s at 1 3 31 note.
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tually the federal courts have responded to this demand by
devising rules of self-limitation.

Prior Resort and Exhaustion
Two doctrines are commonly resorted to for the purpose
of marking off certain areas within which administrative ac
tivity enjoys a limited amount of autonomy. The first of these
devices26 requires that a complaining party, before invoking
the courts, must await the action of the competent administra
tive tribunal27 or must exhaust all the administrative remedies
available against any action which has already been taken.28
That the predominant purpose of the rule is to give due play
to administrative expertness appears clearly from its applica
tions, as well as from the exceptions to its application.29 Con
cerning the former, the ground of cornity30 and the argument
.. The doctrine has been variously referred to as "exhaustion of adminis
trative remedies," "prior resort to administrative action," or "primary j uris
diction" doctrine.
"" See, for instance, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
( 1 907) 204 U. S. 426 ; United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship
Co., ( 1 932) 284 U. S. 474 ; see also the recent decision in Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., ( 1 9 38) 303 U. S. 4 1 at 50-5 2.
28 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 9o8) 2 1 1 U. S. 2 1 0. The distinction
between tire principle of primary j urisdiction and that of exhaustion of rem
edies is real, although it is commonly disregarded. The former has reference to
situations in which original administrative action has not as yet been taken.
It is therefore possible that the contemplated act is of the purely administrative
type so as to come within the rule of Hayburn's Case and to escape judicial
revision entirely. Thus, by applying the prior resort doctrine, the court merely
indicates that under the circumstances the anticipated administrative act neces
sarily will involve a justiciable issue. In other words, the courts have found
the separation of powers doctrine inadequate, if not inconvenient, in cases
where mixed administrative and justiciable questions are involved. On tire
other hand, exhaustion of remedies envisages the possibility of hierarchic re
view of primary administrative action and the doctrine emphasizes the desir
ability of giving precedence to administrative review over judicial review.
.. For detailed discussions, see "Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of
Judicial Relief," 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 2 3 01 and Berger, "Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies," 48 Yale L. J. { 1 9 3 9 ) 9 8 1 ; see also Kirchwey,
"The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Judicial Enforcement of the
Act to Regulate Commerce," 14 Col. L. Rev. { 1 9 14) 2 1 1 .
80 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) 2 I I U. S . 2 1 o.
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that the administrative remedy is analogous to one at law
which, if adequate, bars equity,31 are more in the nature of
judicial reconciliations of the prior resort and exhaustion doc
trines with prevailing notions of judicial power and pro
cedure. Nevertheless, the courts have to some extent been
activated by a desire to keep their dockets clear of a great mass
of tedious litigation. On the other hand, the exceptions to the
requirement of prior resort and exhaustion have been formu
lated with regard to the absence of technical questions and to
the actual or relative nonavailability of administrative re
lief.32

Administrative Finality
The second rule which is designed to insure respect for
the competence of administrative agents is embodied in the
doctrine of administrative finality.33 Accordingly, "even
when [under the exhaustion doctrine] resort to the courts
can be had to review a Commission's order, the range of issues
open to review is narrow. Only questions affecting constitu
tional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites
of proof can be raised. If these legal tests are satisfied, the
Commission's order becomes incontestable."34 The practical
applications of the rule, however, lack the symmetrical
beauty implicit in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's terse statement.
Questions of constitutional power, as well as of statutory au
thority, not infrequently depend upon fact determinations ;
and it is familiar doctrine in American administrative law that
"jurisdictional facts" and "constitutional facts" cannot be
81 Elliott v. El Paso Electric Co., (C. C. A. sth, 1 93 7 ) 8 8 F. (2d) sos .
.. For detailed discussion, see "Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of
Judicial Relief," 35 Col. L. Re'V. ( 1 935) 230 at 233-240; and Berger, "Ex
haustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 Yale L. J. ( 1 939) 9 8 1 .
81 Dickinson, Administrati'Ve Justice, chap. III, p . 3 9 ff.
" Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939) 307 U. S. us
at 1 3 9-140. See chap. XI, infra.
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conclusively determined by administrative agencies.85 This
is so even though the facts to be established may clearly call
for the expert knowledge of appointed administrative spe
cialists.
Briefly stated,S6 whenever the jurisdiction of an admiflistra
tive body depends upon the existence of specific facts, a court
reviewing an administrative determination must reach its own
conclusions as to the existence of those facts.37 It is neverthe
less true that if the latter are "jurisdictional" only in a statu
tory sense, the statute itself may make the findings of the
administrative agency conclusive. 38 Conversely, if the pres- ence of particular facts is made necessary to the validity of an
administrative act by the constitution,89 then the fact de
termination must always be reviewable by the courts. Admin
istrative finality is thus subject to limitations whose extent is
largely within the discretion of those courts.
The field actually reserved for administrative fact finding
is indicated by the judicial expressions of respect for adminis
trative expertness. In regard to findings of "jurisdictional
facts," looking to statutory authority only, the courts have
inclined towards admitting the conclusiveness of such findings
or have limited their inquiry to the reasonableness of the find
ings.40 On the contrary, judicial scrutiny of "constitutional
85 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, p. 309 ff. ; Dickinson, "Crowell v.
Benson : Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of
'Constitutional Fact,' " 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. ( 1 932) 1 055.
"" Professor Dickinson's article in 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 055 (note 3 5, supra)
should be consulted for a complete treatment of the subject.
87 See, for instance, Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, ( 1 929) 280 U. S.
1 9 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., ( 1 9 1 0)
2 1 6 U. S. 5 3 8 ; cf. United States v. Ju Toy, ( 1 905) 1 9 8 U. S. 253 ; Freund,
Administrative Powers over Persons and Property ( 1 9 2 8 ) , p. 2 9 1 ; Dickinson,
Administrative Justice, p. 29 2.
88 Dickinson, article, So U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055 at 1 059, 1 063.
89 This does not involve the constitutionality of the enabling statute as such,
but the constitutional propriety of its application to a given situation.
Dickinson, article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 055 at 1068.
'" Dickinson, Administrative Justice, pp. 3 1 0-3 1 2 ; article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev.
1 05 5 at 1 067. Professor Dickinson points out the relation between the method
of review (certiorari as compared with collateral damage suits) and its scope.
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facts" is more pronounced. In the now classic Ben A von case,41
which was concerned with confiscation as a question of due
process, the United States Supreme Court indicated that where
constitutional issues are involved the court must form an in
dependent judgment from the record made before the ad
ministrative agency.42 Finally, Crowell v. Benson/3 equally
well known because of its enigmatic potentialities, went still
further, requiring a trial de novo "for the final determination
of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the
constitutional rights of the citizen depend."44 Thus the courts,
although they have refrained from doing so extensively/5
may in their discretion subordinate administrative finality
whenever such "fundamental or jurisdictional facts"46 are
Ill lSSUe.
41

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, ( 1 9 2o) 2 5 3 U. S. 287.
See also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, ( 1 936) 2 9 8 U. S. 3 8,
and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, ( 1 936) 298 U. S. 349•
'" ( 1 9 3 2 ) 2 8 5 U. S. 22, Dickinson, article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. I OS5. See
also Wood Towing Corp. v. Parker, (C. C. A. 4th, 1 9 35) 76 F. (2d) 770,
and Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, ( 1 935) 296 U. S. 1 0 ; cf. Shields v.
Utah Idaho Central R. Co., ( 1 9 3 8 ) 305 U. S. 1 7 7, noted in 39 Col. L. Rev.
( 1 9 3 9) 693·
.. Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 93 2 ) 285 U. S. 2.2. at 56. The full passage is as
follows : "In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the ordinary
one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations. Nor
have we simply the question of due process in relation to notice and hearing.
It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial
power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions. It is the ques
tion whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the
j udicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in
this instance a single deputy commissioner--for the final determination of the
existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights
of the citizen depend. The recognition of the utility and convenience of ad
ministrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their
proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does not require
the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress
could completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the
authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the
Executive Department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists
under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of bureaucratic
character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not
infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes
in effect finality in law."
411 See the note in 39 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 93 9 ) 693.
"' Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 9 32) 285 U. S. 2 2 at 63.
42
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A dministrative Law Reforms
The discretionary element in both the exhaustion and the
finality doctrines must be kept well in mind if proposed ad
ministrative law reforms in this country are to be intelligently
appraised. Any legislative attempts to enlarge, or even to fix,
the circumference of administrative autonomy is hemmed in
by judicial conceptions of basic constitutional principles. Leg
islation which transcends the indicated limits will escape a
declaration of unconstitutionality only if it is susceptible of
an interpretation that will neutralize those provisions not in
harmony with the announced principles. It must also be ob
served that the utility of proposals tending to strengthen
rather than to curtail court control of the administrative may
run afoul of the same barriers. The defunct Logan Bill/1 first
sponsored48 and later abandoned49 by the American Bar As
sociation, embodied a scheme for the creation of a federal
administrative court or, as it was later termed, "a consolida
tion of existing legislative courts."50 This organism, to be
composed of trial and appellate divisions and nominally in
tended "for the gradual segregation of judicial functions now
exercised by federal administrative agencies," 51 would ac
tually have adjudicated controversies arising from adminis
trative action. Being a legislative court, it would have had the
power, not enjoyed by the constitutional courts, to pass on
administrative questions.52 Assuming that the personnel of
this tribunal would have been selected with a view to ad
ministrative qualifications and that through its routine the
court would in any case have soon developed into an expert
•• S. 3787 and H. R. 1 2 297, 74th Cong., 2d sess. ( 1 936)
6 1 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 9 36) 720 at 76o.
49 62 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 9 3 7 ) 789 at 8os.
00 6 2 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 9 3 7 ) 789 at 8os.
01 6 1 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 93 6) 7 20, recommendation 2 (a)
.. Supra, note 1 1 .
..
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body, the net gain would still have been disproportioned to
the effort spent. For while all disputes to come before the
court would have received specialized treatment, the limita
tive interpretations of the exhaustion and finality principles
in an indeterminate number of instances would have reduced
the effect of the scheme to hardly more than a multiplication
of available appeals. Viewed in this light, at least the ultimate
object of one feature of the new Administrative Law Bill/13
which has not fared well with the critics,54 deserves some
credit. 55 Section 4 of the bill provides for intra-agency review
by specially organized review boards whose personnel would
be recruited from within each agency. The institution of
hierarchic appeals in the case of all administrative agencies is
indispensable to an integrated administrative process and con
tributes substantially to the respect which administrative com
petence should and can command.36
However, no legislative proposals nor new designs for the
j udicial or administrative apparatus are of themselves suf
ficient to insure the best possible relationship between the two
departments of government. The problem is not merely one
of mechanics ; it is also one of attitudes. In this country ad
ministrative autonomy, because of constitutional conceptions, ...
is to a large extent dependent upon judicial self-restraint. It
is important, therefore, that this restraint should be carried to
the point where the interplay of adjudication and adminis"' S. 9 I S, H. R. 4136, 76th Cong., Ist sess. (I939). See McGuire, "The
American Bar Association's Administrative Law Bill," I La. L. Rev. (I939)
ss o. See also infra, chaps. VI, XI.
.. Jaretzki, "The Administrative Law Bill : Unsound and Unworkable," 2.
La. L. Rev. (I 940) 194 ; Symposium, "American Bar Association's Adminis
trative Law Bill," 34 Ill. L. Rev. (I94o) 64I ; see also Jaffe, "Invective and
Investigation in Administrative Law," 52. Harv. L. Rev. (I939) 12.01 at
u z s- u J2..
"" The procedural and technical defects of section 4 are fully discussed by
Professor McAllister in his contribution, "Administrative Adjudication and
Judicial Review," to the Symposium in 34 Ill. L. Rev. 64I at 68o, and by Mr.
Jaretzki in the article in 2. La. L. Rev. 194 at J u-3 IS·
"" Cf. Jaffe's article, 51 Harv. L. Rev. u o i at uz7.
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tration becomes cooperative rather than competitive. To this
end "we must learn, as quickly as we may, how to make popu
lar government at once responsible, capable, and just."57
Manifestly, traditional prejudice against administrative ac
tivity, born of a habit of thinking, is most apt to recede in the
proportion that the tasks assigned to the administrative are
customarily well done.58 Consequently the constant supply
of adequately trained personnel 59 to take over those tasks is
essential, and a critical glance at the law schools, in which a
large number of our public servants receive their prepara
tion, is pertinent. Philosophically there may be no funda
mental distinction between private law and public law.
However, in our law schools, which are primarily geared to
preparation for immediate practical tasks, the differentiation of
private and public law courses in the curriculum is in need of
greater emphasis. A better integration of the public law
courses would be of benefit to our future public servants.
•• Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Theory," 47 Yale L. 1. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 5 3 8 at 576.
'
.,. Landis, The Administrative Process, pp. 1 43-144· Cf. Cooper, "Admin
istrative Justice and the Role of Discretion," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 5 7 7 at 6o1 .
111 See the proposal of the American Bar Association concerning "A Yearly
Clinic to Study Administrative Processes," 62 Rep. A . B. A . ( 1 93 7 ) 7 8 9
a t 8o1 ; cf. Ballantine, "Administrative Agencies and the Law," 24 A. B . A. J.
( 1 9 3 8 ) 1 09·

PART III
THE REVIEW POWERS
OF THE
ORDINARY COURTS IN FRANCE

CHAPTER VI

Review of Administrative Regulations

I

N FRANCE, under the principle of differentiated
agencies, a system has evolved which sanctions adminis
trative finality in all matters of administrative concern,
and the sanction extends to actual administration, as well as to
the adjudication of ensuing controversies. Nevertheless, a
mere summary conclusion that all matters not specifically in
terpreted to have administrative content are cognizable by the
ordinary courts would fall far short of an accurate appraisal of
the French administrative system. Judicial authority in re
gard to administrative action at certain points has always as
serted itself and has not been content with concessions of
jurisdiction. These assertions indicate areas in which public
and private interests overlap and compete and where the
actual review powers of the ordinary courts of France assume
a familiar significance.
A. THE QUESTION O F THE LEGALITY OF REGULATIONS

Despite the firm language of the enactments prohibiting
judicial interference with administration/ there have been
read into the differentiation of agencies nonstatutory excep
tions which actually permit the ordinary courts of France to
control administrative action to some extent. This power of
the civil courts, which generally rests upon illegality, varies
in scope with the nature of the ace before them, and especially
in the case of administrative regulations it has been subject
to fluctuating limitations.
Administrative regulations result from the exercise of the
power of administrative agencies to make rules and to adopt
1 See p. 1 31 supra.
• See Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, zd ed. {1921)1 Vol. z, p. z63 fi.
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ordinances.3 Such regulations have been defined as "obliga
tory rules imposed by a public agency other than the legis
lature."4 For a long time it has been conceded that the courts
have power not only to interpret these regulations but also
to inquire into their legality. 5 Likewise, a duty on the part of
the courts to exercise these powers has been recognized. 6 His
torically, the acknowledged jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
in regard to the interpretation and legality of administrative
regulations has its origin in a famous statutory exception to
the rule prohibiting the judicial agencies from obstructing the
actes de la puissance publique. By virtue of the Penal Code
of 1 83 2/ the judicial courts were permitted to interpret and
to verify the legality of certain regulations before they pro
ceeded to impose the penalties provided for their transgresa Aucoc, Con/irences sur /'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed.
(r 8 85 ) , Vol. r, p. I Z3 ff. ; Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed.
( 1 8 9 7 ) , Vol. r, pp. 81 ff., 1 7 8 ff. ; Moreau, Le reglement administratif ( 1 9oz) ;
Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, r oth ed. ( 1 9.z r ) , p. 6o ff., nth ed.
( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 55 5 ; Bertkilemy, Traite elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3 th
ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. u r ff. ; Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel, franfais et
compare, 7th ed. ( r 9 Z I ) , Vol. r , pp. 536, 5 3 7, Vol. 2, p. 7 5 ff. ; Duguit Traite,
Vol. 2, p. 1 82 ff. ; Duguit, Law in the Modern State, English translation ( 1 9 1 9 ) ,
p . 79 ff. ; Bannard, Precis de droit administratif ( 1 9 3 5 ) , p . 246 ; Waline,
Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif ( 1 9 36), p. 290 ff.
• Moreau, p. 2.
• Aucoc, Vol. r , p. 499 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 291 ; Moreau, p. z6o ; Esmein,
Droit constitutionnel, Vol. r , pp. 5 3 6, 5 3 7 ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 49
ff., 7 2 1 ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes de la puissance publique
( 1 9 1 4) , pp. 1 65, r 67 j Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 69, 1 2th ed., p. 5 6 8 ;
Appleton, Traite elimentaire du contentieux administratif (1 9 2 7 ) , p. 1 05 ff. ;
cf. Jeze, Les principes geniraux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( 1 92 5 ) , p. 3 78.
• Ducrocq, Vol. r, p. 84: "The principle that regulations are subject to the
limitations of the laws has received the double sanction of the recourse to
the Conseil d'Etat for excess of power, and the obligation of the judicial au
thorities not to apply regulations until after having verified their legality....
(Italics added.) See also Moreau, p. 2 6 1 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 1 89, Vol. 3,
p. 49 ; Dareste, p. 1 65, note 3, citing note by Sarrut, D. 1 89 7·2.2 2 5 ; Apple
ton, p. 1 05.
• Code penal, art. 471, § 1 5, confers upon the judicial courts power to
convict, and subject to the penalties provided, "those who shall have offended
against regulations lawfully made by administrative agencies, and those who
shall not have complied with regulations or orders issued by municipalities."
(Italics added.)
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sion. 8 However, even before the enactment of this statute,
and as far back as I 8 I o, the Cour de cassation insisted upon
this right of the courts to inquire into administrative regula
tions.9 In doing so the courts carefully avoided asserting the�
power to annul regulations or to interpose direct obstacles to
the execution of administrative orders. But they took the
position that they must refuse any aid in the execution of un
lawful orders because they had authority to grant judicial
enforcement only where it served the execution of laws. Con
sequently, before they could intervene on behalf of an ad
ministrative agency they were bound to ascertain whether or
not the act to be enforced was legal and was therefore law.10 .
Thus, in 1 830, a civil court11 refused to apply an administra
tive regulation on the ground that "ordinances may not be
issued except for the purpose of executing or maintaining the
laws, and that the regulation before it would, on the contrary,
have the effect of violating a statute." The regulation in
volved attempted to suspend the freedom of the press.12 Giv
ing due consideration to this attitude of the j udicial courts,
it is not surprising that the enactment of 1 83 2 came to be in
terpreted extensively at once, and that the power of the courts
to refuse to enforce police regulations which they deemed il8 Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours con
tentieux, zd ed. ( I 896) , Vol. I, p. 480 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, pp. u o4I I o6; Reglade, "L'Exception d'illegalite en France," 40 R. D. P. (I 9z 3 )
3 9 3 ; Waline, Manuel, p. Z95·
0 Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 48 I-48z, and the cases cited in the note on p. 48z ;
Berthelemy, Traite, p. u os ; Moreau, pp. z6o-z6I, note 6, and cases cited
there ; Garner, "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in
France," 9 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. ( I 9 1 5) 6 3 7 ; Garner, "French Administrative
Law," 3 3 Yale L. J. (I 9Z4) 597·
10 See the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernement in the Septfonds
case (infra, note 4 I ) , S. I 9Z 3 ·3·49, D. I 9Z4·3·4I, and the accompanying note
by Hattriou, La jurisprudence administrative ( I 9Z9), Vol I, pp. s o, s z, 53·
11 The Tribunal de commerce de la Seine ; see Hauriou, ibid., p. 53.
'" The ordinance of July zs, I 8 3o, was held to violate the law of July I 8,
I 8 z 8, regulating the freedom of the press.
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legal13 was, for a time, held to extend to all types of adminis
trative regulations. The statute indeed was held to express
nothing more than the legislative sanction of a "pre-existing
and superior rule." 14
B. THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF REGULATIONS

It was inevitable that the doctrine of the differentiation of
administrative and judicial agencies should lead to virtually
insoluble difficulties at this juncture. Actually, it complicated
the question of jurisdiction over regulations to a degree which,
up to very recent times, precluded reconciliation of the re
spective attitudes of the two sets of courts. 15 This condition
was the result of mutual insistence that the application of the
doctrine of differentiated agencies depended upon the intrin
sic nature of the rule-making function and of administrative
regulations,16 a matter itself in dispute.
The theory of delegated legislation has been quite gen
erally rejected by modern French writers. 1 7 On the other
hand, the legislative character of administrative regulations
13

Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 48I, 483 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 5 I .
Ducrocq, Vol. 3 , p . 292. See also Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3 , p . 5 2 . Appleton, pp.
I 06-I 07 {and cases cited) : "At this point judicial doctrine began to see in
the implied power of the judicial tribunals under art. 4 7 I, § I 5
but
an individual application of a general, presupposed rule, according to which
the courts may interpret regulatory acts and test their legality in connection
with controversies over which they have jurisdiction." (Italics added.) The
entire development is set out in the opinion of Commissaire Matter in the
Septfonds case and in Hauriou's accompanying note (see note 1 0, supra) .
10 Bannard, Precis, p. I 62 ; Appleton, Supp., pp. I 5-I 6.
lB Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 7 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. I 82 ff.
17 Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. 2, p. 8 I ; Duguit, Manuel de droit
constitutionnel, 3d ed. ( I 9 I 8 ) , p. 506 ; cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 4I4,
Vol. 3> p. I 44 ; Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 6I, 6 8, 1 2th ed., pp. ss6, 567,
5 7 6 ; Moreau, p. I 64 ff. ; Reglade, 40 R. D. P. at 403 ; Berthilemy, Traite,
pp. I 24-1 2 5 ; Jeze, Principes, p. 3 7 8 ff. Cf. Dareste, p. I 65, and a case cited
there decided by the criminal division of the Cour de cassation in I 845, using
this language : "the ordinance of May 2, I 84I, being but the result of a delegation of legislative power, was essentially in the nature of a law and its inter
pretation belongs to the ordinary courts."
:u
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persists in being partly acknowledged, although it is the sub
ject of much controversy.18 The disputable argument has been
advanced that the character of regulations is nonlegislative
because of the sole fact that they emanate from agencies other
than the legislature. But neither the assimilation nor the dis
tinction of the two types of general rules resulting from legis
lation and from rule-making could contribute materially to
the clarification of the complex situation confronting courts
and theorists. If Duguit's analysis, unquestionably correct in
its emphasis upon the two-fold quality of the regulation, is
accepted, it is possible to avoid objection to the power of the
courts to interpret general administrative rules. For the con-:J
stitutional prohibition contemplated administrative acts only,
not legislative acts; and the interpretation of legislative acts, J.
by whomever promulgated, is certainly the very essence of
-

This interesting problem cannot be considered except by way of the most
perfunctory allusion, because of the proportions it has assumed in the discus
sions of both continental and Anglo-American writings. See, e.g., Jacoby,
"Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review : A Study in Comparative Law,"
36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 9 36) 8 7 1 ; Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung ( r 8 8 7) ; Mayer,
Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, 2d ed. ( 1 9 14), Vol. r, pp. 65, 68-70.
18 The principal exponent in France of the theory of intrinsic identity of laws
and regulations is Duguit; see Traite, Vol. 2, pp. r 82, r 89, Vol. 3, pp. 49 ff.,
7 2 1 . In the same sense, Moreau, p. 6o ; Reglade, 40 R. D. P. at 401 ; Bannard,
Precis, p. 247 ; Jeze, Principes, p. 28. For the contrary view, see among others,
Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 54 ff. [However, the insistence upon a fundamental
difference is no longer to be found in the r zth edition (p. 563 ff.) and one
may rather conclude that the similarity is implicitly admitted.] ; Berthilemy,
Traite, p. 1 22 ff. ; Appleton, p. r o8.
The courts seem to favor the theory that although formally regulations are 
administrative they bear a notable resemblance to the laws. See, e. g., Compagnie
generale de navigation v. Grandperrin, (Cass.) D. r 9o8.r .76, holding that
the j udicial agencies could interpret a regulation concerning river navigation
because it was not an "individual and special administrative act" but a
regulatory ordinance made under the police power conferred upon the ad
ministrative by law, and therefore "partaking of the character of a law."
Similarly the same court, in Guillou v. Prefet de la Seine [S. 1 9 1 8-1 9 1 9. 1 . 1 94
at 1 95, cited by Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 1 90, Vol. 3, pp. 7 2 1-7 2 2 ; see the
note in 34 R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 7 ) , p. 6zo], said that the "regulations
do
not constitute special and individual administrative acts
but general
provisions made by virtue of the rule-making power of the administration,
which consequently partake of the character of the laws." The same language
was employed by the Tribunal des conflits in the Septfonds case, infra, note 4 1 .
•

.

.
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the judicial function. 19 Conversely, the remaining adminis
- trative quality of regulations would still prevent the judicial
courts from ascertaining their legality as a condition prece
dent to their application.
Admittedly the argument involved is highly formalistic.
Nevertheless it deserves to be elaborated further, if only to
demonstrate the complications into which the seemingly well
defined doctrine of differentiated agencies has led. While it
has not been difficult to maintain that, due to their legislative
aspect, regulations may be interpreted by the ordinary courts
without violating the principle of judicial noninterference,20
the recognition of a power in those courts to inquire into their
legality has necessitated an exception to the doctrine of dif
ferentiation.21 For, the nullification incident to declarations
of illegality most clearly constitutes interference with . ad
ministration. But the impediment of the doctrine can be
-- avoided by disregarding the administrative origin of regula
tions, and by deriving from their legislative character not
only the power and duty of the courts to interpret them, but
also the power to refuse application for illegality.22 In the
lJl

Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, p. I 8 9, Vol. 3, pp. 49, 7 2 I .
Ibid., Vol. 3 , pp. 5o-s z.
"' Ibid. p. 5 2 ; Duguit insists that this exception, originally statutory and
limited to one specific type of ordinance (art. 4 7 I, § I 5, Code Penal, supra,
note 7 ) , came to be given general scope "par la force 'meme des chases.' "
22 See the note by Sarrut accompanying the decision in Raoulx v. Gallet, D.
I 8 9 7.2.225 at 2 2 6 :2 : "The ordinary courts have a right to interpret these
\ regulatory decrees ; since they are in the nature of laws there is no violation
of the principle of the separation of powers. .
The ordinary courts
may, and are even required to, verify the legality of these regulatory decrees,
that is, they must inquire whether the chief executive did not exceed his delega
tion, and whether he observed the form and other requirements imposed by
law. For in doing so, far from exercising an improper control over the law
itself . . . they [the courts] on the contrary cause the text and spirit
of the law to be protected in regard to the act which the law authorized the
tchief executive to accomplish within designated limits." (Quoted by Dareste,
--p. I 6 5, note 3.)
See also Ducrocq, Vol. I , p. 84, Vol. 3, p. 2�1 ; cf. Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 26,
note r ,
20

.
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very case23 repeatedly referred to by Duguit, decided upon
the report of an outstanding jurist of the day/4 the court said
verbatim : "for that reason [that regulations partake of the
nature of laws] 25 it is for the judicial authorities . . . to test
their legality and to interpret their meaning." On the other
hand, the power to declare regulations illegal has also been
defended on the ground that it is an integral part of the ju
dicial function, whether exercised by the administrative or the
ordinary courts, and therefore is not dependent upon the in
trinsic nature of regulations. Thus Professor Hauriou very
interestingly has referred to the principle of the "supremacy
of the law" insisting that every court must be able to refuseto apply regulations which are illegaP6
"" Guillou v. Prefet, S. I 9 I 8-I 9 I 9. 1 . 1 94, cited supra, note 1 8 .
.. Ambroise Colin ; see Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 7 2 2 ; note, 34 R. D. P.
( 1 9 1 7) 623.
"" See note 1 8, supra.
.. Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., p. 69 (see 1 2th ed., p. s68) ; cf. Appleton,
p. 1 09. As far as the differentiation of agencies is concerned, Hauriou, while
finding nothing in the relevant statutes in the way of this power of the ordinary
courts, considered the precept displaced by the more important rule that "le
juge de /'action doit etre juge de l'exception.'' See Hauriou, Jurisprudence,
Vol. 1, p. 6o (note under the Septfonds case) and Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 568. ..
In the 1 oth edition of his Precis (p. ss) Hauriou circuitously argued that 1
administrative regulations "are not laws" for "they can be declared illegal.''
It would seem, however, that the existence or nonexistence of a power in the
courts to make declarations of illegality depends upon the constitution rather
than upon the nature of the impeached act. Cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2 , p. 1 9 3 1
but see Berthilemy, Traite, p . 1 2 3 , note 1 , interpreting the Guillou decision,
supra, notes 1 8 and 23, as not assimilating regulations to laws, "because it,
_J
affirms the right of the courts to inquire into their legality.''
On the absence of judicial authority in France to declare parliamentary laws :-:··
illegal, see : Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 48 3 ; Moreau, p. 263, note t ; Dareste, p. I 63,
note 1 ; Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. I , p. 563 ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2,
p. I 9 3 1 Duguit, Etudes de droit public ( 1 903) Vol. 2, p. 5 20 ff. See also Duez,
"Le controle j uridictionnel de la constitutionnalite des lois en France," in
Melanges Maurice Hauriou ( I 929), p. 2 I I ff., disapproving contemporary
efforts to vest the courts with power to question the constitutionality of the
acts of the legislature ; also the note in 53 R. D. P. ( 1 936) 670 ff., concern
ing two recent decisions of the Conseil d'Etat [Arrighi and Coudert, Rec.
1 9 3 6.966, S. I 9 3 7·3·33> 54 R. D. P. ( 1 93 7 ) 3 70]. Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 7•
See also Ducrocq, Vol. I, p. I 9, as to the former power of the Senate to deter
mine the constitutionality of laws.
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C. EFFECTS AND RATIONALE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
ORDINARY COURTS OVER REGULATORY ACTS

In view of the doctrine of differentiation of agencies, con
siderable emphasis has been placed upon the fact that a judicial
declaration of the illegality of a regulation is but a refusal to
apply the regulation in a specific instance, and amounts in no
way to an annulment.27 Since annulment can be obtained only
through the administrative jurisdiction, i. e., the Conseil
d'Etat,28 a regulation stigmatized as illegal by an ordinary
court nevertheless continues in force. Consequently, so long
as an administrative agency does not see fit to revoke a given
regulation, or so long as the regulation has not been annulled
by the Conseil d'Etat upon a recourse for excess of power, each
successive litigant whose right of action or defense depends
upon the invalidity of the same regulation must renew the
collateral attack. This circumstance seemed to open one more
avenue of escape from the confusion which necessarily sur
rounded all efforts to harmonize the power of the ordinary
courts over the quasi-legislative acts of the administrative
with the principle of noninterference. The argument was
made29 that the statutory provisions embodying the principle
must be given a practical interpretation to the effect that
(a) every governmental agency ought to be left to fulfill its
mission with absolute freedom, (b) every act by which one
agency encroaches upon the freedom of action of another
should be deemed void. Both of these rules were supposed to
justify the contested review powers of the courts. First, with
out these powers .the courts could not freely perform their
adjudicating functions, and secondly, in pronouncing regula"' Laferriere, Vol. I , p. 504 ; Ducrocq, Vol. I , pp. 84-85, Vol. 3, p. 292 ;
Moreau, pp. 263, 265-266 ; Dareste, p. I 6 9 (note particularly the interesting
analysis of authorities in note I ) ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. so, 722 ; Reglade,
40 R. D. P. at 4 I 6 :ff. ; Hattriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I , p. 59 ; .Appleton, p. I I o.
28 Supra, chap. III.
29 Moreau, p. 263.
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tory orders illegal the ordinary courts did not encroach upon
the administrative sphere of action since they merely refused
to give a concurrence to which the particular administrative
acts were not entitled.30 But even though this theory pre
tends to break with the "obscure notion"31 of the traditional
differentiation of agencies, the substituted "clear notion" of
"the relative independence of the different agencies"32 pre
sents little more than a change of argument and rationaliza
tion.
The fact that an administrative regulation remains intact
notwithstanding a judicial declaration of illegality is com
paratively unimportant. Consistent refusal by the highest ju
dicial tribunal to apply a regulation certainly may become
an effective means of forcing an administrative agency to re
peal or to amend its act.33 The administrative department can
enforce its regulations manu militari only in exceptional cir
cumstances ; ordinarily it is dependent upon judicial ma
chinery for the enforcement of its rules and orders. 34 Except
in case of urgency35 the ordinary courts were thus actually
placed in a position where they could exercise a certain control
over the policies of the administration.36 This result was not a
desirable one in all respects, particularly because it could lead
to the anomalous situation where a regulation declared illegal
by one of the ordinary courts was treated as valid and ap
plicable by the administrative courts. 37
80 Ibid.
81
80

Ibid.
Ibid

•

.. Duguit, Traite,

Vol. 3, p. s o
Infra, chap. X, subdivision B.
85 Infra, chap X, p. 1 69 ff.
18 Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 63 ; d. Berthelemy, "De l'exercice de
la souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 2 1 R. D. P. (1 904) 2.09 at : r.z i 
:r. : u . Moreau (p. 2.63) evidently underestimated the potential effects of the
power of the ordinary courts in this respect.
• See Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 504 ff.
..

•
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Obviously the problem of the reviewability of adminis
trative regulations was fraught with inconsistencies. Professor
Appleton in his treatise on administrative jurisdiction38 sug
gested that the si�uation could be clarified only by a proper
understanding of the doctrine of the separation of powers,
which he maintained should be taken in a political rather than
a strictly functional sense. Conceding the mixed legislative. administrative nature of regulations, he realized that the
separation of powers as previously interpreted could only lead
to an impasse. For, "if regulations are deemed to be laws,
the ordinary courts cannot adjudge them illegal or refuse to
apply them without violating the principle of the separation
of powers and the law of August I 6-24, I 790, title 2, article
I O ; on the other hand, if regulations are looked upon as ad
ministrative acts, the courts can no more test their legality
because this would be to misconstrue the principle of the dif
ferentiation of the judicial and administrative functions, pro
/claimed by title 2, article I 3 of that statute."39
D. THE

SEPTFONDS

CASE COMPROMISE

During the time when legal writers searched for a more
realistic basis, the judicial courts conservatively continued to
predicate their review powers on the legislative quality of ad
ministrative regulations. Many of the decisions of the Cour de
cassation and of the lower courts contain assertions of the right
to interpret and to declare illegal general acts on that ground.40
Not until I 923 did the Tribunal des conflits signify its dis.. Pp. 1 09-I I O.
"" Ibid., p. 1 0 8 . Cf. the opinion in the Septfonds case, D. I 9 Z4·3·4I at 44
(VIII) , infra, note 4 1 .
<O See the cases collected by Appleton, p . 1 07 ; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1,
p. s z ff. In one instance, Martin v. Ville de Marseille, S. I 9 I 8- I 9 I 9 . I ·73> the
Cour de cassation seemed to deviate from a consistent line of decision, holding
that the judicial courts could not interpret an ambiguous term in a municipal
taxing statute. However, Duguit, ( Traite, Vol. 3, p. so) considers the de
cision merely an "accidental error." Cf. Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 54·
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agreement with these holdings in the much discussed de
cision in the case of Septfonds v. Chemins de fer du Midi.41
The Tribunal adopted the opinion of Commissaire Matter,
who argued the case for the government. After analyzing
minutely the question which was before the court, the com
missaire du gouvernement suggested the necessity of making
a distinction between the power of the courts to interpret regu
lations and the power to test their legality. The argument was
founded exclusively upon the basic law42 which prohibits 
the judicial agencies from "disturbing the operations of the
administrative department." The commissaire concluded that
interpretation which "follows, conforms to and applies" the
regulation, does not constitute an interference, while "a decla
ration of illegality and a refusal to apply it wipes out the
regulation, and consequently interferes with the administra
tive action."43 Consequently the power of the ordinary courts
to interpret administrative rules was conceded and the right
to determine the question of legality was denied.
It is of interest to note that already in an earlier case44 the
Tribunal des conflits seems to have attempted to create an ex
ception to the rule by which the courts inquired into the legal
ity of the administrative acts. That case involved a regulation
issued by the military authorities in time of war and the
Tribunal held the civil court bound by the regulation. The
decision was severely criticized and it was insisted that not
even the exigencies of the war could justify an "extension in
the application of the principle of the differentiation of
agencies." 45
01 D. I 924.J.4I, S. I923·3·49 ; see Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I , p. so ff. ;
Precis, uth ed., p. s68 ; Appleton, p. I I I , Supp., p. I 6 ; Berthilemy, Traite,
p. I 24, note ; Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 62 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 5 1 .·
.. Law of Aug. 1 6-24, I 790, tit. 2, art. 1 3, supra, p. I 3, note 3 8.
48 D. 1 924·3·41 at 44 :2 (VIII) .
" Chemins de fer du Nord v. Vion et fils, S. I 9 I 7.J.I, D. 1 9 1 6.3·57> de
cided July 29, 1 9 1 6.
415 See Reglade, 40 R. D. P. at 406 ; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 34
ff., p. 5 7 and note, S. I 9 I 7·3·I·
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The doctrine of the Septfonds case reserving the question
of legality for the administrative courts became the accepted
rule after the Cour de cassation, in I 926/6 asserted once more
the j urisdiction of the judicial courts over the legality of ad
ministrative regulations. The subsequent adherence on the
part of the judiciary to the Septfonds compromise is reflected
in the case of Lamy v. Chemins de fer du Nord,41 decided by
the Cour d'appel of Paris in I 930.
E. CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON

The rule announced by the Tribunal des conflits in the
Septfonds case standing by itself seems to mark a return to a
stricter interpretation of the differentiation · of agencies and
the consequent curtailment of the scope of judicial review of
administrative regulations. Such a development seems to be
in harmony with the previously discussed trends in the di
rection of autonomy in all essentially administrative matters.
However, it would be a grave error to assume that the sequel
of the Septfonds doctrine was a complete surrender by the
judiciary of previously asserted power. The true import of
the doctrine is indicated by the exceptions to which the rule is
subject. These exceptions were carefully pointed out by the
commissaire du gouvernement, although they were not in
volved in the case.48 They were grouped under two separate
categories, the first of which derives from express statutes.
Most important is section I 5 of article 47 I of the penal code,
interpreted to confer power on the judicial tribunals to verify
the legality of all regulations imposing criminal penalties.
Secondly, plenary jurisdiction over all matters of indirect
taxation has been given to the civil courts. Of far greater
significance, however, is the reference to certain nonstatutory
"' Alamichel v. Ville de Vichy, S. I 9z6. I .z I 3, cited Bonnard, Precis, p. I 6z.
Gaz. Pal. I 930.I .684. See the note there ; Appleton, Supp., p. I 6.
48 D. I 9 Z4.J.4I at 44 :z-45 :I.
••
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exceptions comprised in the second group. The commissaire,
citing various authorities/9 defended the theory that the or
dinary courts could always determine whether an administra- . .
tive agency had acted within its power i n issuing any regula
tion affecting ( 1 ) personal liberty, and ( 2) personal status
or property rights. 50
That the Septfonds decision has not been understood to in
augurate a sweeping change is very probably indicated by the
fact that criticism has been confined to its procedural implica
tions. It must be borne in mind that the abolition of judicial
review of the legality of regulations is not synonymous with
complete absence of court review. Ascertainment of legality,
so far as affected by the Septfonds decision, has merely been
remitted to the· exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative
courts. Therefore, if a judicial court, called upon to apply an
administrative regulation, is in doubt as to its legality, it must
refer the issue to the Conseil d'Etat. 5.1 That this procedural complication was undesirable because of the additional ex
pense and delay involved is evident.52
·

'" D. I 9 24·3·4I at 45 : 1 .
Infra, chap. IX, subdivision A.
01 Prior to the Septfonds case the Conseil d'Etat not infrequently had to
pass upon the legality of regulations which had been referred to it by lower
j udicial courts, even though the latter might have decided the issue themselves
under art. 4 7 x, § 1 5 of the Code Penal (supra, note 7 ) . See Reglade, 40 R. D. P.
at 424; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. x, p. 6o, Precis, uth ed., p. 568.
Technically the issue of legality in these cases becomes what is known as
a question prejudicielle. The doctrine of the questions prejudicielles through a
system of declaratory judgments operates to keep intact the respective spheres of
administrative and ordinary j urisdictions. Thus whenever the decision of a
controversy properly before a court necessitates the determination of a question
that may not be passed upon by that court, that question must be referred to
the competent tribunal. See Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 492 ff. ; Appleton, p. 1 2 6 :ff. ;
Hauriou, Precis, x oth ed., p. 8 7 7 :ff. ; Bonnard, Precis, p . 1 59 :ff. ; Waline,
Manuel, p. 1 5 8 :ff. The courts will not allow a question prejudicielle obviously
designed to delay j udgment; cf. the conclusions (VIII) of the commissaire in
the Septfonds case, D. 1 924.3.41 at 45· See the recent decisions of the Tribunal
des conflits in Societe des forces motrices d'Arrens v. Pahu, and Durand v.
Societe L'Energie electrique Rhone et Jura, D. 1 934·3·57 (6o) (and note by
Prof. Pepy) , noted 52 R. D. P. ( 1 935) 329.
a Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I, pp. S I-52, Precis, uth ed., P · 568, note
1 9 ; Appleton, Supp., p. 1 6.
150
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In the United States the separation of powers as originally
conceived has been favorable to judicial control of the legality
of the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies. Ad
ministrative regulations are deemed to grow out of the ex
ercise of delegated power, and the courts may invalidate the
delegation by the legislature if it is too broad. 53 Morever,
they may set aside the regulation if the administrative body
in making it has exceeded the delegation.54 In the adjudica
tion of controversies the courts have reserved to themselves
the interpretation of regulations although weight is given to
prior consistent administrative interpretation.
The circumstance that American administrative law has
been unencumbered by the difficulties accompanying the de
velopment of the French droit administratif makes the simi
larity of the net result of the two systems all the more impres
sive. True, the French judiciary was finally limited to the
interpretation of administrative regulations. However, the
statutory exceptions, read in conjunction with the general doc
trine that the legality of any general rule encroaching upon
personal liberties or property rights is subject to judicial ap
praisal, render the review powers of the French courts com
parable, if not equal, to those of the constitutional courts in
the United States.
The proposal of the Administrative Law Bill 55 to vest the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
with power "to hear and determine whether any [ administra
tive J rule . . . is in conflict with the Constitution of the
"" Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, ( I 935) 293 U. S. 3 8 8 ; A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, (I 935) 295 U. S. 495· Cf. Waline, Manuel,
pp. 32 I-241 referring to certain extreme instances of legislative "abdication"
in France during the period I 924-1 935.
"' Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, ( 1 935) 2 9 6 U. S. I 76
.. S. 9 1 5, H. R. 4236, 76th Cong., r st sess. ( 1 9 3 9 ) , § 2 ; 62 Rep. A. B. A .
( i 9 3 7 ) 789 at 8 1 6, 847 ; 63 Rep. A . B . A . ( 1 938) 3 3 I a t 3 34 ; McGuire,
"The American Bar Association's Administrative Law Bill," I La. L. Rev.
( I 9 39) sso; Symposium, 34 Ill. L. Rev. ( 1 940) 64I .
•
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United States or the statute under which issued" would not
affect the foregoing result. Nevertheless, for present com
parative purposes the proposal is exceptionally noteworthy.
It is not intended as a substitute for existing methods of ju
dicial review of regulations in connection with actual con
troversies. 56 But it provides a procedure for obtaining de
claratory judgments on the validity of administrative rules. 57
Since the federal constitutional courts, even under the De
claratory Judgments Act,58 could not render such judgments,
except in connection with a "case or controversy,"59 it must
be assumed that the court of appeals would render such judg
ments in its capacity as a legislative, or let us say an adminis
trative, court. Thus administrative rules could be annulled
upon the petition of private parties in precisely the same man
ner in which the French Conseil d'Etat acts upon a recourse
for excess of power. If, however, the petition fails and the
rule is upheld, then it may again become subj ect to attack
in connection with an ordinary action.
However, it should not be overlooked that there has been
a tendency to incorporate more drastic provisions for the ju
dicial review of regulations into modern statutes, of which the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1 93 8 60 is the most outstand"" Sec. 3 specifically provides that "nothing contained in this section shall
prevent the determination of the validity or invalidity of any rule which may
be involved in any suit or review of an administrative decision or order in
any court of the United States as now or hereafter authorized by law."
61 S. 9 1 5, sec. 3 : "The court
.
shall have no power in the proceed
ings except to render a declaratory judgment holding such rule legal and
valid or holding it contrary to law and invalid."
08 48 Stat. L. (r 934) 955, 2.8 U. S. C. ( 1 9 34) § 400.
1111 Muskrat v. United States, ( r 9 r r ) 2. 1 9 U. S. 346 ; Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Grannis, ( r 92.7) 2.73 U. S. 70 ; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association,
( 1 92. 8 ) 2. 7 7 u. s. 2. 74·
00 5 2. Stat. L. ( 1 938) 1 040 ; z r U. S. C. (Supp. 1 93 9 ) , § 301 et seq. See "The
New Food, Drug and Cosmetic Legislation," 6 Law fs! Contem. Prob. ( 1 939)
r ; Fuchs, "The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act," ibid. 43·
•
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ing instance. Under this statute61 "any person who will be
adversely affected" may obtain a review of the regulation in
a United States Circuit Court of Appeals. These courts are
given jurisdiction not only to "set it aside in whole or in
part, temporarily or permanently," but also "if the Secretary
[ of Agriculture] refuses to issue, amend or repeal a regula
tion . . . [to] order [him] to take action, with respect to
such regulation, in accordance with law."62 Provisions of
this type seem to run so definitely counter to heretofore ac
cepted notions of division of labor in the departments of
government that the flagrant imposition of administrative
functions upon federal courts can scarcely be expected to stand
the test of constitutionality. Since they have not as yet been
put to that test, it is very doubtful whether they should be
considered as representative of the American administrative
system.
11 Z l
81

U. S. C. (Supp. 1 9 3 9 ) , § 3 7 1
Ibid., § 3 7 1 (£) (3 ) .

(£) .

CHAPTER VII

Jurisdiction Over Public Officers
URISDICTION of the ordinary French courts has been
limited in regard to administrative regulations on the
constitutional ground that they emanate from adminis
trative bodies.1 As a rule2 acts of general application, even if
illegal, retain their administrative immunity. So far as the
judicial courts are concerned, they are not nullities until so
declared by the administrative courts. Acts of individual ap
plication,3 however, have not been accorded the same treat
ment. In respect to these acts it has been held that certain
kinds of illegality deprive them of their: administrative char
acter, notwithstanding their administrative origin, so that
controversies to which they give rise must be litigated in the
ordinary courts. The classic instances with which the new
regime administratif had to deal were official acts which fur
nished the basis for actions ex delicto or quasi-ex delicto against
administrative officials. The difficulties which at the outset
grew out of these cases had an important bearing upon subse
quent jurisdictional developments.

J

1 Reference must again be made to the law of the 1 6th Fructidor, year III
(Sept. z, 1 795) : "Defenses iteratives sont faites aux tribunaux de connaitre
des actes d'administration de quelque espece qu'ils soient.
. " See
translation, supra, chap. I, note 3 8.
• Septfonds v . Chemins de fer du Midi, S. 1 923-3-49> D. 1 924·3·411 supra,
chap. VI, note 4 1 .
8 Continental writers have frequently given specific attention t o the dis
tinction between acts of general and acts of limited application. See, e. g.,
Waline, "Observations sur la gradation des normes j uridiques etablie par M.
Carre de Malberg," 51 R. D. P. ( 1 934) 521 at 5 3 9 ; Mayer, Deutsckel
Verwaltungsreckt, zd ed. ( 1 9 14 ) , Vol. 1 1 pp. 84 ff., 95 ff. ; Bernatzik,
Recktspreckung und materielle Recktskra/t ( 1 8 8 6 ) , pp. 1 ff.
•
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A. THE CONDITIONS AT THE TIM E OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION

The new regime, solicitous to ward off interference by the
j udiciary with administrative objectives and policies, pro
hibited not only j udicial inquiry into administrative acts but
also actions against administrative officials and agents on ac
count of such acts.4 For it was apparent that without the second
interdict the first might easily be circumvented. But even so,
the problem to be solved was far too intricate to yield to these
simple rules.
The new order could not hope to succeed by discarding the
institutions of the ancien regime in their entirety; nor did it
attempt to do so. Certain traditions inevitably survived and
served to qualify the content of the new doctrines and the
meaning of the new labels. It was not difficult to oust the ju
dicial courts from all participation in and control over ad
ministrative action. On the other hand, to prohibit those
courts from assuming jurisdiction over the persons of ad
ministrative agents conflicted sharply with the fact that re
dress of all delictual and quasi-delictual acts was available
only in the ordinary courts. This limitation was itself due to
the doctrine of the differentiation of agencies, which pre
cluded the administrative from exercising jurisdiction over
strictly judicial matters. 5 But it is well to bear in mind also
that at the beginning the new administrative organism was
not equipped with any machinery for the judicial disposition
of complaints.6 The personal liability of public officers be
came thus at once submerged in a vexing problem of juris
diction.
4

Statutes quoted supra, chap. I, note 3 8.
Art. 891 Constitution of the sth Fructidor, year
See supra, chap. I, note 40.
1 See supra, chap. I, subdivision C.
•
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In France, prior to and immediately following the Revo
lution,7 the maxim obtained that "the king can do no wrong."8
Consequently suits for damages sustained on account of the
acts of governmental agents could be directed only against
those agents personally and had to be prosecuted in the ordi
nary courts. But the political background of the French sys
tem forced later developments to take a turn away from the
earlier practice. In France the position of the j udiciary prior
to I 789 was extremely strong, although it was so in a political
rather than in a constitutional sense. Prosecutions of adminis
trative officials in the judicial courts often had political sig
nificance, and the Crown frequently found it necessary to
protect itself with evocations,9 that is, by withdrawing from
the courts the jurisdiction which they had assumed over the
person of public officers. The revolutionary legislators there
fore felt that they were confronted with a double task. Pro
vision had to be made for the personal liability of public pf
ficials in order to provide an effective guarantee against arbi
trary invasion of civil liberties.10 At the same time, it seemed
necessary to protect administrative agents against mala fide
actions which, as the experiences of the past taught, might in
directly impair administrative efficiency. The personal liabil
ity of public officers was originally sanctioned by article I 5
of the Bill of Rights of I 789,11 and was reiterated in article 24
7 Cf. Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif et de droit public, I oth ed.
( 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 367.; Duguit, Traittf de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( 1 92 3 ) , Vol.
3, p. 2 6 2 :ff. (also the bibliography at p. 294).
8 Hauriou, supra, note 7, referring to the Anglo-American conditions, sug
gested that this principle can survive only in countries where "the courts are
pervaded with the sense of their responsibility." Cf. Duguit, Etudes de droit
public ( I 9 0 3 ) , Vol. 2, p. 637.
• Supra, pp. I x , 25 ; cf. Laferriere, Traiti de la furidiction administrative
et des recours contentieux, 2d ed. ( 1 896), Vol. I, p. 6 3 8, note I .
10
Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 2 63-264 ; Ducrocq, Cours de droit adminis
tratif, 7th ed. ( 1 897), Vol. 3, p. 330.
u "Sbciety has a right to demand that each public officer account for his
official acts." Declaration of Rights of Aug. 2 6, I 789, art. I 51 quoted in

-
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of the Bill of Rights of I 793.12 Regulation of criminal liabil
ity was effected through specific sections of the criminal code,13
while civil liability for torts was derived from the broad
language of article I J 8 2 of the civil code14 which provides
that "Anything done by a person which causes damage to
another obligates the person through whose fault the damage
has occurred to make reparation." On the other hand, abuses
of criminal prosecutions and civil actions against administra
tive functionaries were first sought to be checked by a statute
enacted in I 79015 which required the concurrence of the hier
archic superior before a court could proceed to determine the
personal liability of an official on account of an act done in the
exercise of his official function.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
16
AGENTS OF THE YEAR VIII

The incorporation in the constitution of the year VIII 17
of the provisions of its article 7 5,18 requiring the consent of the
Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 2 64 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 0 ; Jacquelin, Les
principes dominants du contentieux administratif ( I 899), p. 1 26.
"' The security of society "cannot exist if the limits of the functions of
the state are not clearly defined by law and if the personal liability of all
functionaries is not assured." Declaration of Rights of May 29, I 793, art. 24,
quoted by Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 264.
18 See Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 267.
" See Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 I ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 364.
ll! Law of 7-I 4 October, 1 790 ; see also the similar provision of the law of
Dec. I 4, I 789, art. 6I, as to municipal officers. Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 6 3 7 ;
Ducrocq, Vol. 3 , p . 3 3 I ; Jacquelin, Principes, p . 1 2 6 ; Appleton, Traite
lllmentaire du contentieux administratif ( I 9 2 7 ) , p. 20. This provision must
be read together with the statutes enacting the differentiation of agencies and
imposing forfeiture for nonobservance by the courts (supra, p. 1 3 ) .
111 De Cormenin, Droit administratif, sth ed. ( I 84o) , Vol. 2 , p . 3 3 8 ff. ;
Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 6 3 7 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 2 ff. ; Jacquelin, Principes,
p. 1 2 7 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., pp. 367-368 ; Appleton, pp. 2 2 8-229 ;
Bertkllemy, Traitl lllmentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( I 9 3 3 ) i p.
8s-&6.
11 1 799-I 8oo.
18 22 Frimaire, Year VIII (Dec. I 3, 1 799) : "Art. 75· The agents of the gov
ernment, other than the ministers, may not be prosecuted on account of acts related
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Conseil d'Etat to prosecutions of administrative agents, did
not establish a new principle. The enactment merely gave new
emphasis to the necessity of protecting administrative agents
and placed the power to authorize actions against them uni
formly and exclusively 1 9 in the hands of the highest adminis
trative body. However, this article 7 5 became the basis of
important developments which caused a great deal of dis
pute and discussion because of their bearing upon both the
scope of the differentiation of agencies and the extent of the
personal liability of administrative functionaries. Correspond
ing to the diverging attitudes toward the issues involved, in
terpretation and appraisal of the effect of article 7 5, which
remained in force until r 8 7o, fluctuated considerably.20
In the case of Lefevre-Pontalis v. Cheronnet/1 decided in
r 8 64, the Cour de cassation held that "the guarantee of art.
7 5 is but the consequence of the fundamental principle of the
separation of powers," and that "its only obj ect is to insure
independence of the administrative department from the ju
diciary and to protect, not the accused person, but the admin
istrative act."22 However, it is quite clear that the require
ment of special authorization of suits against administrative
agents was motivated by other equally forceful considera
tions.23 At the beginning of the new regime the only remedy
which a private party had to recover compensation for ad
ministratively inflicted injuries was an action against the ofto their functions, except in pursuance of a decision of the Conseil d'Etat. In that case the action must be prosecuted in the ordinary courts."
"' There were nevertheless a few, though unimportant, exceptions. See
Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 63 8 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2 7.
20 The life-span of the provision was somewhat of an anomalous phenomenon.
Art. 7 5 continued to be applied as a strictly administrative rule, notwithstand
ing its origin as a constitutional precept and notwithstanding the fact that
several succeeding constitutions had not reenacted it. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 332 ;
Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2 9 ; Appleton, p. :u 8 ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 85, note
I . Cf. de Cormenin, Vol. 2, Appendix, pp. 9 9-100.
lll s. 1 864. 1 .248.
mo
In the same sense, de Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 342.
28 Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 8 7.
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ficial. The potential intimidation of administrative agents,
who were thought to be exposed not only to personal liability
but also to prosecutions tainted with personal and political
motives, had to be counterbalanced by a certain amount of
protection. Even without the attempted differentiation of
agencies, this seemed necessary in a country where deliberate
judicial interference with administration was anticipated.
Likewise the placement of a protective mechanism in the
hands of the highest administrative body was more effective
than a mere procedural device for the guidance of the courts.
The latter, Hauriou24 suggested, would have been adequate
only in a country with a "stronger and a more responsible
judiciary" than that of France at the time.
The amount of protection of officials from mala fide prose
cutions actually afforded by article 7 5 can be gathered from
its sanctions as well as from its practical operation. Whenever
a criminal or civil action was instituted in a judicial tribunal
to whose jurisdiction it normally belonged/11 the court was
bound 26 to exercise its jurisdiction, unless the incriminated act
was "related to an administrative function" within the mean
ing of the constitutional provision. Whether or not this was
the case the court determined for itself. 27 The administrative
department had no authority to assert a conflict, since there
was no dispute as to jurisdiction; only its exercise was sub
j ected to administrative consent.28 In view of these limita
tions, the scope of article 7 5 could easily be overestimated.29
"' Precis, roth ed., p. 3 6 7.
Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 ·
28 Ibid., p. 3 3 4, and cases cited.
"' Ibid., p. 3 3 8 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2. 8 ; Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p.
3 6 8 , note 2..
"" Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 7 ; Jacquelin, Principes, pp. 12. 8-r 2.9. Art. 3 of an
ordinance of June r, I 8 2. 8 express!y prohibited conflicts. There was no occasion
for the administrative to vindicate jurisdiction, and conversely the authoriza
tion to be given by the Conseil d'Etat did not confer jurisdiction but merely
removed a procedural obstacle to its exercise. Laferriere, Vol. r , pp. 63 8-63 8 .
""' Cf. Ducrocq, Vol. 3 , p. 3 3 8 ; Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 3 6 8 , note 2..
211
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Nevertheless, the provision was implemented with sanctions
which rendered it far more effective than was ultimately
found desirable. The law of August I 6-24, I 790,30 embody
ing the differentiation of agencies, and also the criminal code31
provided forfeiture and civic degradation for judicial officers
who deliberately interfered with matters of administration by
entertaining actions and executing judgments against admin
istrative officers. 32 Furthermore, the criminal code33 imposed
money fines for wilful violations of article 7 5. In fact, the
cases in which the courts requested authorizations from the
Conseil d'Etat were numerous,34 and the general consensus
is that the constitutional provision was "scandalously
abused." 35 According to statistics for the latter part of the
period which ended in I 8 70, the number of authorizations by
the Conseil was uniformly much lower than that of the re
j ections.86 This, however, contrasts sharply with the corre
sponding figures for the years I 808 to I 8 I 3 , when the au
thorizations far outnumbered refusals.37 It is in regard to
this earlier period that de Cormenin spoke of the Conseil
d'Etat as an advisory body "without favor and without hatred,
and better suited than any other official body to protect at once
80 Supra, p. 1 3, note 3 8.
111 Art. u7 ( 2 ) , Code penal.
82 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 7 ·
83 Art. 1 2 9 . Ducrocq, ibid. ; Hauriou, Precis, x oth ed., p. 3 6 7, note 3 ·
"' See the tables of the Mises en jugement concluding each volume of the
Recueil des arrets du conseil for the years 1 845 through 1 8 6 6 ; see also the
statistics given by De Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 3 8 0.
.. Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 640 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 3 3 8-3 9 ; Jeze, 26 R. D. P.
( 1 9 09 ) 2 6 3 , quoting from the conclusions of Commissaire du Gouvernement
Tardieu in Girodet v. Morizot [D. 1 90 8 .3.57 :3 ; S. 1 9 0 8 .3 . 8 1 ] ; Hauriou,
Precis, x oth ed., p. 3 6 8 ; Waline, Manuel ilimentaire de droit administratif
( 1 9 3 6 ) , p. 3 7 3 ·
88 See Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 · It is difficult to reconcile the figures given
by Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2 8, for 1 8 52 to z 8 64 with the data referred to
by Ducrocq ; the latter, however, seem to be more in accord with the tabula
tions in the volumes of the Recueil des arrets (supra, note 3 4) for the same
years.
111 De Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 3 8 o : 1 22 7 authorizations, 3 05 rejections.
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the governmental agents against private vengeance, and pri
vate persons against arbitrary action of such agents."38 Later,
when the situation reversed itself, proportionately the great
est number of rejections involved civil actions against admin
istrative functionaries,39 which do not seem to have been
within the purview of article 75 at the time of its enactment.40
The gist of article 7 5 of the constitution of the Year VII I
lies in that its operation was limited to suits on account of "acts
related to [ official] functions."41 The limitation, as inter
preted, attained an importance far beyond the immediate oc
casion in so far as it rested on the fundamental distinction be
tween faute personnelle and faute de service. Undoubtedly
-bearing in mind the political environment of article 7 5there is some .significance in the fact that the interpretations of
the limiting phrase subsequently relied upon are those con
tained in the decisions of the judicial courts rather than in the
mises en jugement of the Conseil d'Etat. The case most fre
quently referred to is Lejevre-Pontalis v. Cheronnet/2 deas

Ibid., pp. 3 39-40.
Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 ; Jacquelin, Principes, pp. 1 2 7-1 2 8 ; cf. the tables
in the volumes of the Recueil des arrets covering the corresponding years.
.. Jacquelin, p. 1 2 7 ; Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 368, note 2 .
... Supra, note r 8.
42 S. r 8 64.1 .248 ; referred to by Laferriere, Vol. r , p. 6 3 9 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3 ,
p . 334; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2 8. Action was brought against the mayor
of a town who in the course of duties performed in connection with an elec
tion had publicly slandered the plaintiff. Defendant invoked the protection of
art. 7 5 and was upheld both at the trial and upon appeal. The Cour de cassation
reversed the lower courts.
Laferriere, however, insists that the decision misconstrues the scope and in
tent of art. 7 5, because of certain language which must be taken as dictum only
and not essential to the definition of acts of administrative officers which are
relatifs a leurs fonctions. The court prefaced the body of its decision by term
ing art. 7 5 "a consequence of the separation of powers" (supra, at page 97)
and "protecting not the inculpated person, but the administrative act."
Earlier, in the matter of Regnault [S. r 846.1 .59o], the same court had
found art. 75 to apply because delictual acts imputed to a public weigher were
"related to the function." The officer in charge of a public weighing machine,
after having performed his duty at the instance of the owner of a wagon, was
requested to reweigh the wagon upon the intervention of the mayor. The
weigher, taking offense, refused to reweigh and accompanied his refusal with
verbal abuses, threats, and assault upon the mayor. These acts, having occurred
89
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cided by the Cour de cassation in I 8 64. I t held that for article
7 5 to be applicable "it is not sufficient that the defendant be
an administrative agent, nor that the incriminated acts occur
during the performance of his duties," but that "it is essential
that the acts are related to the function, in other words, that
they form a part of the very function with which they are
identified, and of which they constitute the execution, even
though a malicious one."
C.

REPEAL OF THE "ADMINISTRATIVE GUARANTEE"
INTERPRETATION-CONSEQUENCES 43

The growing unpopularity of the protection of adminis
trative agents under article 7 5 of the constitution of the Year
VIII manifested itself through frequent attacks upon the
provision in and out of parliament.44 Ultimately, pressure
from liberal factions45 resulted in an assault upon its pro
tracted existence46 through the abrogating text of the decree
of September 1 9, I 8 70.47 However, the seemingly unambiguupon the demand made and in connection with the refusal to perform an act
within official duties, were deemed related to the function. (Laferriere, loc.
cit., contrasts this decision with that in the Cheronnet case as representing the
correct doctrine.)
48 Laferrih·e, Vol. r , p. 640 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 3 3 2, 339 ff. ; Jacquelin,
Principes, p. 1 3 0 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3 , p. 2 9 1 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, roth
ed., p. 3 6 8 ff. ; Appleton, p. 229 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 84 ff . ; Waline,
Manuel, p. 3 7 3 ff.
•• Laferriere, Vol. r , p. 640 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 2 ; Duguit; Traiti, Vol.
J , pp. 290-2 9 1 ·
'" Laferriere, loc. cit; Duguit, loc. cit.
48 See note 20, supra.
41 The provisional National Defense Government of r 87o, which was en
dowed with virtually dictatorial powers, decreed :
"Art. I . Article 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII is repealed.
"Also repealed are all other provisions of general or special laws whose ob
ject is to impede actions against officers of all classes.
"Art. z. Provision shall hereafter be made for civil penalties which in the
public interest may have to be imposed upon private persons instituting ill
founded actions against funtionaries."
This enactment in the form of a "decree-law" (decret-loi) , subsequently
ratified in national convention, had all the legislative force of an act of Parlia-
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ous death sentence of the decree served only to prove the
transmigratory powers of the substance of the ill-respected
article 75·
The language of the decree was indeed broad. All laws ob
structing suits against administrative o:fficers48 were repealed.
But the law of August I 6-24, I 790, which contained one of
the sanctions of the former "administrative guarantee,"49 also
gave statutory expression to the constitutional differentiation
of the judicial and administrative agencies. Whether this law,
together with other statutes depending upon it, was affected
by the decree was therefore of the utmost importance. It must
be remembered that the ouster of the ordinary courts from
jurisdiction over matters pertaining or related to public ad
ministration had never been acquiesced in unconditionally in
all quarters. It is particularly interesting here to follow
J acquelin's50 defense of his thesis that the decree of I 8 70 re
pealed the differentiation of the two jurisdictions. To Jac
quelin the intent of the decree was obvious. It reflected the
ideas of the liberal party of the day. On September I 8, I 8 70
the government appointed a commission which was to examine
the question of suppressing the administrative courts. A favor
able report was unanimously voted. On the following day,
September I 8, the law abrogating article 7 5 of the constitu
tion of the Year VIII was passed. This viewpoint that the leg
islative intent behind the decree of I 8 70 was to remove any
and all obstacles, with no solicitude for the maintenance of
the differentiation of agencies, has at various times been
forcibly defended.51 The contrary attitude received its chief
ment. Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 30 . Cf.
Vol . 3, P· 3 5 5 ·
48 Ducrocq, Vol . 31 p. 3 5 3, Jacquelin,
U9-30.
48 Supra, chap.
note 3 8.

Laferriere,
Principes,

Vol. 1 , p. 640 ;
pp. 1 3 1 -3 z ;

Ducrocq,

Appleton,

pp.

I,

"" P.

1 3 9·

61 See Ducrocq, Vol . 3 1 pp. 3 3 9 1f. ; 345, 3 5 1 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 741 re
ferring to the conclusions of Le on Blum, who, in a I 9 1 8 case before the Conseil
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support from the argument that the absence of specific lan
guage52 in the hastily made58 decree does not warrant the as
sumption that it should have such drastic consequences.
It seems natural that the judicial tribunals should have
seized the opportunity to exercise once again, without restric
tion, their traditional jurisdiction in criminal and tort cases.
The impediment of having first to ascertain whether the crime
or tort was a functional rather than a personal act had been
removed. It is in this sense that the Cour de cassation in 1 872
interpreted the decree of 18 70 in Meyere v. Rollin,"4 which
has become the leading case on the point. The court held that
d'Etat, undertook to deduce the intent of the framers of the decree from the
preceding debates.
Hauriou (Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 3 69, note ) , taking issue with Jacquelin, ad
vances the argument that the latter might be correct "if the principle of
[statutory] interpretation, which consists in supplementing the language of
statutes by the intent of the legislature and by preparatory material, were
universally accepted" ; that, however, "this is not so," and "that, quite to the
contrary, the principle applied in practice is that of purely objective interpre
tation, i. e., the reconciliation of the language with the situation to be regulated
by the statute."
52 Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 64I .
63 Berthelemy, Traite, p . 8 7 . The reporter of the decree, i n the Collection
complete des lois, decrets, etc. [Duvergier, Vol. 70 ( I 8 7o) , p. 3 3 5, note]
was apprehensive of the broad implications of the decree, which was passed
at a time (war of I 8 7o with Germany) "when even the firmest minds did
not retain desirable composure." He remarks that the National Convention would
have to decide whether or not the decree should have the broad effects given
to it at the time, perhaps without fully realizing the consequences. [The decree
was later approved without restriction (supra, note 47 ) , though no civil pen
alties pursuant to art. 2 of the decree were ever enacted. Ducrocq, Vol. 3,
pp. 3 55-5 6 ; Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp. ( I 892) , Vol. I o, p.
7 86.]
"' D. I 8 72 . I .3 8 5 ; Laferriere, Vol. I , pp. 642-643 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 340 ;
Jacquelin, Principes, p. I 3 4 ; Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 3 6 8-3 69, note 4 ;
Appleton, p. 2 3 1.
The case involved a civil action against an army general (Meyere) who had
Rollin imprisoned for two weeks, without a hearing in court, after an alterca
tion with an officer. The general contended that Rollin was a member of the
mobilized forces. Rollin denied that he came under the jurisdiction of the gen
eral and recovered a judgment ordering his release as well as damages for
wrongful imprisonment after the civil court found that he was not a member
of the army (because previously rejected on account of physical defects) . The
general appealed, asserting that the civil court violated the principle of the dif
ferentiation of agencies in that it had interfered with the execution of an
administrative act.

1 04-

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

the necessary effect of the decree was to permit the judiciary
to appraise and determine the nature of the act of a govern
ment agent alleged to give rise to a civil action for damages.
It was argued that if the determination of this question had to
be referred to the administrative courts, this would revive, in
a different form, the former protection of administrative of
ficers. However, it is of even greater significance that the ad
ministrative Conseil d'Etat55 had already attached the same
meaning to the decree of I 8 70, less than a year after its pro
mulgation, in another oft-cited case, de Cumont & Stofflet v.
Engelhard.56 In the appeal Engelhard,57 the Cour de cassation
again held that the differentiation of the administrative and
judicial agencies did not nullify the right restored to private
individuals by the decree of September I 9, I 8 70, to proceed
directly against administrative officials in the civil courts in or
der to obtain indemnity for injuries to such individuals. More
over, the decision pointed out that the ordinary courts could
not be denied the power to appraise the facts and motives en
tering into the delictual acts brought before them without
rendering illusory the remedy afforded. The language em
ployed was repeated by the Cour de cassation in the matter of
"' Charged at the time with the disposition of conflicts (supra, p. z6) .
"" D. I 8 7z.3. I 8 (3d case), decided contrary to the conclusions of Laferriere.
The case was referred to by the commissaire du gouvernement in the Meyere
case. It is cited by Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 641-64z ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 34 ;
Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p . 369, note 4 · Two newspapers had been suspended
for two months upon the order of a prefect, at the instance of military author
ities in time of war, with approval of the Minister of the Interior. The prefect's
publicly posted order set forth as grounds that the newspapers incited to civil
war, that their owners were guilty of conniving with the enemy, and that
they endangered their country. The publishers sued to have these statements
declared defamatory and libelous and to have the judgment published at de
fendant's expense. See also Dune v. Engelhard, D. 1 87z.J.I 8 (zd case) .
"7 D. I 8 73.1.29 1 . After the Conseil d'Etat had confirmed the jurisdiction
of the civil court in de Cumont v. Engelhard (supra, note 5 6 ) , the plaintiffs
recovered judgment. Engelhard, the defendant prefect, appealed ; but the
Cour de cassation rejected the plea that the judgment violated the "separation
of powers." The case is discussed in Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp.
( 1 8 8 8 ) , Vol. 3, p. 245, and referred to by Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 643, 64s ;
Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 34·
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Petit58 decided during the same year. Consequently the repeal
of the "administrative guarantee" had effectively removed all
obstacles to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ordinary courts
in actions against administrative agents.
D. REACTION-THE TRIBUNAL DES CONFLITS AND THE
PELLETIER

CASE

The j udicial interpretation of the decree of I 8 70, which
made a visible inroad upon the well-guarded administrative
sanctum, had begun to entrench itself firmly. Suits against
public officers on account of their official acts increased in
number. 59 Possibly the fear-or hope-that the principle of
differentiation was losing vitality was well founded. How
ever, fear and hope subsided suddenly with the advent of the
Tribunal des conflits and its resolution of the conflict in the
case of Pelletier v. General de Ladmirault.60
The Tribunal des conflits was permanently established
by the law of May 24, I 8 72. 61 A year later the administrative
department invoked its jurisdiction in an effort to have the
judgment of a civil court in the Pelletier case set aside because
of an erroneous interpretation of the decree of I 8 70, and of
the consequent violation of the differentiation of agencies.
The Tribunal in its de�ision 62 sustained the challenge and
.. D. I 8 7 3 · I ·3 9 0 ; cited in Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp. ( I 8 8 8 ) ,
Vol. 3, p. 245 ; Laferriere, Vol. I , pp. 643, 645 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 340 (see
also the other cases there) ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. I J4. The case involved an
"administrative delict" of a member of a municipal council ; no detailed facts
are given in the decision.
.. Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 643.
00 s. I 8 74·:Z.:z 8 ; D, I 8 74·3·5·
81 Supra, p. z 6.
82 Pelletier v. de Ladmirault, S. I 8 74.z.z 8 ; D. I 8 74·3·5 [the decision is re
ported as of July 30, I 8 7 3 , but by many writers (Laferriere, Ducrocq,
Jacquelin, Duguit, Hauriou) it is assigned to July z 6, I 8 7 J ] . The relevant
parts of the decision are in the following language : "Article 7 5, constitution
of the year VIII, does not affect the prohibition addressed to the civil courts
regarding cognizance of administrative acts, and refers exclusively to the
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confined the operation of the decree of I 8 70 within limits
sufficiently narrow to preserve the full force of the law of
August I 6-24, I 790, fortified by that of the I 6 Fructidor,
Year III.
prohibition to summon before them administrative functionaries on account of
their functions,
These texts [the laws of August 1 790 and Fructidor,
year III, on the one hand, and article 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII,
on the other] established two distinct prohibitions which, although they both
rest upon the principle of the separation of powers, whose exact interpreta
tion they were intended to assure, referred to different objects and do not
produce the same consequences in point of jurisdiction. The prohibition ad
dressed to the judicial courts to take cognizance of acts of administration of
whatever nature constitutes an absolute and general rule of jurisdiction de
signed to protect administrative acts and can be enforced by the administrative
department by exercising its right to assert a conflict whenever, contrary to this
prohibition, the judicial courts have assumed j urisdiction over an adminis
trative act. The prohibition to sue the agents of the government without pre
vious authorization, designed first of all to protect public functionaries against
malicious prosecution, did not constitute a rule of jurisdiction, but created a
plea in bar, placing an obstacle in the way of all suits against these agents on
account of acts related to their official functions, even when the acts in question
did not have an administrative character and constituted crimes or delicts sub
ject to the jurisdiction o� the ordinary courts. This plea was available only in
the ordinary courts and could never occasion the assertion of a conflict on the
part of the administration. The decree
abrogating article 7 5 of
the constitution of the year VIII, as well as all other provisions of general
and special laws whose object is to hinder suits against public functionaries of
all kinds, has had no other effect than to suppress the plea in bar founded
on the absence of authorization with all its legal consequences, and to restore
to the ordinary courts their entire freedom of action within the limits of their
jurisdiction ; however, it [the decree] could not have had the further effect of
extending the limits of their jurisdiction, and of removing the prohibition,
addressed to them in provisions other than those expressly repealed, by the de
cree, to take cognizance of administrative acts, and to deny in that case to
the administrative authorities the right to assert conflicts. Such an interpreta
tion could not be reconciled with the law of May 2.4, I 8 72., which, by establish
ing the Tribunal des conflits, sanctions anew the principle of the 'separation
of powers' and the rules of jurisdiction which follow from it. Furthermore,
in the case at bar it is necessary to apply the special legislation concerning
the state of siege. In fact the action commenced by Pelletier
against
General de Ladmirault
intends to have the seizure {performed
by virtue of the law concerning the state of siege) of the newspaper
published by Pelletier declared arbitrary and illegal, and therefore of no force
and effect, and consequently to have ordered the restitution of the copies
improperly seized and to have the defendants jointly condemned to the pay
ment of two thousand francs in damages. The prohibition and seizure of the
newspaper ordered by the general as commander of the state of siege constituted
a preventive police measure taken by the general as a representative of the
state in the exercise and within the limits of the extraordinary powers con
ferr,ed upon him by article 9, section 4 of the law of August 9, 1 849, concern•

•
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The decision attracted widespread attention 63 commen
surate to its immediate and mediate import, and although it
disposes of a purely jurisdictional issue, the facts upon which
the original cause of action rests must be specifically noted.
As in the de Cumont & Stoffiet case,64 the plaintiff in the
original action was a publisher, the first issue of whose news
paper had been confiscated upon the order of an army general
in time of war. If, therefore, the civil court had the power to
declare the seizure of the newspaper, illegal-as it did-so
that the plaintiff might recover judgment for restitution and
damages, it had necessarily power to scrutinize the propriety
of the administrative act,61' the seizure itself.
In laying the foundation for its decision the Tribunal des
conflits referred to the statute to which it owed its exist
ence.66 This law, the Tribunal held, reaffirmed the differ
entiation of agencies, and that doctrine consequently could
ing the state of siege, and responsibility for which rests with the government
which delegated its powers to him. Plaintiff's claim rests entirely upon this
exercise of police power, and, aside from this act, does not impute to de
fendants any personal errors of the character which would involve their
personal liability ; in fact the action is directed against the act itself, repre
sented by and merged in the functionaries who caused its performance and
cooperated in its execution. Upon these grounds the civil court of Senlis was
incompetent to take cognizance of plaintiff's claim."
68 See Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 643 ff.; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 341 ff. ; Jacquelin,
Principes, p. 1 34 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 2 9 1 ff.; Jeze, 2 6 R. D. P. at
264; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 3 6 8 ; Appleton, p. 23 1 ; Waline, Manuel, p.
3 73 ff.
.. Supra, note 56.
06 Compare the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernement, David, who
contended (D. 1 8 74·3.6 :3) that the de Cumont case (D. t 8 72.3 . I 8 , supra, note
56) was decided by the Conseil d'Etat in the opposite sense only because the
civil court did not have to pass upon the validity of the administrative act in
order to determine the consequences of the delictual act complained of, which
could be appraised separately. Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 3 74·
06 Supra, p. 1 05. Jacquelin (Principes, p. 1 4 1 ) objected that a conflict could
no more be asserted by the administrative under the regime of 1 8 70, than for
merly when art. 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII was in force ; for art. 3
of the ordinance of June 1, 1 828, never having been repealed, still prohibited
conflicts in matters of suits against administrative agents. However, it would
seem that the very language of the statute precluded its operation once the sys
tem of administrative authorizations had been abolished.
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not be affected in its scope by the decree of I 8 70. The latter,
it found, had only abolished the "plea in bar" by which the
exercise of jurisdiction normally belonging to the ordinary
courts could be arrested in the absence of preliminary author
ization. The decision draws a distinction between the statutes
of I 790 and the Year III as compared with the repealed
article 7 5. The former were said to contain a general rule of
jurisdiction intended to protect all administrative acts; the
latter only afforded a procedural protection for the benefit
of administrative agents. The procedural obstacle indeed had
been removed, but the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
was not thereby enlarged. It was obvious that unless the
abrogating decree of I 870 was construed to leave the differ
entiation of agencies unaffected, actions against adminis
trative officials could be readily turned into a device for col
lateral attacks on administrative acts in the civil courts. To
forestall this contingency67 was the unmistakable aim of the
Tribunal des conflits.
The doctrine announced in the Pelletier decision became
at once the law applied by all courts,68 and its significance is
well reflected in the subsequent developments. The critics of
67 D. r 874·3·5 :3. Cf. the conclusions of the Attorney General, Reverchon,
in the Meyere case (D. r 8 72.1.385 at 3 9 1 : r ) : "It [the decree of r 8 7o] indis
putably derogates the principle of the separation of powers, and it is not to
be supposed that its authors did not sign it with full knowledge. But even if
they had not realized all the consequences thereof, it would not be for the
judicial authorities to pass upon its wisdom. . . . It is their duty
simply
to assure its exact and faithful application." See also Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 340.
But see the conclusions in the matter Valentin, cited by Laferriere, Vol. I,
pp. 645-46, note z, criticizing the Meyere decision.
68 Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 645 ; Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 264; see also Jacquelin,
Principes, p. I 3 4 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 2 9 1 . The force of the decision
is interesting as an indication of the great respect which the Tribunal des
confl.its commanded immediately following its organization.
Cf. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 343, citing early cases in which, by way of distinction,
the Tribunal had held the civil courts competent in actions against administra
tive officers because the acts attacked were deemed purely personal and not re
quiring inquiry into official functions (e. g., Godart v. Cliquet, D. I 874·3·4) .
•
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the doctrine of the Pelletier case insisted not only that it
resurrected the former "administrative guarantee," but also
that it re·placed that guarantee with an even more effectively
protective mechanism.69 Indeed, formerly the ordinary
courts determined for themselves whether a cause before
them required the formality of authorization by the Conseil
d'Etat. But the new order of things apparently enabled the
administrative department to withdraw from the civil courts
suits against administrative agents which they had determined
to be within their jursdiction. The defendant official would
therefore escape personal liability whenever a conflict should
be resolved against these courts ; for the administrative courts
have no power to hold the individual members of the active
administration liable in damages. 70 The argument which saw
in the new system an aggravation of the evil sought to be
remedied 71 apparently assumed that the Pelletier decision
would encourage the administrative department to abuse its
right to challenge the jurisdiction of the j udicial courts, and
furthermore that it would have the necessary support of the
Tribunal des conflits. Had these anticipations been well
founded, the subsequent legislative proposals to restore ad
ministrative protection as it existed prior to I 8 70 would have
been almost certain to become law. 72 However, the fears en
gendered by the Pelletier holding did not materialize. Even
though the decree of I 8 70, as finally interpreted, afforded
•• Ducrocq complained that the decree of I 8 70 seemed to be destined to have
none of the effects intended by its authors (see also p. 346) .
Jacquelin, Principes, pp. I J Z-I J J, I43 : "· . . it [the administrative pro
tection] has been reestablished . . . with the aid of the erroneous conception
of the principle of the separation of powers."
76 Jacquelin, Principes, p. I J 3 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 74·
71 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 352 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. I 33·
72 Bills continued to be introduced after I 8 73 ; in I 8 79, the principle co-author
of the decree of September I 9, I 8 7o, introduced a draft of a law to this effect,
which was favorably reported by a committee. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 343-345 ;
Jacquelin, Principes, pp. I43-44·
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protection to administrative agents, it was a new form of
protection. It was no longer administrative but judicial pro
tection-73 protection by judicial methods. 74
'18 Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 73, 3 75 ·
" Berthelemy (Traiti, p. 87) defends the doctrine of the Pelletier case on
another ground : Even if it be conceded that the doctrine limits greatly-not
wholly-the scope of the decree of 1 8 7o, it is unimportant. For neither under
the old nor under the new systems was the administrative officer privileged as
compared with a private person. There could, ab initio, be no privilege be
cause what is protected is the functional act only. The private person, not
having any official functions, needs no such protection (p. S s ) . The argument
is valid if in each case the functional act can be and actually is distinguished,
and if the machinery provided is capable of precluding abuse or even error.

CHAPTER VIII

Faute Personnelle and Faute de Service •

T

HE

Pelletier decision was an award by the newly ap

pointed arbiter, the Tribunal des conflits, in favor of
the continued unimpaired validity of the principle
of the differentiation of agencies. Nevertheless, only the ac
tual applications of the doctrine announced can throw light
upon whether or not it has succeeded in barring collateral at
tacks upon administrative acts in the form of damage suits in
the civil courts. In order to appraise the respective develop
ments accurately, various circumstances must be taken into
consideration.
Some of the anticipated effects of interpreting restrictively
the act that repealed the unpopular "administrative guar
antee" were checked almost at once, and one factor in partic
ular contributed to making generally palatable the doctrine
whose birth had been attended by so much skepticism. At the
time of the Pelletier case an old notion was being super
seded,2 and the French had definitely arrived at admitting
that the king can do wrong. In other words, the principle of
state liability had taken root and was being established on a
broader basis as time went on until, soon after the turn of the
century, it extended to all administrative acts, excepting only
acts of state.3
1 Lafe"iere, Traite de la juridiction administrati'Ve et des recours conten
tieux, 2d ed. (1 896) , Vol. 1, p. 646 ff. ; Jeze, note, 26 R. D. P. ( 1 903) 263 ff.;
Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( 1 923 ) , Vol. 3, p. 277 ff.;
Appleton, Traiti eUmentaire du contentieux administratif ( 1 927) , p. 232 ff.,
and notes, D. 1 92 I . I .41 ff., D. I 92 I .I.I 7 ; Hauriou, Precis de droit admin
istratif et de droit public, 1 oth ed. ( 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 3 70 ff.; Bannard, Precis de droit
administratif ( 1 9 3 5 ) , p. 99 ff. ; Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit adminis
tratif ( 1 9 3 6 ) , p. 3 7 6 ff. (See chap. IV, note 3 1, supra.)
• Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 366 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 426 ff.
• Bannard, Precis, p. 97, and cases cited there. According to the numerous

adjudications, state liability seems to have been primarily based on
III

a

theory of
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With state liability complementing the administrative
agent's personal liability, private persons inj uriously affected
by administrative action appeared to have ample protection.
It mattered little what instrumentality administered the re
lief to which they were entitled, so long as the dispensation
of relief was fair and satisfactory. Furthermore, the solvency
of the state, as compared with that of the individual agent,
afforded greater assurance of ultimate indemnification. Thus,
what once was purely a jurisdictional issue now turned prima
rily into the less vexing problem of allocating liability,4 and
the spectre of the differentiation of agencies withdrew into
a convenient distance. Nevertheless, the two issues remained
inseparably connected, and any decision fixing liability, which
must always turn on the distinction between personal and
service errors,

inevitably

and

automatically

determines

whether an administrative or a civil court shall have juris
diction. Consequently, the actual extent of the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts in suits against administrative officers
depends upon the current definition of

faute personnelle.

It

is important for the purpose of this investigation to demon
strate conclusively that the definitions underlying the long
line of adjudications initiated by the

Pelletier

decision 5 dis

close no attempts to transform suits against officers into in
direct attacks upon administrative acts by broadening the
concept. Indeed, if there had been, for an instant, a breach
through which j udicial competence might have been ex
tended to strictly administrative acts, that breach was well
nigh hermetically sealed by the doctrine of the

Pelletier de

cision, aided by the evolving theory of state liability.

"fault," i. e., faulty (defective) functioning of the public services, equivalent
to which is the failure to function and delay in the functioning (ibid., p. 92, and
cases cited ) . However, the courts have gone a step farther and have recognized
liability for exceptional risk in some instances ( ibid., pp. 94-95 ) .
• Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 3 6 6 ; cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 2 74.
5 D. I 8 74·3·5 at 7 :3 : "Pelletier's claim is founded exclusively upon the ad
ministrative act
[and] imputes no personal act whatever to the defendants
which would involve their personal liability."
.

.

•
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A. EARLY PERIOD--LAFERRI ERE

"Personal fault" and "fault in the service" are mutually
exclusive concepts. The classification of official conduct as one
or the other determines the liability of the individual whose
apparently authorized act has caused inj ury to a private per

son. 6 This acute difference in the consequences calls for ac

curate definitions. But in law mutually exclusive concepts are
forever prone to defy inclusion in neatly divided groups.
They overlap, and every disputed area means litigation and
work for the courts, as well as stimulus for the minds of the
theorists. The latter, in France, endeavoring to detect and fix
the characteristics of

faute personnelle,

have time and again

suggested abstractions. Repeatedly attempts have also been
made to demonstrate that the abstract criteria thus proposed
are the ones which have guided the courts in fixing liability
in individual cases.

I . Intent and Magnitude of Error
The pioneer analysis of the qualities which indicate that the
act of an administrative officer is personal rather than admin
istrative is that of Laferriere. 7 The matter of

Carriol,S

Laumonnier

in which Laferriere acted as commissaire du gou

vernement, originated with an action for damages in the civil
courts by a match manufacturer who sought to hold two
former ministers of finance and a prefect personally liable for
6 As to concurrent liability, see note 72, infra.
Vol. 1, p. 648 ff.
" Decided by the Tribunal des conflits in 1 8 7 7, S. 1 8 7 8 .2.93, D. 1 8 7 8·3·1 3 ·
The decision is important also because it holds that the annulment of an ad
ministrative decision does not retroactively render its execution illegal. How
ever, in this case the state was declared liable in damages subsequent to the an
nulment of the administrative act. The excess of power, which was found to
be the ground for annulment, consisted in the attempt to circumvent expropria
tion proceedings in order to avoid compensation. Cf. Monpillie v. Gruet, infra,
note 7 1 . On the other hand, execution of an annulled decision is personal error.
Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 2 84.
•
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having had plaintiff's factory closed. The Tribunal des con
flits found that no acts had been alleged which pointed to
personal liability so as to justify the ordinary jurisdiction.
In this often cited case Laferriere suggested to the Tribunal
that there could be no personal liability for the following
reason : The acts complained of were administrative and not
personal because they "revealed an administrative agent, a
representative of the state, more or less subject to error,"
but they did not reveal "the human being with his weak
nesses, his passions, his indiscretions."9 The personal nature of
the act, which is the condition precedent to personal liabil
ity, manifests itself according to Laferriere either through
the magnitude of the error, where it "exceeds the ordinary
risks of the function," 10 or in the "bad intentions" of the ad
ministrative officer.11 In support of this proposition, Laferriere
referred to the following fact situations 12 which had previ
ously come before the Tribunal des con:Hits and which had
been held to involve personal acts :

(1)

defamatory utter

ances of a police commissioner concerning the official func
tions of a former magistrate ; 13 ( 2 ) libelous statements con
cerning private persons contained in a prefect's letter to an
under-prefect and divulged to third parties ; 14 ( 3 ) incrimi
nating allusions, oral 15 or inserted in the minutes of a council
meeting.16 Although these verbal acts had been committed
while the respective functionaries were engaged in the per
formance of their official functions, they could be easily dis
tinguished from the function.
• Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 648-649 ; see the case, S. I 8 7 8.z.93 at 94 :3 and
D. I 8 7 8·3 · I 3 : I .
10 Laferriere, ibid.
n Ibid.
u Ibid.
13 Catta v. Troquier, Rec. 1 8 8 1 .403.
" De Rubelles v . Prefet de 1'Allier, Rec. I 8 80.999.
15 Virnont v . Prefet de Ia Marne, Rec. I 884.5 8 I .
18
Anduze v. Maire de Chalabre, Rec. 1 8 79.8o s .
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In addition, Laferriere pointed out another type of case,
the classification of which, however, proved far more trouble
some. This is the type of case presented by an act which
obviously is quasi-delictual, if not delictual, because of the na
ture of its inj urious consequences, and yet coincides so com
pletely with the administrative act which constitutes the
legitimate performance of a function that to j udge the one
would be to judge the other. I n one case referred to by
Laferriere,17 an administrative agency, in order to justify
certain action it had taken, published a statement rectifying
facts alleged in an article by the party adversely affected. In
an action against the responsible official, the plaintiff claimed
damages because of (inter alia) the defamatory nature of the
statement so published. The Tribunal found that it was within
the power of the administrative agency to publish the state
ment and that "no passage thereof could be separated so as to
b� susceptible of individual appraisal."18 Consequently, the
Tribunal held the act administrative in its entirety and there
fore not cognizable in the ordinary courts.

2. Negligence
The Tribunal des conflits in Laferriere's time, however,
was far from applying a well-formulated concept of

personnelle.

faute

This is amply illustrated by a number of de

cisions. Various degrees of negligence frequently appear t o
have been sufficient for the Tribunal t o find that the nature
of the acts complained of was personal : 19 e.g., misdirection
of a valuable letter by a carrier ; 20 errors in the text or delay
11 Vol. I , p. 649 ; Soleillet v. Briere de Lisle, Rec. I 882..J73·
Similarly, involving official publication of statements of facts, Viette v.
Dalloz, Rec. I 8 77.I075 ; Bousquet v. Pougin, Rec. I 8 7 8.47 ; see Laferriere,
Vol. I , pp. 649-650, note 6.
19 Laferriere, loc. cit.
00 Bertrand v. Rimbaud, Rec. 1 8 74.643.
18
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in delivery of telegrams ; 21 negligent homicide resulting from
the disregard of precautions by a highway engineer ; 22 per
sonal inj uries inflicted upon a private person by the horse
of an army officer out riding but not on duty.23
3·

A buse of Power

The personal character of acts connected with the perform
ance of official functions is more evident in those early de
cisions which involved abuses of power. Laferriere24 refers,
as an illustration, to a case of mutilation by administrative
officers of an election advertisement recommending candi
dates for election and also attacking certain members of the
government.25 The mutilation, though made upon the or
der of the Minister of the Interior, was held to involve per
sonal liability, since it infringed upon the statute26 by which
the defacing of election advertisements was made a delict ir
respective of the person by whom it was committed. The
case of

Requite

v.

Grignoux-Vienne/7

involving abuse of

power, which the Tribunal des confl.its was called upon to
decide in

I 8 79, has often served to indicate the point at which

erroneous official action may turn into personal fault. A gov
ernment munitions factory had ordered that all stray dogs
entering upon its premises be poisoned by throwing a poison
ous substance into the courts and paths of the factory grounds.
An agent employed on the premises intentionally attracted
a dog and threw some of the poisonous substance to it, caus01 No early cases involving this particular situation have been found although
Lafe"iere (loc. cit.) uses it as an illustration ; but see Sureau v. Rigaudie,
D. I 907·3 ·Io2, Rec. 1 9o6.I 96.
22 Matter of Pradines, Rec. I 87 5.764.
23 Tubeuf v. General du Guiny, Rec. I 893.I 54.
•• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 6so.
23 Vincent v. Fosse, Rec. I 89o.I 8 3 ; D. I 8 9 I ·3·3 I .
.. Art. I 7, law of July 29, I 8 8 I .
"" Rec. I 879.803.
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ing its death. The officer was held personally liable to the
owner. Classified along with the

Requite case is that of
Dezetree v. Maire de Meslay-le-Grenet/8 where the action
of a mayor was found to have been personal rather than ad
ministrative. The facts were as follows : A member of the
town council on three occasions had absented himself from
meetings of the council without offering a valid excuse. Un
der these circumstances a declaration of resignation could
have been obtained by the mayor from the prefect. However,
the mayor, omitting this formality, ordered the member to
leave when he appeared at a subsequent meeting. This act
was held to engage the mayor's personal liability.
By way of contrast, one should note the far more conse
quential case of

Gounouilhou v. de Tracy,29

in which the

administrative department, insisting upon the administrative
character of the act attacked, was sustained by the Tribunal
des conflits. The action from which the conflict arose was
directed against a prefect by the publisher of certain period
icals. These periodicals had been stricken from the list of
publications attached to the permits issued to newspaper
vendors. It was held that the act of striking the names of the
newspapers from the catalogue was not of itself responsible
for the exclusion of these newspapers, but that the exclusion
resulted from issuing licenses to vendors only upon the condi
tion that the particular publications should not be offered for
sale. In other words, the elimination of certain p eriodicals
from the catalogue was an integral part of the act of licensing,
which, if irregular in any respect, could be censured in its en
tirety only by the administrative courts. Plaintiff's claim, the
Tribunal said,

''tends to have the civil court indirectly order
the prefect to reform his act by condemning him to pay dam-

118 Rec. r 8 8 3·939· See Laferriere, Vol. r , p. 65 r ; Ducrocq, Cours de droit
administratif, 7th ed. ( r 89 8 ) , Vol. 31 p. 347·
'"' Rec. r 8 77.9 3 1 ; S. r 87 8 .2..1 57.
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ages for each day's delay in revoking the re.strictions attached
to the licenses."30 Laferriere criticized the decision 31 on the
ground that it was beyond the powers of the administrative to
impose a condition upon newspaper vendors which, in fact,
operated as a limitation of the freedom of the press.32 Viewed
in this light, the act of attaching the condition to the license
seemed to him an abuse of power and a faute personnelle. This
view obviously was not in accord with the doctrine of the

Pelletier

decision, which reserved administrative policies

for the scrutiny of the administrative courts exclusively.
However, Laferriere's critical comments concerning the

Gounouilhou case significantly anticipated a trend

of thought

which later became articulate.33
'

B. CLASSIFICATIONS OF JEZE

From the beginning, the chief difficulty in determining the
limits of personal liability presented itself when inj urious
acts of administrative officers appeared so intimately inter
woven with the exercise of official functions that what was
administrative could not be segregated from what was per80 Rec. I 8 77·9 3 I at 93 8 (italics added). The Tribunal's decision contains the
language customarily employed since the Pelletier case, affirming that the de
cree of September I 9, I 8 7o, had had no other effect than to suppress the plea in
bar formerly available in case of actions against public officers without previous
authorization, and that it did not remove the prohibition against cognizance
of administrative acts by the j udiciary. It held that "illegality imputed to an
[otherwise] administrative act does not deprive the act of its administrative
quality and does not convert it into a personal act" ; and that the act complained
of "cannot be separated and qualified as a distinct and independent fact which
might be appraised by the j udicial courts."
31 Vol. I, p. 65 I, note 3 ·
'"' But compare the opinion o f the commissaire d u gouvernement i n the case.
A "law" attributed to December 2.5, I 8 75, in art. 3, provided that "prohibitions
to sell and distribute in the public streets can no longer be issued by the ad
ministrative agencies as isolated measures against individual newspapers."
However, the statute required applicants for licenses to submit lists of the pub
lications they intended to sell. These lists, upon inspection, were signed by the
prefect and served as license certificates,
88 See infra, chap. IX, "The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass."
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sonal. Ever since, one of the primary concerns has been to
trace as accurately as might be done this elusive line of de
marcation.
r.

Bad Faith-Gross Error

In a comment published in 1 909 34 Jeze obj ected to the
attempts which had been made to establish inductively the
line dividing

faute de service

from

faute personnelle.

In

stead, Jeze proposed to deduce from the cases the considera
tions which had guided the courts in determining liability
and j urisdiction. He found that the courts in fact had only
elaborated and refined the criteria already detected by
Laferriere. Obviously one of these criteria, "bad intention,"
Jeze pointed out, is not difficult to discover because its pres
ence invariably manifests itself through an overt act of hos
tility towards the victim.35 Consequently in cases of mali
cious intent personal fault is not merged in but is

ccdetached

from the exercise of the function."36 The author, on the other
hand, directed attention to the apparent complication which
enters into the determination of liability when the latter de
pends upon whether or not the error committed is great
enough to "exceed the ordinary risks of the function,"37 or
"to be inexcusable because of the peculiar situation of the
official."38 Jeze, thus dividing personal faults into ( I ) faults
accompanied by bad faith and

(2)

faults arising from gross

.. 26 R. D. P. ( 1 909) 263.
Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 267. In Grosson v. Souhet, Rec. 1 902.644, the Tribunal
des conflits resolved a negative conflict arising from an action for damages by
a plaintiff whom the mayor had denied access to the municipal slaughter-house.
See also Lalande v. Peynaud, D. 1 899·3·93, Rec. 1 89 7 · 7 5 8, holding a faute
personnelle the act of a mayor, who, after proper publication of a corrected
election list, posted a second notice and had the town crier announce that a
named person had been rightfully stricken from the list because of bankruptcy.
88 Jeze, loc. cit.
87 Ibid.
"" Ibid.
36
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error, expressed in fact what Hauriou39 later described more
clearly as different degrees of "detachability." I n other words,
there is either a personal act clearly separable from· the "me
chanical or automatic" performance of the function,40 such
as disconnected defamatory statements ; 41 or there is a dis

tinguishable

but not

detachable

circumstance to which the

alleged inj ury is attributable, for instance, gross negligence
in the performance of an official duty. 42
2.

Fautes Lourdes

It should be observed that the decisions cited by Jeze to
illustrate

fautes lourdes

(grave errors) 43 involving personal

liability, are also instances in which the personal element of
bad faith was discernible but not separable from the admin
istrative act. Thus (a) in

Gerome v. Gerbault44 the defendant

postmaster had, without proof, formally reported the theft
by an employee of a folder containing postal money orders.
Actually the folder had been misplaced by the postmaster
himself. (b) The fault imputed to officers of the sanitary
police in

v.

Mascaras

Sene et Chiche45

consisted in an erro

neous diagnosis of a young woman aboard ship, which resulted
.. P,·icis, I oth ed., pp. 3 7 1-3 72 .
.. Ibid., p. 3 70.
" Lalande v. Peynaud, D. I 899·3·93• Rec. 1 897·758, supra, note 3 5· Cf.
PrHet v. Loumagne, Rec. 1 89 7.49 7 ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 3 7 2 .
.. De Rubelles v. Prefet de VAllier, Rec. 1 8 8o.999, supra, note 1 4. But cf. the
later case of Sureau v. Rigaudie (Rec. 1 906. 1 9 6, D. 1 907·3 · 1 02) holding the
erroneous delivery of a telegram not to be a "personal fault." (Hauriou, Precis,
1 oth ed., p. 3 73, note. The other case referred to there, Bouhier v. Candelier,
Rec. 1 8 8 1 .9 1 8, does not seem to be in point.) Evidently it was recognized that
the error, on the part of mail and telegram carriers, could not well be con
strued as being tainted with bad faith in the absence of direct evidence.
43 Subclassified into delictual and non-delictual errors (26 R. D. P. at
2 67-268) .
" Rec. I 9o8.5 0 1 , See also Coutareau v. Gillet, D. 1 9 I 3·3·1 Jo, S. I 9 I 4.J-5 1 ;
Waline, Manuel, p. 3 7 8
.. Rec. 1 902.209, D. 1 903·3·93·
•
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in her internment in a h ospital and subsequent death. In these
cases the personal fault apparently consisted in "gross error
in the determination of facts."46 The decisions indicate that
the error-or rather the negligence-was deemed equiv
alent to bad faith. 47
Another group of cases tends to show that personal liability
may arise from errors of law, as for example where the ad
ministrative officer is grossly mistaken as to his powers. The
instances referred to in Jeze's comment48 involved the fol
lowing situations : (a) A mayor, having custody of the survey
maps recorded in the city registry, gruffiy prevented inspec
tion by a taxpayer of a map already placed at his disposal by
a clerk in the mayor's offi.ce.49 (b) The defendant mayor had
given notice to a property owner to make repairs on a build
ing to prevent danger to the public. 5° Upon failure to comply,
the mayor ordered the immediate demolition of the building.
Under the applicable statute51 the mayor had authority only
to order provisional precautions to be taken in case of im
minent danger. Destruction of a building in all cases has to
be authorized by the Conseil de prefecture, and must be pre
ceded by expert findings, notice, and opportunity for hearing.
•• Jeze, z 6 R. D. P. at 268. In the second case the Tribunal said, "these facts,
if proved, would constitute gross errors which because of their consequences
exceeded the normal exercise of the function with which the two physicians were
charged." ("If proved" emphasizes the function of the Tribunal des conflits,
which is not to establish the alleged facts, but merely to fix the liability and con
sequent j urisdiction upon the assumption that the facts are as asserted.)
47 Comparable are the cases involving utterances by public school teachers in
class which, e. g., are indecent, violate the principle of neutrality in matters
of religion, or tend to j ustify the commission of crimes. Girodet v. Morizot, Rec.
1 9 08.5 9 7, S. 1 908.3.81, D. 1 9o8.3.57, noted 25 R. D. P. ( 1 908) 2 7 2 ; Jeze,
26 R. D. P. at 269.
48 Jeze, 2 6 R. D. P. at z69-27o.
48 Uhel v. Le Visage, Maire, Rec. 1 900.5 1 ; the Tribunal held that "the act
[of the mayor] could not be said to be of an administrative character because
of the circumstances under which it occurred."
"" Maudiere v. Maire et commune de Nouzon, Rec. 1 904.252 (negative con
flict.)
"1 Law of June 2 1 , 1 898, chap. 1 , concerning the public safety, arts. 3-6.
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(c) Demolition of a wall under construction on privately
owned property on the bank of a creek was ordered by a
mayor/2 and effected the day following. The order was is
sued because of alleged public danger in case of flood. Upon
complaint, the action was defended on the ground that it had
been taken after due deliberation and approval by the city
council, and in the belief that the wall was located upon land
owned by the city. The mayor also insisted that under the
circumstances he could legitimately hold himself to be acting
with the implied statutory authority of the prefect. 53 How
ever, the Tribunal des conflits held that the mayor acted
without proper authority, and that the impeached act, being
outside his powers, was "purely personal."
In the first of the foregoing instances the personal element
could well be said 54 to have manifested itself in the arbitrari
ness of the act, amounting to an abuse of power. But in the
second and third cases any intentional abuse of power had to
be inferred from the grossly erroneous interpretation, if not
the disregard,55 of express statutory provisions defining the
mayor's powers. In the light of the reported facts these are
obviously borderline cases, and it is not too difficult to imagine
that under somewhat similar circumstances no personal fault
might be found. It seems indeed extremely probable that the
supposed malicious motives of the respective officials were
not the real ground of decision. The j urisdiction of the or
dinary courts could well be confirmed in these cases ; but the
result, as appears below, may more correctly be reached under
"" Montlaur v. Balmigere, Maire de Tournissan, Rec. 1 9 04.8 8 8, D. r 9o6.J.5 8.
"" Art. r6 of the law of April 8, r 89 8, title II, Non-navigable Water Courses :
"The mayor may, with the authority of the prefect, take all measures necessary
in policing water courses."
.. Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 270, 2 74
.. These cases should again be considered in connection with the doctrine of
administrative trespass, infra, chap. IX, pp. 143 and 1 50 ff.
•

FAUTE PERSONNELLE, FAUTE DE SERVICE

123

the doctrine of trespass56 instead of by what seems a doubt
ful application of the faute

personnelle doctrine.

Aside from the cases of non-delictual fautes lourdes, Jeze57
calls attention to two decisions 58 holding that violations of
statutes expressly prohibiting the acts involved constituted

fautes personnelles.
The author also considers the particular situation in which
an unmistakable

faute personnelle

has been committed upon

the order or with the approval of a hierarchic superior. The
general rule 59 seems to be that the element of obedience does
not affect the personal character of the act. In the

Vincent

case 60 police officers who had mutilated election posters in
violation of a criminal statute were held liable notwithstand
ing the order of the Minister of the Interior.61 A similar re
sult was reached 62 in an action against a colonial official who,
upon the order of his superior, caused a native to be forcibly
expelled from his hut and his property to be destroyed. Prob
ably with greater justification, the same principle has been
applied in the case of personal acts defended with the subse
quent approval of a superior officer.63
68 Infra, chap. IX.
•• 26 R. D. P. at 270-2 7 1 .
68 Vincent v. Fosse, Rec. 1 890. 1 83, D . 1 89 1 .3.31, supra, note 2 5 ; Girodet v.
Morizot, Rec. 1 908.597, S. 1 908.3.8 1, D. 1 908.3·57, noted 25 R. D. P. ( 1 908 )
2 72, supra, note 47·
68 Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 27 1-273.
00 Supra, note 5 8 .
61
The case is especially interesting if viewed in the light of the objections
raised before the Tribunal by the Minister of the Interior. The latter directed
attention to the fact that the action was brought not only against the officers
who executed the order but also against the under-prefect who had transmitted
it. On the other hand, the prefect who had received his instructions from the
minister and had traJ!smitted them to the under-prefect was not made a party
defendant. The government suggested that this had been done in order to avoid
involving the minister personally. See Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 7 9 ff., 3 82, con
cerning the virtual absence of a civil liability of the ministers.
82 Mohammed-ben-Belkassem, Rcc. 1 89 1 .542, D. 1 892·3·1 25.
88 See Saffroy v. Martin et Ligeron, Rec. 1 894.628, D. t 896.3 . 1 0. Duguit
( Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 285 ff.) agrees that superior orders or approvals do not
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C. LATER DEVELOPMENTS

The earlier analyses of

faute personnelle

have been fol

lowed by various attempts to devise more accurate definitions.
However, no new criteria have been discovered and in fact
little has been done beyond carefully redefining the basic
ingredients ; that is, the personal intent and the evidentiary
circumstances which must accompany the impersonal func
tional act.
r.

Duguit-Detachable and Nondetachable Errors

Duguit, in his treatise on constitutional law and in a note,64
emphatically insists upon the necessity of dividing personal
faults into ( r ) "detachable" 65 and ( 2 ) "enclosed"66 faults.
Accordingly, in some cases the fault consists in an independ
ent act, which, purporting to be official, is in fact personal be
cause of obvious bad faith or malicious intent. 67 I n other
cases, however, there is only one functional act, but this act
"contains a personal element." 68 The distinction emphasizes
anew that personal fault can always be isolated from the of
ficial function whether the former takes the form of a separate
preclude the subordinate's personal liability ; however, he thinks that these
facts should operate as a mitigating circumstance [referring to Barthelemy's
article, "L'influence de l'ordre hierarchique sur la responsabilite des agents,"
3 1 R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 4) 49 1 ] , insisting that the order of the hierarchic superior is
capable "of giving administrative character to a faute personnelle," (p. 54 7 ) .
The classic exception to the prevailing rule is the absolute obedience due a
military superior. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. z86, z89-z9o.
"' Traiti, Vol. 3, p. z78 ff. ; note under Monpillie v. Gruet, Maire de Bordeaux, S. 1 9 1 8- 1 9 1 9.z.1 ff.
"" Faute ditachable (ibid.) .
66 Faute incluse (ibid.) .
87 Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. z8o-z 8 1 , cites as examples Lalande v. Peynaud,
s. I 899·3·95, D. I 899·3·93> Rec. I 897·7 5 8, supra, note 4 1 ; Girodet v. Morizot,
S. 1 908.3.8 1 , D. I 908·3·57> Rec. 1 908.597, supra, note 47 ; and Carbonnel v.
Sige, S. I 9 I Z·3·33, in which the facts were similar to those in Gerome v.
Gerbault, Rec. I 9o8.5oi, supra, note 44·
66 Duguit, ibid., p. z&z.
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qualifying fact. Duguit, however, draws the

further conclusion69 that if the fault is

incluse,

the ordinary

courts cannot take jurisdiction. For in order to determine
whether an administrative act contains a personal element,
these courts would have to scrutinize the administrative act
in its entirety. This, of course, would contravene the differ
entiation of agencies and the doctrine of the

Pelletier

de

cision. Duguit's theory has not been accepted ; nor is there
any indication in the decisions70 that the administrative do
main has been invaded through the exercise of j urisdiction by
the ordinary courts over what Duguit termed

fautes incluses.

2. A ppleton-1ntellectually Discernible Fault
The decision of the Cour de cassation in

Cruet, Maire de Bordeaux,71

Monpillie

v.

which inspired Duguit's an

alysis, brought forth a further attempt to circumscribe with
particular care the characteristics of personal fault. Profes
sor Appleton, commenting on the

Monpillie

case and a few

years later on the decision of the same court in

monnier/2
••

Laur

v.

Le

in principle adopted the definition according to

Ibid., pp. 290 ff., 292-93.
Cf. Appleton, note, D. I 92 I . I .4 I at 42 : I .
'11 D . I 92 1 . 1 .4 1 , S. I 9 1 8- 1 9 I 9.2.r . The mayor of the city of Bordeaux is
sued an ordinance regulating the inspection of meat imported into the city and
making provision for the transportation of meat found unstamped to a central
inspection place. The parties affected by the enforcement of this provision, over
their objections, entered a recourse for excess of power and obtained annulment
by the Conseil d'Etat because of a vice of form (Matter of Chambre syndicale,
etc., Rec. I 9 I 6.243 ) ; they also prosecuted the mayor for abuse of power
under arts. I 84 and I 86 of the Code penal, and simultaneously instituted suit
for damages against the city and the mayor. In both actions the j udicial courts
held themselves without jurisdiction and were upheld by the Cour de cassation,
which found that the measures taken by the mayor "did not involve any per
sonal fault separable from the function which could be determined by the civil
courts without inquiring into the administrative act itself."
72 D. 1 9 2 I . I . I 7. The mayor of a town had authorized the installation of an
outdoor rifle range. Upon being notified of the danger resulting to the public,
certain precautions were taken, but proved insufficient. A passerby was seriously
7°
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which personal fault arises from malicious intent either ap
parent on the face of the act or inferable from the gravity of
the error.73 This author also recognizes that fault, liability
for which can be determined by the ordinary courts, may ap
pear in the form of a separate act accompanying the lawful
exercise of a function. However, Professor Appleton con
cludes from the adjudicated cases that the civil courts are
competent even if the element of fault, though inseparably
connected with

(inclusY4

the functional act, can

be

"intel

lectually" or "by an operation of the mind" discerned from
the latter.
Neither of the two cases annotated by Professor Apple
ton held that the impeached acts contained a personal ele
ment. In the

Monpillie case

the enforcement of a regulation

by confiscating meat for the purpose of inspection was found
"to have been within the exercise of administrative functions,"
although the procedure followed was irregular. In other
words, illegal administrative enforcement is not deemed per se
a

faute personnelle.75

In

Laur

v.

Lemonnier/6

no personal

error was imputed to the mayor because of his failure to take
adequate measures for the protection of the public. 77 It seems
injured and filed suit in the Conseil d'Etat for damages against the town, and
in the civil court against the mayor. The latter found in favor of plaintiff but
was reversed by the Cour de cassation because the act complained of "was in fact
only an alleged insufficiency in the measure taken by the mayor in the exercise of
his legitimate functions." (See also Compagnie d'assurances Rhin et Moselle v.
Henry, D. 1 933·3·41 ; Appleton, Supp. p. 34.) The Conseil d'Etat held. the
town liable in damages for faute de service.
It is now recognized that faute personnelle and faute de service can exist
side by side, though only one recovery is allowed. Bannard, Precis, p. 1 oo ;
Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 8 8" ;
Appleton, note i n D . 1 9 2 1 . 1 .1 7 :1 .
, Appleton's notes in D . 1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7 and 4 1 are substantially identical with the
corresponding text of his Traiti ilimentaire du contentieux administratif, p.
230 ff.
•• Cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 2 8 1 , supra, note 67.
"' Appleton, note, D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 .41 at 42 :2, and Traiti, p. 243· See supra, note 7 1 .
76 D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7, discussed by Appleton in a footnote t o the case and in his
Traiti, pp. 2 3 5, 2 3 8.
n See note 72, supra.
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therefore that, regardless of the magnitude of the conse
quences, misfeasance does not result in personal liability if it is
due to an error in judgment rather than to gross negligence.78
These were indeed the immediate implications of each of the
two decisions. But, as Appleton points out,79 it is far more im
portant to observe the new trend evidenced by a growing dis
inclination on the part of the courts to hold administrative
officers personally liable unless the injurious acts were clearly
accompanied by personal motives.
3·

Recent Decisions

The marked shift of emphasis in the direction of the sub
j ective element80 of bad faith or malicious intent is illus
trated by several recent decisions. The Cour de cassation
found personal fault in the refusal of an army physician to
care for a soldier who insisted on two successive days that he
was ill. The soldier died during the imprisonment ordered
by the medical officer on the ground that the soldier was an
alcoholic. 81 But in another instance an army physician was
held by the same court not to be personally liable, although
the death of a soldier occurred as a result of questionable
diagnosis and treatment. 82 The Tribunal des conflits83 af:..
firmed the jurisdiction of a civil court on the ground that the
following state of facts, if proved, would involve a faute per
sonnelle because of obviously malicious intent. The prefect
against whom the action was brought had issued a pass (carte
.. Appleton, note, D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7 at 1 8 and Traiti, pp. zJS, 2 3 8 .
.,. Appleton, note, D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 .1 7-1 8 and Traiti, pp. 234-2 36. Cf. the early
case in which an error in the delivery of a telegram was not treated as personal
to the administrative agent. Sureau v. Rigaudie, D. 1 907·3·3·1 oz, Rec. 1 906.196.
80 Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 7 8-3 79.
81 Fontenas v. B
, Gaz. Pal. 1 9 23.2.3 1 9 ; Appleton, Traiti, p. 244·
80 Chiron v. Sineau, D. H. 1 926.8 1 ; Appleton, Traiti, p. 244.
88 In Matter of Navarro et Mounier, D. H. 1 926.55. See Appleton, Traiti,
p. 245 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 78.
.

•
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d'invalidite)

to a disabled veteran. The latter was purposely

led to believe that the pass entitled him to free railway trans
portation. Upon the express order of the prefect the veteran
was apprehended the first time he sought to make use of the
pass for that purpose, and was charged with the violation of
railway regulations.
In another instance the infliction by police officers of per
sonal inj uries ("third degree") upon a prisoner while in
custody at the police station was held to be a personal fault.84
This case should be contrasted with a singularly illustrative
set of circumstances in which the Tribunal des conflits de
clined to find personal fault notwithstanding very grave con
sequences. 85 An intoxicated person was arrested and detained
at police headquarters. Without being searched he was locked
into a room which he set on fire with matches he carried on
himself. Due to the disorderly state of the room the fire
spread, and the inebriate burned to death in consequence of
delay on the part of the fire department. 86
The tendency of the courts to recognize only malicious in
tent or bad faith as indicative of personal fault, and to ex.. Immarigeon v. Perrin, (Confl.) Rec. 1 9 2 2. 1 8 5 ; Appleton, Traittf, p. 245·
"' Dionnet et Proton v. l'Etat, ( 1 9 1 3 ) S. 1 920·3·47· See Waline, Manuel,
pp. 3 77-3 78. See also the other cases cited there (Thomas v. Ruaux, Rec.
1 9 28.87 1 ; Claire v. }arnot et Loison, Rec. 1 929.3 89) .
88 In this connection, compare Gerome v. Gerbault, Rec. r 908.501 and
Coutareau v. Gillet, D. I 9 I J·3·I JO, S. I 9 I 4·3·5I (cited Waline, Manuel,
p. 3 7 8, supra, note 44) , involving negligent accusations of subordinate officers.
See also Mayer v. Kraencker (D. H. 1 934·3 9 8 ; Appleton, Traiti, Supp.,
p. 3 3 ) , where the Cour de cassation affirmed a decision of the Caur d'appel
de Paris (which had reversed the trial court) answering in the negative the
question whether the injury caused by the driver of a fire-truck through a col
lision at a street intersection resulted from personal fault. Cf. two recent cases
decided by the Cour d'appel de Paris (Beguin v. Choquet and Schmitz v. Cabanel,
Gaz. Pal. 1 9 J5.2.257, 52 R. D. P. 8 I I ) . In the first, unintentional disregard of
traffic regulations by petty military officers in the course of a driving lesson,
resulting in bodily injury to a third person, was held not to involve a fault
which was "distinct from the exercise of [their] official function." [Similar,
Thepaz v. Mirabel, (Confl.) Gaz. Pal. 1 9 3 5·2.2 6 1 .] On the other hand, in
the second case, the fact that a police officer on duty was driving at an excessive
speed and on the left side of the road was found to be a faute personnelle in
respect to the resulting collision and inj uries.
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elude from consideration the seriousness of the injury, is
well exemplified by

Duez

v.

Fournier,S1

a late decision of

the Cour d'appel of Douai. This case involved a tort action
against an employee of the bridge and highway department
who in criminal court had been found guilty of negligent
homicide. A child engaged with others in play had received
fatal injuries through contact with machinery operated by
the defendant. The record disclosed that the employee had
repeatedly, and immediately before the accident, forbidden
the children of the neighborhood to come on the premises
where work was in progress. The court held that the act caus
ing the death coincided with the lawful performance of an
administrative function and that the civil liability therefore
accrued to the state. 88 The decision of another appellate court,
in

v.

Bonnefond,89 was felt to be inconsistent with
the holding in Duez. v. Fournier because of the supposed sim
ilarity in the facts of the two cases. In the B onnefond case a
Fournier

public school teacher had injured the eye of a pupil with her
fountain pen. The court found that the abrupt gesture of the
defendant which had caused the harm was "a fact completely
apart from the acts which constituted the exercise of her pub
lic functions," and that the fault therefore was imputable to
her personally. However, differences in the circumstances
attending the two cases90 may account for the seemingly con
flicting solutions. The act which caused the death of the child
in the

Duez

case coincided completely with the regular,

87 D. 1 93 6.2..5 1 , 53 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 6) 6 8 5 ; contrasted in 54 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 7 )
1 54·
88 Waline, in a note accompanying the decision (D. 1 9 36.2..5 1 , 53 R. D. P.
685), criticizes the result and suggests that criminal negligence necessarily in
volves personal fault. Cf. 52 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 5 ) 8 1 o..
"" D. H. 1 93 6.502..
00 See 54 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 7 ) 1 5 3-1 54· The decision in part reads : "· , , one
can indeed not accept as admissible the explanation given by [the defendant] con
cerning the happening of the accident, because a fountain pen simply gliding from
the hand of the person using it could not . , , penetrate the eye of a child
standing in the vicinity of the [teacher's] desk. , , , In fact the [her own]
statements disclose that she turned around abruptly." D. H. 1 93 6.502. at 503.
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though negligent, exercise of the function, viz., the operation
of the machinery by the engineer in charge. On the other
hand, the abrupt movement of the teacher which injured the
pupil was an independent act obviously calculated to have
a disclipinary effect. Furthermore, the different relationships
between the administrative agent and the victim may also
have influenced the result. 91
In terminating this perusal of the more recent adjudications, a somewhat unusual case should be considered in which
the Cour de cassation 92 declined to find personal fault in the
inaction of a mayor who had failed to notify an inhabitant of
the granting of a petition by the town council. The court held
that this omission, which resulted in pecuniary damage to the
plaintiff, was an "act inseparable from the [mayor's] func
tion," and therefore not reviewable by a civil court.
D. CONCLUSION

In the light of the adjudicated cases, it is quite clear that
there has been no inclination to inflate the faute personnelle
concept for jurisdictional purposes. It is true that legal writers
at various times have attempted to read new criteria into the
decisions. Moreover, the courts may have refrained from in
dicating the exact contours within which they would confine
the doctrine.93 But it is equally true that the courts have never
deviated from the base line of culpable intent, but have
rather in the course of time kept closer to it. In the main they
01 Cf. Lemaire v. Prefet du Nord, Gaz. Pal. 1 9 37·1·396, 54 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 7)
3 8 1, where a municipal hospital attendant in immediate charge of a patient was
held personally liable on the ground of gross negligence.
02 Saint-Martin v. Gaussorgues, Gaz. Pal. I 9J &.t 84, 55 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 1 68.
An inhabitant had petitioned the town council to make certain improvements.
The petition was granted, but the mayor merely summoned the petitioner to ap
pear before the public work commission without informing him of the favorable
action of the council. This, the complainant insisted, caused him to abandon
the matter.
18 See Waline, Manuel, p. 377·

·

FAUTE PERSONNELLE, FAUTE DE SERVICE

131

seem t o hold that an injurious act i s personal t o the adminis
trative official when "the function has served his personal
ends," but not when <<in committing an error he believes him
self to be performing his official function."94 To the essential
requirement of abuse of power, gross negligence in the law
ful exercise of power has at times been assimilated.
The jurisdiction of the civil courts over the persons of ad
ministrative officers has thus been limited to cases involving
official activity which is faulty not because of intrinsic illegality
but because of the presence of an independent, nonadminis
trative element. The phrase that a fault to be personal must
be "distinguishable and separable from the administrative
act and from the exercise of the function," though stereotyped,
is a clear affirmation of the sanctity of strictly administrative
action under the differentiation of agencies.
Upon reviewing the maj or steps in the jurisdictional de
velopments connected with official tort liability in French law,
the capital importance of one fact moves to the foreground.
Ordinary court review of administrative action through the
medium of damage suits against officers did not materialize.
The repeal in 1 8 70, of the former "administrative guaran
tee" had indeed opened the door to this form of collateral
attack so well-known in American law.95 But to sacrifice ad.. Berthilemy, Traite, p. 8:r., quoted by Appleton, note, D . 1 9Z I .I,1 7 ::r., and
Traite, p. z J4..
"' Collateral attacks upon administrative acts through damage suits against
officials are unobstructed and common in American administrative law, and the
jurisdictional complications of the French systems have been unknown in the
United States. But also an ideal combination of state liability with personal
liability of administrative officers is far from having been achieved. On the
subject of personal liability, see Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative
Officers," :1. 1 Minn. L. Rw. ( 1 93 6 ) ::63. Nevertheless, the inherent weaknesses
of the principle of unmitigated personal liability are too obvious not to have
been recognized.
Federal law offers an interesting example of retaining personal liability as
a matter of preserving obsolete form. In the case of taxes wrongfully collected,
recovery must be sought in a suit against the collector personally. The tax
payer's remedy against the collector, of common-law origin [White v. Hopkins,
(C. C. A. sth, 1 9 3 1 ) 51 F. (:r.d) 1 59 at 1 61 ] and "equitable in its nature and
.
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ministrative autonomy so lightly would scarcely have been
consonant with the history and spirit of the droit administratif,
and close adherence to a restrictive interpretation of the statu
tory language which seemed to defy the differentiation of
agencies effectively preserved the status quo.
However, the conclusion is inevitable that the j udicial con
struction of the decree of I 8 70, which thus prevented a re
distribution of jurisdiction, materially prompted the evolu
tion of another phase of the French administrative system.
grounds" [Hartwell Mills v. Rose, (C. C. A. sth, 1 932.) 6 1 F. (zd) 441 at
443] has been appropriately called an "anomalous relic of bygone modes of
thought," particularly where the officer "was acting in the line of duty."
Justice Cardozo in George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, ( 1 93 3 ) 2.89 U. S.
373 at 3 82.. In fact, execution on a judgment against the collector or other
revenue officer for money paid into the treasury cannot issue if there has been
probable cause for the act or if the collection has been made under the directions
of a superior officer. 2.8 U. S. C. ( 1 934) , § 842., In either case the officer under
the statute is entitled to a certificate from the court. The effect of a certificate
of probable cause or of direction of a superior officer is to convert the suit against
the collector into a suit against the government. United States v. Sherman,
( 1 8 7 8 ) 9 8 U. S. 565 ; George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, supra.

CHAPTER IX

The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass
A. IS THERE AN INHERENT J UDICIAL POWER TO PROTECT
PERSONS AND PROPERTY AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE
ENCROACHMENTS ?

T

HE question whether j udicial power necessarily im
plies power to protect persons and property against
administrative encroachments can be evaded in the

United States by pointing to the Constitution, under which

the courts have successfully asserted the power to review ad
ministrative acts. This power of the courts is commonly based upon the postulate of the "supremacy of law" and the re
quirement of "due process of law." But more precise answers
to the suggested question may

be

found in the motives which

lie behind the express and implied constitutional guarantees.
Penetrating legal analysis has arrived at the conclusion that
"legislation and administration, representing the force of
collectivism, clash to some extent with the courts, representing
the interest of property owners : and the 'rule of law' takes on
a deeper significance."1 M oreover, the Supreme Court itself
points to its protective mission, reminding that "when funda
mental rights are in question this Court has repeatedly empha
sized 'the difference in security of j udicial over administrative
action.' " 2
However, the different conception of the separation of
powers with its companion doctrine of differentiated agencies
might well be understood to have obviated the performance
of an analogous function by the judiciary of France. It is
1 Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Theory," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 5 3 8 at 559 · .
• Crowell v. Benson, ( 1932.) 2.85 U. S. 2.2. at 6 1 .
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therefore of vital importance to observe the doctrine of or
dinary court protection of civil rights and property which
has been unceasingly defended in the face of the postulate
of administrative freedom from j udicial interference. In the
words of Dareste,3 "If the principle of the 'separation of
powers' were pushed to its extreme . . . all rights and liber
ties of the people would be remitted to the administrative.
. . . This was indeed the theory of the revolutionary period ;
however, it soon became undermined and the entire doctrinal
development of the last hundred years is but the history of

the conflict between the 'separation of powers' and the equally
essential principle which places the rights and liberties of
the people under the safeguard of the judiciary." But the
theory that declares the administrative courts utterly incom
petent and postulates the ordinary jurisdiction4 for the re
dress of all administrative invasions of "private constitutional
rights" has at times been subj ect to dispute. Little or no light
has been thrown on the origin of the doctrine by any of the
conflicting authorities. Its validity has been assailed with
considerable force by Jacquelin,5 who denied that it had any
influence upon the distribution of jurisdiction between the
two sets of courts. On the other hand, a maj ority of the writers
who have discussed the subj ect are unequivocally committed
to the contrary view.6 Their statements of the principle, gen8 Les voies de recours contre les actes de la puissance publique ( x 9 1 4) , p. 1 76,
note z (italics supplied) .
• In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary.
• Les principes dominants du contentieux administratif (1 899), pp. 8z ff.,
97 ff., x o6 ff. At the last page, it is stated : "The foregoing investigations with a
view to discovering a general and directive principle have been fruitless, and
this failure confirms the observation • . that the distribution of j urisdiction
[among the administrative and judicial courts] has been altogether arbii
trary. • • •"
6 Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. (x 8 9 7 ) , Vol. z, p. 1 3 : "The
judicial courts are the guardians of the right of property, and of the security,
freedom and status of persons."
Aucoc, Conferences sur /'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed.
( x 8 8s), Vol. x, p. 48 z : " ·
the judicial courts alone may adjudicate, even
.

.

.
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erally broad and categorical, have a counterpart in many of
the decisions of the courts.7 At the same time the adjudication
of personal and property rights affected by administrative
action has in many instances been reserved for the ordinary
courts by express statutory provisions.8 Therefore, in order
to determine whether the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
over questions of status, civil liberties and property rights
must be considered as original and

as

having been confirmed

rather than made the exception by the various statutes, other
factors have to be taken into consideration. But even such
adversely to the administrative department, questions relating to the civil
status and the domicile of persons, to property rights [and] to servitudes founded
on rules of private law."
Laferriere, Traite de Ia juridiction administrative et des recours conten
tieux, zd ed. ( I 896) , Vol. I, p. 5 I 4 : "The civil personality of each member of
society . . . is placed under the exclusive protection of the judicial courts."
Ibid., p. 5 2 9 : "Aside from the civil rights properly so called, there are indi
vidual rights, legal faculties attached to each person, which are more or less
broadly recognized by the constitution and by political laws. Such are : the
individual freedom, the freedom of the press, the freedom of work and of in
dustry, the right to associate [and] the right to assemble. The controversies
which may arise from the exercise of these rights, in principle, come within
the j urisdiction of the ordinary courts ; it is before them that redress for illegal
encroachments, be it by third persons or by the administration itself, must be
sought."
Dareste, p. 247 : "· . . the ordinary courts . . . are the natural guardians
of the rights of property, of individual freedom and of the rights attached to
the person." See also p. 272.
.
Appleton, Traite elimentaire du contentieux administratif ( I 9 2 7 ) , p. I4o:
"It is generally recognized that the judicial courts alone are competent to
adjudicate questions of status, civil capacity, domicile, violations of individual
liberty and other similar rights immediately connected with the exercise of the
liberties guaranteed to the individual by the constitution." Ibid., p. I 5 2 : "The
courts have affirmed ever so often that the j udiciary are the natural guardians
of private property."
Cf. Moreau, Ll" reglement administratif ( I 9oz), p. z6o ; Duguit, Traite de
droit constitutionnel, zd ed. ( I 9 2 3 ) , Vol. 3, p. 3 0 ; Bonnard, Precis de droit
administratif ( I 9 3 5 ) , p. I 5 8 ; Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit adminis
tratif ( I 9 3 6 ) , p. 5 2.
• See the cases in the Repertoire de ligislation (Dalloz) ( I 848), Vol. I o,
p. 472, No. 1 3 8 et seq. ; Supp. ( I 8 8 8 ) , Vol. 3, p. 2661 No. 209 et seq. Also see
the cases noted in the digests to each volume of Dalloz, Recueil Periodique,
under "C ompitence AJministrative."
8 Aucoc, Vol. I , p. 48I ff. ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 97 ff. ; Repertoire general
alphabitique du droit franfais (I 894) , Vol. u, p. 639, No. 7 5 9 ; Appleton,
p. I 4o ff.
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sources as legislative history and annotations accompanying
some of the recorded statutes afford no conclusive test.9 How
ever, a recent legislative enactment of February 7, I 9 J J ,10

sanctioning the exclusive j urisdiction of the ordinary courts
in all matters of personal liberty, is of considerable interest
in this connection. This law expressly prohibits the adminis
trative department from claiming j urisdiction over such mat
ters in the Tribunal des conflits, even though acts of adminis
trative agents may be involved. The discussion of the motives
for the enactment11 makes especial reference to the judicial
declarations that the ordinary courts are

de la liberte individuelle.12

les gardiens naturels

It is also of interest that the

Conseil d'Etat at various times has acknowledged the purely
declaratory nature of related statutory provisions by holding
them to be but individual applications of a general principle�13
The writers who deny that the protection of private rights
is peculiarly a matter for the civil courts insist that the juris9 See, for example, Duvergier, Collection complete des lois, dicrets, etc.,
Vol. 3 3, p. 2 14, note 2. In connection with the law of June zz, 1 8 33, regulating
the organization of the Conseils generaux de departement and the Conseils
d'arrondissement--both administrative bodies-it was argued that these elective
bodies on general principles must be the judges of the validity of elections held
for their formation ; "however, they [certain members of the legislature] con
sented to make an exception to this rule, and to leave to adj udication by the
ordinary courts questions relative to the eligibility [civil capacity] of the re
spective persons, because these questions, of a totally judicial nature, require
special knowledge which the council members might lack." [Italics added.]
But compare the utterances made in the debates concerning the law of June
30, 1 83 8, regulating the care of the insane. Duvergier, Vol. 3 8, p. 491 at
5 1 2-5 1 3 . Art. 29 of the statute makes provision for judicial inquiry into the
legality of the detention of a person in an insane asylum under a decree of the
administrative agencies. In regard to this statute it was said that "in the matter
of personal liberty there is and can be but one recourse, that is, to the country's
judiciary (la justice du pays) , because it alone offers a genuine guarantee."
"' Art. 2 of the act amending the Code d'lnstruction Criminelle.
n D. 1 9 3 3.4.66 at 67, note II.
"" Cf. the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernment in L'Action fran�aise
v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1 9 3 5·3.25 at 2 8, discussed infra, chap. X, at note 1 .
"' See Jacqteeli'1 Principes, p. 1 00 ; Dareste, pp. 247-248, note 2 ; decision
of the Conseil d'Etat in the matter of Clouet, Rec. 1 844.493-94 (question of
loss of citizenship)
•
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diction of the administrative courts is paramount and can be
limited only by express statutory exceptions. As Bequet re
marks,14 "jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the act
under attack, and not upon the nature of the right in whose
name action is brought." Further objections to the prevailing
doctrine have been made upon the ground that there is no
valid reason for discriminating between different private
rights by not according all private rights the same protec
tion.15
However well taken the obj ections may be, and however
numerous the statutory exceptions to the rule, the predomi
nantly affirmative attitude of the authorities must at least be
recognized as strong evidence of what the Germans would
term a Rechtsuberzeugung; i. e., an innate belief pervading legal thought that the rights and liberties of the individual
are more safely guarded in the hands of the j udiciary than
in those of administrative agencies. That this conviction among
the French closely parallels the conception of the function
of the courts in the United States can hardly be open to doubt.
B. THE TRESPASS CONCEPT

Prerevolutionary conditions in France called into being a
jealously guarded differentiation of the administrative from
the judicial agencies. For a time political bias obscured other
14 Repertoire geniral alphabetique du droit franfais (1 894), Vol. n, p. 638,
No. 752, citing Bequet, Contentieux administratif.
115 Ibid., p. 639, No. 759 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 98. Hauriou, Precis de
droit administratif et de droit public, 1 oth ed. ( 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 38, note 1, nth ed.,
( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 30, note 1 0 admits the principle of judicial competence in regard
to invasions of property rights amounting to a total dispossession (cf. ibid.,
1 oth ed., pp. 8 7 6-77, note, nth ed., p. 347), but denies its validity as to en
croachments upon other private rights.
Cf. the note by Alibert under the Melinette decision, S. 1 933·3·97, 5 1 R. D. P.
( 1 9 34) 140 at 142, criticizing the decision because it was inspired by "the
false and stereotyped" precept that the judicial courts are the guardians of
personal rights and public liberties.
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vital issues. But as the reasons for this attitude, and conse�
quently the prejudice itself, began to disappear, interest in
the normal scope of judicial authority revived. It was a natural
course of events that evolved a means of bridging the gap be
tween the competing principles of differentiation of agencies
and of ordinary court protection of personal liberty and of
property. Gradually, this means took shape in the form of the
doctrine of administrative trespass-voie
r.

de fait.16

General Theoretical Considerations

(a) Illegality
The act of an administrative officer, though performed in
the exercise of his official functions, may be purely personal
and therefore beyond the confines of the administrative j uris
diction. 17 Similarly, acts of administrative officials or agencies
may be devoid of intrinsic legality to a degree which reduces
their administrative content to the bare fact of their origin
within the administrative department. If such is the case, ac
cording to the doctrine accepted in France, the department
disclaims the act as nonadministrative, unless it is of a general
regulatory nature.18 Jurisdiction may then be exercised by the
ordinary courts without contravening the constitutional pro
hibition against their taking cognizance of, and interfering
with, administrative operations.
As a rule, according to Laferriere's time-honored for
mula/9 which continues to h old sway, illegality20 does not de16 "Administrative trespass" or "trespass" will be used interchangeably with
the French term, voie de fait, throughout this discussion.
17 Supra, chaps. VII and VIII.
18 See supra, chap. VI.
16 Vol. I, pp. 478-So, quoted by Dareste, p. I 68. Cf. Appleton, p. I03 ff.
20 See Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 6 8 I ff. ; Hauriou, Pricis, I oth ed., p. 52 ff.,
nth ed., p. 5 7 7 ff. ; cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 97 ff., '3oo, 323. Cf. the declaration
of rights of May 29, I 793, art. 24, supra, chap. VII, note I 2 ; Duguit, Traiti,
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prive an action of its administrative quality21 so

as

to bring

it automatically within the j urisdiction of the ordinary
courts.22 To this extent the analogy between general regula
tions and individual administrative acts is complete; both
must be respected by the j udicial courts and any infirmity in
one or the other only "affects its validity, not its nature."23
The rule, however, is subj ect to qualification in regard to acts
of only individual application.
(b) Usurpation of Power
Individual administrative acts, in theory and practice, have
always been recognized as being susceptible of varying degrees
of illegality; as a result illegality has been deemed capable of
assuming proportions that will destroy the administrative
quality of the affected act. Such a high degree of illegality is,
according to Laferriere,24 present whenever an administrative
agency steps not merely outside the sphere of its own compe
tence but beyond the domain constitutionally occupied by the
aggregate of administrative authority. 25 Any act illegal within
Vol. 3, p. 2 64. See the comparative study of the question by Andersen, Ungultige
Verwaltungsakte ( 1 927), p. 293 ff.
21
"Just as illegality or vice of form attending the decision of a judicial
tribunal
. does not destroy its j udicial character." Laferriere, Vol.
I, p. 478
.. Laferriere, of course, had reference exclusively to actes de puissance pub
lique, since according to his theory (see p. 40, supra), all actes de gestion in
principle, come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. This, however,
does not affect the validity of the doctrine in question but merely calls for the
logically necessary extension of its application to all acts which according to
modern prevailing theory have been beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny, viz.,
all acts--whether authoritative or managerial-pertaining to public service.
Supra, p. 41
.. Laferriere, ibid., p. 478.
"' Ibid., p. 479·
"" Cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 7 1 4-1 5 ; Dareste, pp. 262-265, citing
Commune de Corbon v. Valet, D. I 8 7 7 . 1 .9. Cf. the language used by the com
missaire du gouvernement in Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du
RhOne, (discussed infra, chap. X, at note 24), D. 1 903·3·41, S. 1 904·3·1 7 at
•

•

•

•
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this definition constitutes a usurpation of power.26 In turn, the
resultant lack of administrative quality produces consequences
whose nature differs according to whether the act bears the
semblance of a decision or order/7 or of an act performed in
the execution of such an order.28 In the former case the pur
ported decision is simply nonexistent, while in the latter the
effects actually produced by the act of execution call for
active redress.
The "nonexistent act"29 by its very term implies that it is
without any effect whatever, so that it may be completely
disregarded. 30 Not being administrative and having no legal
consequences, it is evident that it gives rise to no jurisdictional
problem.81
On the other hand, when usurped power not only is trans
formed into an executory determination but manifests it2 0 :2 : "Employing the customary legal terminology, it is not merely contended
that [the administrative agency] exceeded 'the limits of its pow�rs,' but that it
did not act in 'the exercise' of its powers, and that it left 'the domain legally
assigned to it.' "
"" Laferriere, Vol. 2, pp. 497-499 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 709, 7 I 3 H.,
Vol. 2, pp. 2 94-95 ; Appleton, pp. I OJ-I 051 p. 593 :ff. ; Bannard, p. 2 I 7·
11 Decision executoire (supra, p. 36).
"" Operation materielle d'execution. Concerning the classification of this type
of act, and its relation to other forms of administrative action, cf. Kormann,
System der rechtsgeschaftlichen Staatsakte ( I 9 I o) , p. I J :ff. ; Jellinek, Verwal
tungsrecht, 2d ed. (I929), pp. 2 3 7 H
.., Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498, Vol. I, p. 48o ; Dareste, pp. I 5 J-I55> and cases
there cited ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 7 I 4 ; Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., p. 3 9 ;
Bonnard, Precis, p . I 9 5 ; Waline, Manuel, pp. 442-44, and cases there cited.
See also the recent note by Blaevoet in D. I 9 J8.I.I06 (concerning four de
cisions of the Cour de cassation) . Blaevoet defends the theory of actes adminis
tratifs inexistants and rejects the criticism of the doctrine by Professor Mestre
(S. I 935·3·5 7 ) . Blaevoet likens the nonexistence of an administrative act to its
unconstitutionality (D. I 9 J 8 . I .I o6 at u o :I ) .
80 Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498 ; Jeze, Les principes generaux du droit adminis
tratif, 3d ed. ( I 925) , p. 76 H. ; Bonnard, Precis, p. I 95 i Hauriou, Precis,
I oth ed., p. 39·
81 Because of the usurpation of power, such an act distinguishes itself from
an act which is illegal because of an excess of power. See Duguit, Traite, Vol 3,
pp. 7 I 4-7 I 7 ; Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., p. 3 9 ; cf. the note under Labadie v.
Gaillardon, D. I 8 76. I .2 89 :2. The latter persists until annulled by the adminis
trative j urisdiction. The nonexistent act need not (Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498 ;
Appleton, p. 594) and, in fact, cannot, be annulled (Bonnard, Precis, p. I95) .
•
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self through immediate and tangible results relative t o the
rights of the individual, then the situation necessitates action
to offset the illegal effects.82 In such cases it is no longer pos
sible to speak of a "nonexisting act,"33 and under a system
which postulates the differentiation of the administrative and
judicial agencies the question of j urisdiction over the situa
tion which arises must be dealt with.84 In fact, acts of this kind, ··
due to their flagrant illegality, have been deemed to be non
administrative, so that the responsible administrative agency
is concerned neither with the act itself nor with its conse
quences. This construction automatically leaves the ordinary
courts competent to grant relief whenever private rights have
been thus invaded, without violating the principle of differ
entiated agencies.

2. Administrative Trespass Defined
Illegality resulting from usurpation of power and the di
rectly following violation of private rights are the basic ele
ments �hich have been held to convert acts performed by
administrative agents into trespasses. 35
However, more recently the Conseil d'Etat has shown a tendency to allow a
recourse for excess of power if not for the purpose of annulling, at least in
order to censure the administration active for acting illegally. See Appleton,
p. 596, Bannard, Precis, p. I 95, and the cases cited by these authors. Cf. Matter
of Frecon, D. H. I 935· I 83, infra at note 54·
82 Cf. Hauriou's note under the Piment case, S. I 9 I 0.3 .1 2.9, Jurisprudence
( I 929) Vol. I , p. 6o4 at 6o9.
83 Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 709. Cf. also Waline, Manuel, pp. 443-4441 as
to indications in the Conseil d'Etat of a tendency away from the doctrine of
actes inexistants (Ministre des Travaux publics v. Mahieu, D. H. I 932.I541
S. I 932.3.6o ) .
"' The distinction between the nonexisting executory decision and the wholly
unauthorized act of execution has not always been made. It seems to have been
stated clearly only recently by Professor Waline in his note accompanying the
Action franc;aise case (D. I 935·3·25 at 2 6 :2 ) . Cf., for instance, A ppleton,
pp. I o3-I 05, 593 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, uth ed., p. 578. See Duguit, Traiti,
Vol. 31 pp. 7 I o-7 I 5 ; cf. Dareste, p. I 551 note 3·
85 Laferriere, Vol. I1 p. 530 ; cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 709 ; Hauriou,
Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 5 7 8 ; Appleton, pp. I o4-I05 ;Bonnard, Precis, p. I 5 8 ;
Waline, Manuel, p. 5 7 ; note in D. I 9 35·3·25 at 26 ff. (see the cpnclusions of
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The courts themselves do not seem to have ever given a
clear definition of administrative trespass. Nevertheless the
concept has served in numerous cases as a criterion of juris
diction. Obviously the reluctance to indicate the probable
limits of its application is calculated to preserve the freedom
to predicate the ordinary j urisdiction over acts of adminis
trative origin on other grounds than that they are "nonad
ministrative." This applies equally to the administrative and
to the j udicial courts, as well as to the Tribunal des confl.its,
in their respective concessions, assertions and affirmations of
that j urisdiction.36
In the frequent applications of the doctrine of voie de

fait,

the jurisdiction of the civil courts has commonly been justified
by emphasizing only the "nonadministrative" character of the
the commissaire du gouvernement, ibid.) . Cf. also, Dareste, pp. 262-267,
2 7 1-2 7 9 ; Teissier, La responsabiliti de la puissance publique (I 906) , PP· ss-s s .
88 In the case of Favre v. Mas, D. I 9D4.2.321, referred to by Dareste, p. 2 74,
note 3, the Cour d'appel de Lyon held that the arrest by three police officers
(agents des moeurs) , without warrant or express authority of law, of a woman
suspected of prostitution because of her alleged conduct constituted a judicial
and not an administrative act, even though performed by administrative officers.
Consequently the judicial authority was competent in the matter of damages
which the woman sought to recover for the illegal arrest ; for the judicial
courts are "the natural guardians of individual liberty" and, in principle, their
jurisdiction extends to all questions affecting that right. Dareste (ibid.) points
out ,that this formula was used to circumvent the necessity of having the
legality of an administrative act determined by the administrative jurisdiction
(see question prijudicielle, chap. VI, note 5 1 , supra) . However, instead of
reaching the same result by way of the simple and unquestionably applicable
doctrine of trespass (Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 3o) , the court rested its authority
upon the j udicial nature of the act. (But see the law of Feb. 7, 1 933, supra,
note 1 0, vesting j urisdiction in all matters of individual liberty in the ordinary
courts and excluding conflicts where acts performed by administrative agents
are involved.)
In several cases of seizures (infra, chap. X, note 9) performed by police agents,
the Conseil d'ttat refused to take j urisdiction, and the Tribunal des conB.its
under similar circumstances confirmed the ordinary j urisdiction on the ground
that the acts of seizure were j udicial in nature. The acts in those cases were
indeed authorized under statutes appointing the particular administrative agents
officers of the police judiciare. (See Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit
administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 267.) Nevertheless it would seem to have
presented little difficulty to term administrative an act as plainly so as the seizure
of property. By way of analogy, if acts performed by administrative officers are
not necessarily administrative, acts emanating from j udicial officers need not
indiscriminately be deemed judicial.
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act complained of. 37 Thus, superficially, the primary con
cern seems to have been that the principle of differentiated
agencies should be left unimpaired. Nevertheless, sight must
not be lost of the fact that every trespass presupposes the
violation of a personal right. Hence the question becomes at
once pertinent whether the rule of judicial competence in
cases of administrative trespass is not in fact a manifestation
of the desire to remit the protection of all civil liberties and
property rights to the ordinary courts.
(a) Applications

i. Illegal arrest. The Cour de cassation, in I 8 76, in the
case of Labadie v. Gaillardon,38 decided that an illegal arrest
followed by unlawfully prolonged detention was not an ad
ministrative act and that therefore the lower civil court was
competent to take cognizance. Although there is · no express
reference, the decision is a manifest application of the tres
pass doctrine, revealed in this language : "In passing upon
the character [illegality] and the consequences [invasion of
personal liberty ] of the act, the court below did not interfere
with any administrative act, and consequently did not violate
the principle of the differentiation of agencies."39
87 Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 35, uth ed., p. 2 7 ; Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 5 7 ;
Waline, Manuel, p . 56.
88 D. 1 8 76.1.289 at 296. Gaillardon was arrested upon the order of Labadie
shortly before the latter received a telegram containing his expected nomina
tion as prefect. Thereafter the prefect permitted Gaillardon to be detained
seven days without a hearing. Gaillardon committed suicide, and his widow
sued the prefect personally in the civil courts for indemnity and recovered the
j udgment which the defendant below asked the Cour de cassation to set aside.
111 The case is noteworthy also because it is in sharp contrast with the later
case of Favre v. Mas, D. 1 904.2.3 2 1 , supra, note 3 6, in that it expressly holds
that the act of arrest was not a judicial function subject to inquiry only in the
ordinary courts. The point is discussed with elaboration in the note accompany
ing the report of the decision.
Cf. Matter of GinU:re, Rec. 1 904.8 8, where the Conseil d'Etat, without qual
ifying its grounds for the rejet, declined to take j urisdiction over a case of
alleged arbitrary arrest of a woman.
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ii. Illegal interference with religious· freedom. In Cure
de Realmont v. Maire de Realmont/0 the Tribunal des con
flits recently upheld the jurisdiction of a civil court which had
been invoked by a church community to secure relief from
administrative interference with property devoted to religious
purposes. The action taken by the mayor was deemed not
to conform to the resolution passed by the town council, and
because of the resultant violation of religious freedom the act
was characterized as a trespass. 41
There is a series of interesting decisions of the Tribunal des
conflits involving invasions of religious freedom in which the
trespass doctrine was applied and the judicial competence
affirmed. 42 The question presented by these cases was the
authority of a mayor to order the ringing of church bells on
the occasion of civil interments. Under certain statutes43 and
regulations,44 church bells are recognized as belonging to the
religious cult, except in case of public danger and except as
local laws or local custom authorize their use for other pur
poses. In each case the mayor's order to ring the bells at a
civil burial, having been found to be contrary to existing laws
and regulations and without the sanction of a local custom,
was held not an administrative act, but a

voie de fait and sub

j ect to redress in the civil courts.45
.. s.

1 9 3 5-3-9 7·
"' The council had authorized the construction of a public comfort station
at a designated location behind a church building. The mayor had part of an iron
fence upon the church property removed and had the station placed up against
the church. In order to occupy premises devoted to religious cults it would have
been necessary to follow a specific statutory procedure.
40 Abbe Piment v. Guichard-Voillemond, Maire, Rec. 1 9 1 0.323, S. 1 9 1 0.3.1 29,
D. 1 9 1 1.3.4 1 ; Abbe Mignon v. Godet, Rec. 1 9 1 0.442, D. 1 9 1 1 .3.41 ; Abbe
Thiney v. Dompnier, Rec. 1 9 1 6.52. See also Duguit, Traittf, Vol. 3, p. 7 1 6 ;
Jeze, Principes, p . 78.
48 Art. 2 7, law of Dec. 9, 1 905 ; art. 5, law of Jan. z, 1 907.
" Art. 51, Ordinance of March 1 6, 1 906
.. Cf., however, the recourse for excess of power to the Conseil d'Etat in
the . case of Abbe Bruant v. Maire de Breurey-les-Faverney, D. 1 9 1 1 .3.41 , S.
1 9 1 0.3 . 1 29. t:nder identical facts, with the exception that the mayor alleged
•

DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRESPASS 145

iii. Illegal damage to land. In 1 8 92, the conflict arising
from the case of Lebel v. Bault46 was decided in favor of the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. An action had been in
stituted to recover possession of land, to enj oin the taking
of material from the land, to have the land restored to its
previous condition, and to recover damages for material al
ready removed and used for maintenance work on a public
road. The Tribunal found that the taking of the material was
illegal and a trespass because of nonobservance of statutory
formalities.47
The Cour de cassation in Ville de Mende v. Roussel
( I 90 5 ) 48 held that the Cour d'appel de Nimes did not violate
the principle of the differentiation of agencies by ordering
the city t o restore, at its cost, a private water supply which
had been destroyed by its agents, without observing the re
quired procedure. The action taken was termed a trespass.49

iv. Illegal military requisition.

In

1 930,

the Tribunal des

conflits resolved a negative conflict 50 arising from the refusal
of both the civil courts and the Conseil d'Etat to exercise
jurisdiction in an action for damages by the

voise de Comerves/1

Union Villeneu

whose canning plant had been taken

a local custom, the Conseil d'Etat (July 8, I 9 Io) apparently treated the act
as administrative, though it denied the existence of a local custom, and an
nulled it.
In a note concerning this and the above decisions (in S. I 9 I o. 3 . x z 9, and
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, pp. 6o4, 6o9 ff.) , Hauriou reconciled the holding of
the Conseil d'Etat with those of the Tribunal des conflits, suggesting that the
order of the mayor to ring the bells was considered by the Conseil as a decision
executoire while the Tribunal treated it as an act of execution. This dual aspect
of an order, or the coincidence of a preliminary determination with the order
causing its execution, is only possible in case of verbal orders in which the
two elements, though present, cannot be readily distinguished .
.. D. I 892-J.I I O.
"' Authorization by prefect, according to Law of May 2 r , I 8J 6, art. I 7.
See "procedural trespass," infra, p. I 5 I .
'" D. I 9 I O.I .266 a t 269.
49 See "procedural trespass," infra, p. I 5 I .
"" Supra, p . 27.
151 D. H. 193 I . I J S ·
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over by the military authorities. The Tribunal ordered the
civil court to take cognizance because the requisition, which
had not been made in conformity with statutory formalities,
constituted a trespass.
v. Illegal encroachments on private property. A typical
situation that has found its way into the courts with some fre
quency is the encroachment on private property in the course
of installing electric line equipment. As early as I 8 84 the
Tribunal des conflits in Neveux v. Administration des postes
et telegraphei2 affirmed the competence of the civil courts
in which an action was pending against the post office depart
ment on account of the installation of telephone line equip
ment and apparatus on top of plaintiff's buildings. Finding
that the prefect, in ordering the construction upon private
property, had acted without statutory or regulatory authority,
the Tribunal held that the act was not administrative.53 In
a recent case, Matter of Frecon,5 4 the Conseil d'Etat again
termed a voie de fait the act of placing telephone line supports
into the fac;ades of private buildings without observing the
statutory procedure which had been prescribed in I 8 8 5, as the
sequel to the Neveux case.55
"" Rec. 1 8 84.909.
"" In consequence of this litigation, the competent minister submitted a
draft of a statute regulating the procedure to be followed by the prefect under
similar circumstances. It became law on July 2 8, 1 8 85.
"' D. H. 1 9J5.1 83. See 52 R. D. P. ( 1 9 35) 340 and cases cited there. Cf.
the five cases in D. 1 9 37.1 . 1 7 (Cour de cassation) , summarized 54 R. D. P.
( 1 9 3 7 ) 5 1 7 : Compagnie nouvelle d'eclairage, etc. v. Guiringaud ; Regie du
Syndicat intercommunal, etc. v. Same ; Beziat v. Societe Nord-Lumiere ;
Syndicat des communes, etc. v. Societe Phelan-Segur ; Syndicat des communes,
etc. v. Societe Cuvelier.
111 Supra, note 52. The Conseil d'Etat "annulled" the act of the department
and referred the plaintiff to the civil courts "which alone are competent to
adjudicate the consequences of a voie de fait." The annulment of an executed
decision of course amounts to no more than a censure, and the holding of the
Conseil d'Etat does not imply that such an annulment was necessary before
the civil court could take j urisdiction. Had the case been brought before the
civil court at the outset, and had the administrative asserted a conflict, the
latter would unquestionably have been resolved in favor of immediate action
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vi. Illegal abridgment of the freedom of the press. In
vasions of the freedom of the press have given further oc
casion to sustain the power of the ordinary courts to grant
relief from the administrative action. In the widely discussed
case of L'A ction franfaise/'6 the Tribunal des conflits held
"the general seizure of a newspaper, wherever the same may
be offered for sale" on a certain day, to be a trespass and sub
ject to redress in the civil courts. The court's decision was
based upon the ground that the measure, as taken by the pre
fect of Paris, was not indispensable to the restoration and
maintenance of the public order.
(b) Evaluation
Laferriere,57 when expounding the theory of the judicial
protectorate of civil liberties and property, envisaged situa
tions virtually identical with those involved in the foregoing
cases. These examples lead with indisputable force to the con
clusion that in the case of trespass the jurisdiction of the or
dinary courts rests entirely on the fact of invasion of personal 
rights. Nevertheless this conclusion must be viewed with
caution in order not to do violence to basic concepts of the
droit administratif. Thus, while violation of civil liberties
or of rights of property is an essential element of adminis
trative trespass, the illegality of the invasion is no less im
portant. So far as the courts are concerned, "illegality" refers
to the intrinsic or "nonadministrative" nature of the official
act, and this illegality, rather than the character of its consein the ordinary courts without the previous intervention of the Conseil d'Etat.
It may well be supposed that the particular procedure in the case was em
ployed for the very purpose of bringing the matter before the administrative
jurisdiction in order to provoke an expression of its attitude towards the issue
involved.
18 L'Action fran�aise v. Bonnefoy�Sibour, D. I 9 3 S·l·ZS1 noted 53 R. D. P.
( 1 9 3 6) 296, discuSsed infra, chap. X.
11'1 Vol, I , pp. 479-480, 530,
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quences, has been the touchstone of jurisdiction. The emphasis
upon the formal aspect of the inj urious act is even more evi
dent in the cases of clear trespass in which redress for the
violated right is permitted to be had in civil courts on the
purely formal ground that the act was nonadministrative be
cause it was judiciaJ.58 Moreover, the element of illegality
requires especial consideration because, as will be developed
further, not all illegal administrative invasions of personal
and property rights are trespasses in the sense that they are
subj ect to redress in the ordinary courts.
The utility of the concept of administrative trespass59 and
the necessity when applying it of appraising separately the im
peached act, as distinguished from its consequences, derive
logically from the peculiar situation brought about in France
by the interpretation of the separation of powers. It is true
that the adjudication of private rights and the dispensation
of relief in the event of the violation are generally deemed
to be within the exclusive province of the j udicial courts. But
whenever acts of administrative agencies are involved, the
question of their propriety and legality can, according to pre
vailing doctrine, be passed upon only by the administrative
m

Favre v. Mas, D. 1 904.Z.J Z r , supra, note 36.
"" There are some attempts to deny completely the soundness of the voie
de fait doctrine. Laroque, in a note accompanying the report of the Cure de
Realmont v. Maire de Realmont decision (S. 1 935·3·97> supra, note 40) , ques
tions the grounds for the decision on that account. He finds justification for the
jurisdiction of the civil court not in the violation of the freedom of religion
but in the illegal entry upon the church property. Generally, he recognizes the
principle of judicial competence only in the case of invasion of privately
owned real estate. See also the note by Blaevoet under the decisions reported
in D. I 9 3 7 · I . I 7 at r 8 :z, supra, note 54· But see his more recent note (D.
1 9 3 8 . r . r o6) in which this commentator has fully "reconsidered" the valid
ity of the voie de fait doctrine (ibid. at I r o.z ) . [This note has not been avail
able to the author until a time when it was no longer possible to give a fuller
account of this interesting exposition of the doctrine of administrative tres
pass. However, it may suffice to say that Blaevoet declares himself entirely
in accord with Professor Waline's analysis (infra, p. I 54) of the trespass con
cept. D. 1 9 3 8. I . I o6 at I I I :r .]
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courts and must always be referred to them.60 Under the con
stitutional and statutory protection guaranteeing administra
tive autonomy, the administrative courts are the sole judges
of the formal validity, the administrative legality of such
acts. The administrative department therefore will ordi
narily not tolerate its own acts to be condemned, except by its
own judicial machinery. It is always directly concerned with
the act and its administrative purpose, although the judicial
courts may deal with its collateral or secondary effects. How
ever, now and then these effects are so drastic

as

to be wholly

out of proportion to the original administrative object. May
it not be assumed then that at such a j uncture the administra
tive department is no longer interested in being identified
with the act, and therefore does not insist upon submission of
the question of legality for its determination?

Is it not more

convenient, and less inj urious to the administrative prestige,
to abandon the

enfant terrible

to be branded a

voie de fait

and to be disciplined at the hands of a judicial court?
The trespass concept is elastic. The civil courts may readily
resort to it under circumstances where it would be rej ected by
the administrative courts. The degree of illegality required
may vary according to the dissimilar views of the respective
courts and these views in turn must be harmonized through
the office of the Tribunal des conflits. However, it is certain
that the doctrine of administrative trespass has a definite place
in French administrative law61 and operates in the interest of
both administrative and j udicial j ustice. In regard to the
latter it offers a special advantage by eliminating in many
80 See questions prejudicielles, supra, chap. VI, note 5 1 ; Hauriou, Precis,
1 oth ed., p. 877, note z.
81 See the note by Blaevoet, D . 1 9 3 8. I . I o6 at 1 1 2 :2 . It will be made to
appear more clearly (infra, p. 1 74) that, notwithstanding the similar juris
dictional implications, voie de fait does not in any way coincide with faute
personnelle (supra, chap. VIII) .
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instances the necessity of referring to the administrative juris
diction the question of the legality of acts for which redress is
sought.
3·

The Elements of Trespa.ss- Analyzed

The very fact that the doctrine of voie de fait has received
close attention and analysis only in the comparatively recent
legal literature is significant. It points unquestionably to the
cause which, during the past two decades, has engendered a
great deal of new and penetrating interest in the relation of
the administrative and judicial departments. This cause, in
France as in this country, is the rapid expansion of administra
tive activity since the first World War. Indeed, it would have
been strange if during this period the notion of administra
tive trespass had escaped the searching thought of contem
porary legal writers. 62
(a) Illegality-Usurpation and Procedural Irregularity ·
The results of the various analyses to which administrative
trespass has been subjected are highly interesting and im
portant for the present investigation. According to Hauriou,
who was the first to undertake careful examination and defi
nition, the illegality which may taint the act of an adminis
trative authority can assume two distinct forms. Trespasses
may arise not only from usurpation of power,U3 reflected in
the ends towards which the act is directed, but also from the
unlawfulness of the means employed, i. e., from disregard
of procedural requirements. So Hauriou,64 looking only to
intrinsic defects, has classified trespass as ( I ) trespass due to
·

p.

See Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 3 5, uth ed.,
1 5 7 ; Waline, note in D. 1 9 3 5·3·25 at 26.
88 Supra, p. 139 ff.
"' Hauriou, Precis, t oth ed., pp. 35-36, note 3 ·
82

p.

2 6 ; Bannard, Precis,

DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRESPASS 1 5 1
lack of lawful authority65 and ( 2 ) trespass due t o procedural
irregularity.66 Trespass of the first type presupposes an act
performed outside the exercise of authority expressly con
ferred. Hauriou's qualifying phrase CCfor want of power"
envisages both the constitutional power and authority derived
from legislative and quasi-legislative acts.67 The absence of a
power to act in this instance results in an excess of power at
tended by a

total lack of authority.

On the other hand, in the

case of a ((procedural trespass," there is an excess of power
in the sense of a

total disregard

of required formalities.68

A second classification of trespass on the basis of intrinsic
illegality, suggested by Bonnard,69 seems to differ from the
foregoing in form but not in substance. Bonnard distinguishes
(a) trespass because of irregularity in the executed decision,
and (b) trespass because of irregularity in the act of execu
tion. The former is attributed to the virtual nonexistence of
the purported decision,70 which is ineffectual because it tends
611

Voie de fait par manque de droit ("for want of power") .
"" Voie de fait par manque de procedure ("for want of procedure") .
07 Cf. Abbe Piment v. Guichard-Voillemond, Maire, Rec. 1 9 10.3Z3, S.
I 9 I 0,3. I Z 9, D. 1 9 1 1 ·3·411 supra, note 4z. Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., pp. 34,
5z, emphasizes that there is an autonomous regulatory power which the ad
ministrative may exercise to determine its own "rights" within a domain that
not even the legislature may arbitrarily limit. If on the one hand the admin
istrative has only such "rights" as have been specifically regulated by legis
lative enactment or by its own rules, the administrative rule-making power,
on the other hand, although it must not run contrary to the laws, may be exer
cised to the extent that it is not expressly limited by law. See also ibid., p. 35,
note 1 .
Cf. Andersen, UngiUtige Verwaltungsakte ( 1 9 z 7) , pp. z93, 303 ff. And
see also Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung ( 1 8 87) , pp. Z4 ff., 366 ff., 395 ff.,
Mayer, Deutsckes Verwaltungsreckt, zd ed. ( 1 9 14) , Vol. 1 , p. 65 ff.
88 See Hauriou's note under Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du
Rhone, S. 1 904·3·1 7 at 1 8 :1, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 84 at 1 0 0 : "it is very
important to confine the administration to its habitual procedure, otherwise,
whenever the ordinary methods (mesures de haute police) proved incon
venient, there would be added extraordinary procedures.
There
should no more be extraordinary methods in administration than in the courts
of j ustice."
"" Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 5 7.
70 Supra, p. 140, cf. !he, Principes, p. 7 8 .
•

•

•
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to operate upon a subject matter wholly beyond the powers
of the administrative71 or because it was made without express
statutory authority. The latter is said to arise whenever one
of the following defects is present :
the means of execution,

(2)

(I )

intrinsic illegality in

abuse of an intrinsically legal

means, ( 3 ) employment of a legal means of execution but
with complete disregard of the procedure prescribed,

(4)

em

ployment of a legally permissible method of enforcement
but without the judicial authorization which (subj ect to cer
tain exceptions) 72 is required in all cases of direct execution
against persons or property. It is interesting that in this one
instance Bonnard associates the trespass doctrine with the
principle that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts extends
to all questions concerning individual liberty and private
property. However, there seems to be no adequate reason for
differentiating between invasions of the private domain
through the direct enforcement of general police measures
against persons and property, as in the case of arrests or seiz
ures, and incidental encroachments arising in coimection with
administrative operations, for instance, the appropriation of
private property for the public benefit. Taking Bcinnard's
analysis as a whole, the situations contemplated under (a)
clearly, and those under (b)

( I ) and ( 2)

formulated, correspond to Hauriou's
(b) ( 3 ) and

if only slightly re

manque de droit,

while

( 4) are typical instances of manque de procedure.

"Nonobservance of procedural requirements" has not
always been distinguished from "lack of authority under posi
tive general rules" as a separate form of intrinsic infirmity
which may corrupt the acts of administrative agents. 73 Nevern Supra, p. 1 3 9· See Duguit, Etudes de droit public, ( I 9 0 I ) Vol. I, p. I I ff. ;
Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel fran�ais et compare, 7th ed. ( I 9 : u ) ,
Vol. I, pp. 3 3-35, 548.
1111 Infra, p. I 64 ff.
"' See, for instance, Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 709-Io, 7 I 6-7 I 7 ; Appleton,
op. 1 04-5, 593-94.
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theless, there are many instances in which the courts have un
mistakably recognized procedural trespass. Some examples
will be found among the cases which have been previously
discussed. Thus, in the

Realmont

case74 the court held that

"in the absence of a disappropriation effected in accordance
with the statutory provisions,75 the removal of the fence and
the installation of the public comfort station . . . consti
tuted a trespass."76 Instances of purely procedural trespass
occur frequently in connection with the taking of private prop
erty for public use. So in the

Lebel case77 the failure

to obtain

the authorization of the prefect 78 required by statute caused

the removal of materials from private land for road purposes
to be characterized as a trespass. Similar results were reached
because of the disregard of statutory procedure in the
Villeneuvoise 79 and the Frecon80 cases. 81
••

Union

Supra, note 40.
Art. 1 3 of the law of Dec. 9, 1 905, concerning the separation of church
and state provides that church property can be taken only upon securing a
decree from the Conseil d'Etat or in pursuance of a special act of the legislature.
76 S. 1 9 3 5·3·97 at 99 : 1 . The court's language in this case indicates that a
double trespass was found. Not only had church property been taken without
observing certain statutory formalities, but at the same time religious freedom
had been violated.
The invasion of liberties through the taking of private property may occur
in other situations as well. Compare the seizure of newspapers or printing
machinery, which also involve encroachment upon the freedom of the press.
Obviously coincidences of this type, together with the comparative frequency
of trespass in regard to property, have militated against the recognition by
some writers of the utility of the concept of voie de fait administrative.
77 Supra, note 46.
78 Art. 17 of the law of May :u , 1 83 6, concerning rural highways.
"" Supra, note 5 1 . The formalities prescribed by the law of July 3, 1 8 7 7 (as
amended) relative to military requisitions had been completely omitted.
80 Supra, note 54· Telephone line equipment had been attached to the walls
of a privately-owned building with complete disregard of the requirements
of notice and hearing provided by art. 6 et seq. of the law of July 2 8, 1 885,
regulating the construction, maintenance, and operation of telegraph and
telephone lines.
81 See also Repertoire pratique de ligislation de doctrine et de jurisprudence
( 1 9 1 2 ) , Vol. 3, pp. 257-58, Nos. q 6 et seq.
75
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(b) I nvasion of Civil Liberties and Property Rights
Until very recently, analytical treatment remained con
fined to the forms of inherent illegality which convert the
act of an administrative agency into a trespass. The attendant
violations of specific rights and liberties have received only
incidental attention.82 However, the aftermath of an uncom
monly important decision rendered by the Tribunal des con
flits on April

8,

1 93 5 brought forth penetrating examination

of the elements of

voie de fait

by Professor Waline.83 For

the first time an equal amount of attention was given to the
criterion of "invasion of private property or of public liber
ties." 84 Waline has demonstrated that actually the violation
of a right or of a liberty is sufficient to constitute a trespass
only where the injury is especially severe. 85 The relevancy of
·

·

the degree or magnitude of the unlawful invasion of rights
and liberties is exemplified by cases in which the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts was not conceded although the pre
requisites of

voie de fait seemed fully satisfied.

"" Hauriou, Precis, 10th ed., p. 3 5 ; Bannard, Precis, p. 1 5 7.
See Waline's note in D. 1 9 3 5·3·25. Waline is otherwise in agreement with
Hauriou and Bonnard and distinguishes trespass arising from complete want
of authority from trespass due to nonobservance of formalities prescribed by
statute and especially intended for the protection of private persons.
84 "By public liberties are understood certain rights whose exercise appears
particularly precious to the individual, and which, therefore, have been
guaranteed by the laws or by the constitution." Waline, Manuel, p. 52.
85 See note by Blaevoet, D. I 9J 8. I . I o6 at 1 1 1 : 1 .
83

CHAPTER X

Recent Applications of the Trespass Doctrine

F

OR

A. THE ACTION FRANc;AISE CASE

complete understanding of the significance of the

doctrine of administrative trespass in French law, it is

necessary to examine in detail the resolution of the con

L'A ction franfaise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour.1
A ction franfaise case involved the powers of adminis

flict in the case of
The

trative agencies in regard to the freedom of the press, and
the conclusion reached is in striking contrast to the earlier
1 D. 1 93 5·3·25, noted 5 3 R. D. P. ( 1 936) 296. The decision is in the
customarily concise form : "The laws of August 1 6-24, 1 790, Fructidor 1 6,
year III, Pluviose 28, year VIII, July 29, 1 88 1 and April s, 1 8 84, have been
examined.
"Considering that the action instituted by the publishing company L'Action
franfaise against Bonnefoy-Sibour before the justice of the peace of the northern
canton of Versailles has for its object the reparation of the damage caused by
the seizure of the newspaper L'Action franfaise on the morning of Febru
ary 7, 1 93 4, ordered by the prefect of police to be made at the depositories of
that newspaper in Paris and in the Department of the Seine ; considering that
the seizure of newspapers is regulated by the law of July 29, 1 8 8 1 ; that,
although it is the duty of mayors, and in Paris of the prefect of police, to take
all measures necessary for the preservation of public order and safety, these
duties do not carry with them the power to cause, as a preventive measure,
the seizure of a newspaper without a showing that the seizure, ordered in such
a general manner as appears from the record, viz., wherever the newspaper
shall be offered for sale, in Paris as well as in the suburbs, was indispensable
for the maintenance or restoration of public order; that, therefore, the measure
attacked in the circumstances constituted merely a trespass so that the ordinary
courts have jurisdiction over the case now pending before the court of Ver
sailles ; considering, nevertheless, that the court could not, without exceeding
its powers, condemn the prefect to the costs on account of the rejection of his
challenge [concerning the j urisdiction], because the prefect [in asserting a
conflict] did not act as a party to the proceeding but as representative of the
sovereign power:
"Art. 1 . The arrete de conflit made by the Prefect of Seine-and-Oise on
December 2 0, 1 934 is annulled.
"Art. 2. The disposition in the j udgment of the civil court of Versailles,
dated December 14, 1 934, condemning the Prefect of Seine-and-Oise to the
costs is deemed not to have been made."

ISS
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holdings in the

Pelletier2

and

Gounouilhou3

cases. Upon

the order of the prefect of police of Paris, the newspaper

L'A ction franfaise had been seized on the morning of Febru
ary 7, 1 934, at all places where it was held for sale and dis
tribution within the city of Paris and the Department of the
Seine. The plaintiff publisher instituted an action for dam
ages in the civil court of Versailles, whose jurisdiction was
affirmed by the Tribunal des conflits after it had been chal
lenged by the defendant prefect. The seizure had been or
dered during the grave political situation existing in Paris
on the night of February 6, and the commissaire du gouverne
ment pointed out that 4 "if ever a police prefect could make
use of exceptional powers it was during that night, and the
seizure of newspapers containing appeals to riot could well
constitute a legitimate use of the police power to the extent
that the seizure was indispensable to the prevention of re
newed and more serious disorders.''5 The conclusions of Com
missaire J osse, which the Tribunal adopted, rest on a minute
analysis of the jurisdictional issue involved, and thus con
siderable light is thrown upon the broader implications of the
trespass doctrine and upon the import of its application in the
case.
The Tribunal des conflits had to determine whether or not
it was proper for the civil court of Versailles to allow the ac
tion against the prefect. This rendered it necessary to consider
individually the possible factors which could subject the act
of an administrative agency to the scrutiny of a civil court.
•

Supra, chap. VII, note 6o.
Supra, chap. VIII, note 29 ; note particularly Laferriere's interesting criti
cism, ibid. at note 3 I .
• D. I 9 3 5·3·25 at 3 0 : 2.
6 The prefect of police, under article 8 of a regulation of March I 31 I 9241
concerning newsstand concessions by the city of Paris, had power to prohibit
the sale at stands of newspapers which in his opinion endangered the public
order ; but he had no such special power as to the sale in other places, as for
instance in the streets.
8
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I n the first place the question arose whether the prefect had
committed a faute personnelle6 which would involve his per
sonal liability. This question was answered in the negative by

the commissaire,7 and implicitly by the court, on the ground

that obviously the prefect had acted not from personal mo
tives but from the manifest desire to restore and maintain
public order in the city of Paris on that critical date. In other
words, he "exercised police powers which he had, or believed
he had ; whether wrongly or rightly, legally or illegally,
matters little as far as j urisdiction is concerned."8
The second consideration was the apparent analogy in the
facts of the case to those of tpree earlier cases9 decided by the
Tribunal des confl.its in

1 8 8 9.

At that time the Tribunal had

held the ordinary courts competent to entertain suits insti
tuted against three prefects as the sequel to certain seizures
which were found to constitute invasions of the freedom of
the press. It had to be determined, therefore, whether the
principle upon which j urisdiction depended in the former
cases was applicable to the present case. The commissaire
8

Supra, chap. VIII.
Commissaire Josse, relying on Laferriere's definition of faute personnelle
as an act "which reveals the man with his human weaknesses, his passions, his
indiscretions," and not "the official, the representative of the state, more or
less subject to errors." Supra, chap. VIII, note 9·
" D. 1 9 3 5·3·25 at z 8 : I .
• Defeuille v. Prefet d e police, Usannaz-Joris v. Lefebvre d u Grosriez, prefet
de la Savoie, and Michau et Lafreney v. Boegner, prefet du Loiret, D. 1 89o.J.65.
All of these cases involved political agitations directed against the republican
government by the former nobility of France, in particular by Phillipe, Count
of Paris. In the first case the prefect of police of Paris had ordered the seizure
of a manifesto addressed by the Count of Paris to mayors and towns of France,
as well as of plates and signature stamps used in the printing. In the second
case the Prefect of Savoy had seized at a post office letters similarly addressed
and containing copies of the same manifesto. In the third case the Prefect of
Loiret ordered the seizure of likenesses of the Count of Paris to be distributed
with a newspaper. The courts in which the respective complaints were received
were held to have power to give relief by ordering the restitution of the confiscated
property or by assessing damages against the prefects ; not, however, by holding
the postmaster liable in damages for having surrendered the letters, as in the
second case.
7
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demonstrated at length that the earlier decisions could no
longer stand as precedents, notwithstanding the fact that the
freedom of the press was still regulated by the law of July 29,
I 8 8 I ,10 prohibiting preventive confiscations by the adminis
trative and permitting seizures only in aid of criminal prose
cutions for specifically designated offenses.11 This law had
not been made the basis of the former adj udications, but the
jurisdiction of the civil courts in those cases had been upheld
on the ground that the respective prefects had acted as "of
ficers of the judicial police" 12 under powers conferred by
article

I O of the Code d'instruction criminelle. Since in the
A ction franfaise case the prefect had not acted in such capacity
nor in aid of a criminal prosecution/3 but strictly in the exer
cise of police powers, justification for the ordinary jurisdic
tion had to be found elsewhere.
The seizure of the newspaper

L'Action franfaise

had the

appearance of a bona fide act of an administrative official per
formed in the exercise of his functions. The opinion of the
commissaire points out that under normal circumstances the
administrative seizure of newspapers would amount to such
a flagrant violation of the freedom of the press that it could
not be considered an exercise of police powers, but would
10

As amended, Dec. 1 2, I 893·
to such crimes as murder and arson, and to crimes against the
security of the state (see law of December 1 2, I 89 3 ) .
"' Cf. the instances o f illegal arrest (s'upra, chap. IX, notes 3 8, 3 9 ) , where the
j urisdiction also was predicated upon the judicial nature of the function. Cf.
also the cases cited by the commissaire (Matters of Spitz, Rec. I 920.Ioo6 ;
Dubois, Rec. I 9 2 I .23 I ; Cons. Huignard, Rec. I 9 23.727 ; Marquie, Rec
I 926.383) in which the Conseil d'ttat declined to assume j urisdiction because
the seizures had been made by commissaires de police "acting in their capacity
as officers of the judicial police."
18 At the particular time, art. Io of the Code d'instruction criminelle was
not in force, having been abrogated by the law of Feb. 7, I 9 3 3 (supra, chap.
IX, note I o) . It was, however, re-enacted by art. 6 of the law of March 2 5,
I 9 35, amending the Code d'instruction criminelle. See Waline, Manuel
illmentaire de droit administratif (I 936) p. 450.
n Provocation

•

.
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clearly constitute a trespass.14 However, i t i s also pointed
out that the fact that a liberty, such as the freedom of the
press, is protected and that violations are subj ect to redress
according to statute does not nullify the police powers which
the administrative derives from other laws.15 It is of parH D. I 935·3·Z5 at 30 :11 citing two cases decided by the Cour de cassation
involving violations of the press law of July z9, 1 8 8 1 : Lajudie v. Pomarede,
and Vaugeois-Heron v. Rieunier, D. 1 9 1 9. 1 .3Z.
15 This point is illustrated by a number of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat
indicated the extent of the general police power. It was held that the "freedom
of advertising" (art. 1 5, law of July :1.9, 1 8 8 1 , supra, at note 1 o) was not
violated by a police order prohibiting the use of special vehicles for advertising
purposes in the streets of Paris, in the interest of the safety and convenience of
traffic. Matter of Hostein & Cie., D. 1 901 .3·53 ; Matter of Compagnie nouvelle
des Chalets, etc., Rec. 1 9 0:1..4:!.. Cf. Matter of Cotte, Rec. 1 9:1.4.83 91 concerning
the destruction of "suspicious" billboards under the order of a prefect duly
authorized by the Minister of the Interior in 1 9 1 4 ; held not in violation of the
above law of July z9, 1 8 8 1 .
Respecting the scope o f the general police power i n regard t o "public
liberties" (peddling, art. 1 81 law of July :1.9, I 8 8 1 ) , the decision of the Conseil
d'Etat of Nov. 30, 19:1.8, in the matter of Penicaud (D. H. 1 9 :1.9.39) referred
to by the commissaire du gouvernement appears especially pertinent. It was held
that the statute did not preclude the exercise by the mayors and prefects of
their general police powers in the interest of peace and order, and consequently
they could prohibit the distribution of printed matter apt to endanger the
public order in the vicinity of schools, churches, barracks, or factories; but
that it would be an excess of power and contrary to the statute to prohibit the
distribution of all writings whatsoever in all cases where there is a certain
congestion of traffic.
Enlarging the background of the extent of the police power, there is repeated
emphasis in the conclusions of a decision of the Conseil d'Etat (May 1 91 1933)
annulling a prefect's decree which prohibited a public address by a named
speaker, for the purpose of preventing anticipated disturbances of the public
order. The language employed by the court is of interest in connection with
the principal case : The right of free assembly being involved "the alleged
probability of disturbances was not of such a high degree that the public order
could not have been maintained without prohibiting the meeting." This
implies that under different circumstances the same order might have been a
proper police measure. Matter of Benjamin, D. 1 9 33·3·54 at 5 7 (italics sup
plied) .
Completing the outline, two cases of confiscation are considered in order
to demonstrate the right of the administrative under its general police powers
to interfere directly with property rights. In Monpillie v. Maire de Bordeaux,
D. I 9 Z I . I .4I1 S. I 9 I 8-I 9 I 9.Z.I1 supra, chap. VIII, note 7 1 1 the Cour de
cassation affirmed the incompetence of the ordinary courts in an action against
the mayor on account of the seizure of meat brought into the city without having
been submitted for inspection and stamping in accordance with a city ordinance.
The reason was that both in issuing the order and in causing the seizure pur
suant to it, the mayor had remained within his police powers and his admin
istrative functions (art. 9 7, law of April s, 1 8 841 Municipal Organization) .
·

·�·
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ticular interest to note that the opinion expressly denies that
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts is automatically
excluded whenever the exercise of such police powers con
flicts with a protected liberty.16
In drawing the final conclusions essential to the disposition
of the principal case, the commissioner relied on the prece
dents reviewed. He deduced from the earlier decisions that
administrative agencies, in the lawful use of their general po- lice powers, may indeed curtail constitutional liberties without
committing a trespass, and that redress by the ordinary
And the Conseil d'Etat, in principle, decided that a mayor may within his
police powers proceed to confiscate deteriorated foods where such action is
urgent in view of the existence of serious danger to the public health. Matter
of Societe Laitiere Maggi, D. H. I 924. I 70.
18 Additional precedents sanctioning the administrative jurisdiction, i. e.,
denying the trespass character of the act, in case of illegal invasions of property
rights, are cited in Professor Waline's note, D. I 9 3 5·3·25. The Conseil d'Etat
held itself competent to adj udicate a matter of illegal detention and utilization
of a foreign neutral vessel in Matter of Chan Pek Chun, Rec. 1 9 3 I .I 1 2 5. [The
case is relied on by Laroque, supra, chap. IX, note 59, in his endeavor to discredit
the voie de fait doctrine.]
In this particular instance the question seems pertinent whether the diplomatic
aspects of the case did not contribute to the retention of j urisdiction by the
Conseil d'Etat. Furthermore, one may well ask if and upon what grounds the
administrative jurisdiction might have been vindicated before the Tribunal
des conflits had the action of the owner of the ship been instituted in the civil
court.
In the case of Bailly v. Carques, D. 1 9 I 8 . 3 . I , irregularities in effect
ing military requisitions of beef cattle and grain, in the opinion of the Tribunal
des conflits, did not deprive the respective acts of their administrative char
acter so as to justify the j urisdiction of the civil court. This case should be
compared with the Union Villeneuvoise case (supra, chap. IX, note 5 1 ) ; there
is a difference both in the degree of procedural irregularity and in the conse
quences. The former case involves the taking of personal property, while the
latter was concerned with taking possession of an entire factory. It should be
noted, however, that in the Bailly case the court did not refer to the trespass
doctrine as an alternative solution but rather reached its decision on the basis
of the distinction between faute de service and faute personnelle, i. e., by
denying the quasi-delictual character of the acts in question. In the third case
cited (De Gaste v. Hospices, etc., D. 1 8 95· 3·45 ) the Tribunal des conflits de
cided in favor of the administrative j urisdiction "because there was no trespass,
even though construction on a public works had been begun prior to any admin
istrative formalities and a water course to which plaintiffs claimed a right had
been diverted." Waline, D. 1 9 3 5·3·25· It should nevertheless also be noted that
the court expressly held that there had been no dispossession and that the right
claimed was not a property right.
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courts is not available unless the act complained of involves
a malfeasance or usurpation of power. Consequently the seiz
ure in the A ction franfaise case could be impeached in a civil
court only if there was something in the attending circum
stances which deprived the act of the prefect of its apparently
administrative character, thus reducing it to an unqualified
violation of the law protecting the freedom of the press.17
The test of this proposition depended upon the answers to
two separate questions : ( 1 ) Did the police powers of the
prefect under the particular circumstances extend to the
seizure of the newspaper? ( 2) If so, was the seizure ordered
and made as a means to an end, or as an end in itself?
The first question presents two aspects, being concerned
both with the existence of the powers as such, and with the
mode of exercising them. The general scope of the powers of
the prefect of police in regard to the press could be readily
determined. Thus, according to the express terms of the con
cessions of the city-owned newsstands, the display and sale
of publications which were held to endanger the public order
could be prohibited. Furthermore, since the police author
ities were charged with the maintenance of order in the pub
lic streets, 18 the sale of a newspaper inciting to violence in
the streets of an already inflamed city could also be prohibited
by the prefect. However, whether the newspaper could be
seized raised a different, more delicate issue. The commis
saire du gouvernement concluded 19 that, even though the
11 Although the 1 8 89 cases (supra, note 9 ) denied all right of preventive
seizure of newspapers, the commissioner insisted that "not every seizure of a
newspaper is, nor can be, a trespass" per se.
18 Baldy v. Prefet de Saone-et-Loire, D. 1 9 20.3.2 S ; see art. 9 9, law of
April s, I 8 84, Organization of Municipalities. Cf. Matter of Hostein & Cie.,
D. I 9 0 I ·3 ·53• supra, note I S ; Matter of Compagnie Nouvelle des Chalets, etc.,
Rec. I 902.42, supra, note I S.
10 Reliance was had on the authority of the decision of the Conseil d'Etat
in the matter of Anduran, D. 1 92S·3·43· Upon the recourse of the owner of a
1l.our mill whose plant had been "sealed" because of numerous known and sus
pected violations of certain statutes, it was held that the administrative de-
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seizure constituted an administrative execution, it was justi
fiable because of the exceptional circumstances. It was pointed
out that under the special terms of the concessions the action
taken was appropriate as far as the newsstands were con
cerned. However, in regard to the street sales it was neces
sary to construe the seizure as a direct sanction of an implied
prohibition to sell. On this basis the seizure could be justified
on the ground of the existing emergency and imminent
danger.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE EXECUTION AGAINST PERSONS AND
PROPERTY

At this point, a more intimate examination of direct ad
ministrative execution 20 in French law is imperative. Pro
fessor Waline 21 has said that that "is one of the most delicate
problems of our public law, because it brings into conflict
two fundamental principles, personal liberty and the respect
due the laws."
Trespasses by administrative agencies often stage their ap
pearance in the cloak of acts of enforcement directed imme
diately against persons or property. It is important, therefore,
to determine under what circumstances direct sanctions may
be applied, and when, on the other hand, their use is illegal
in the sense that affected parties are entitled to the protection
partment exceeded its powers in resorting to a sanction not specifically provided
for in the respective statutes, which afforded other adequate means of enforce
ment, since this was "not a cause of emergency and immediate danger." (See
infra, p. r 6 8.) Commissaire Josse developed the problem of administrative exe
cution more fully in the Anduran case.
00 Berthelemy, "De l'exercice de Ia souverainete par l'autorite administrative,"
2. 1 R. D. P. ( r 9o4) 2.09 ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes de la
puissance publique ( r 914), pp. 7 1-89 ; Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif,
r oth ed. ( r 9z r ) , pp. 77-8o, 12.th ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 5 7 8-5 82., and his note ac
companying the Saint-Just decision in S. I904·3·I 7 and La jurisprudence ad
ministrative de r89 2 a I929 (I 92.9), Vol. r , p. 84 at 9 9 ff. ; Bannard, Precis de
droit administratif (1935), pp. r 86-r 8 7.
21 Waline, Manuel ellmentaire de droit administratif (1 936), pp. 451-54.
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of the ordinary courts. That one available form of relief, in
case of the unauthorized application of such sanctions, is of
the injunctive type should be especially noted. For this ex
ceptional, although very limited, power of the French civil
courts to enj oin administrative action must be related to
the fact that no corresponding remedy is available in the ad
ministrative courts.22 Attempts have not been lacking to equip
the latter with powers of injunction (referes) . The difficulty,
however, has been that the administrative courts actually
have no power to interfere with the execution of adminis
trative orders lawfully made. Thus it is possible to obtain an
injunction only by holding the act of enforcement "nonad
ministrative" and therefore subject to the ordinary jurisdic
tion.
r.

The Rule of the Saint-Just Case

The outstanding occasion for dealing exhaustively with the
problem of direct sanctions arose in connection with the en
forcement of the law regulating religious associations. This
statute prohibited the formation of religious congregations
without special legislative authorization, and permitted their
establishments to be operated only by virtue of a special de
cree of the Conseil d'Etat.23 In the case of Societe immobi
liere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du Rhone,24 the owner of cer
tain premises housing an unauthorized school of the Sisters
of St. Charles brought action in the civil court against the
prefect, who had ordered the premises sealed after evicting
the congregation. The prefect had acted in pursuance of a
22 Bannard, Precis, p. 1 59 ; Jacquelin. "L'evolution de la procedure ad
ministrative," 1 9 R. D. P. ( 1 903) 373 and 20 R. D. P. ( 1 903) 5 at 1 7-1 9 ;
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 , p . 1 08.
18 Law of July 1, 1 901, art. 1 3·
"' Decided December 2, 1 902, S. 1 904.3·1 7 ; D. 1 903 .3·41 ; Hauriou, Juris
prudence, Vol. 1, p. 84.
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decree of the "ministers in council,"25 and he challenged the
competence of the court by asserting a conflict.
The Tribunal des conflits had to decide, for the purpose
of determining jurisdiction, whether the action taken by the
prefect was within his administrative functions or whether
it constituted a trespass. The decision required consideration
of the important question of administrative sanctions in the
form of direct execution against persons or property. The
general rule is that direct enforcement of the commands or
prohibitions contained in laws and regulations is permissible
only if it has been previously authorized by a judicial court.26
Penal sanctions for infractions cannot be applied except upon
conviction in the ordinary courts. These courts alone are
deemed competent to authorize or to order the appropriate
means of execution to be employed. If the administrative de
partment resorts independently to methods of direct enforce
ment, it is held to violate the principle of differentiation of
agencies,27 and its action constitutes a trespass because of the
illegal invasion of private rights or property.
This general rule is subject to exceptions. Thus, power to
apply penal sanctions in a few isolated instances has been con
ferred upon the administrative courts by statute.28 In addi
tion, the rigid application of the principle was found to pro
duce undesirable results, particularly where a law failed to
provide sanctions for the violation of its terms. This was the
.. This being the form of decree required by art. 13 of the law of July 11
1 90 1 , for the closing of such establishments.
28 See the conclusions of the commissaire du gouvernement in the case ;
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 8 6 ; Dareste, p. 7 1 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis,
1 oth ed., p. 7 7, uth ed., p. 580.
"' See the opinion in the Saint-Just case, S. 1 904·3 · 1 7 at 2.2. :2, quoted
by Dareste, p. 83.
28 See Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours con
tentieux, 2d ed. ( 1 896) , Vol. 1 , pp. 2o-2 1 1 Vol. 2, p. 629 ff. ; cf. Hauriou,
Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 8 79, uth ed., p. 3 50. The powers originally given have
· recently been reduced by the law of Dec. 28, 1 926. See Berthilemy, Traite
elimentaire de droit administratif ( 1 9 3 5 ) , p. 1 1 46; Waline, Manuel, p. 554·
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condition with which the Tribunal des confiits was confronted
in the Saint-Just case. The statute involved in the case, pro
viding penalties and civil sanctions for certain infractions,29
did not make provision for the effective enforcement of .a
closing order such as was before the Tribunal. Hence it was
for the latter to decide whether the statute was to remain a
dead letter or whether the responsible administrative agency
could supply the sanction which the legislature had omitted.
The Tribunal des conflits conceded the authority of the pre
fect to come to the aid of the statute and to enforce it by seal
ing the premises. 30
The cautious conclusions in the case31 must be weighed
carefully in order to gauge the exact import of the decision,
which elicited approving as well as vehemently disapproving
comment. It should nevertheless be observed that even the
29 Law of July r, t 9or, arts. 8, 1 4, 1 6.
80 Commentators have pointed out that it is possible for a law to be en
tirely devoid of sanctions only because of the restrictive interpretation which
the Cour de cassation has placed on art. 4 7 1 , § 1 5, of the criminal code (supra,
chap. VI, note 7) . A more liberal interpretation would make this statute and
its penalties applicable in case of violation of any administrative regulation.
Consequently laws from which sanctions were omitted could then be effectively
supplemented with regulations for the purpose of curing the defect. See the
opinion in the Saint-Just case, S. I 904· 3 · I 7 at 2 1 : r ; Dareste, pp. 7 1-77;
Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 7 7-78, Jurisprudence, Vol. r, pp. r o 8-ro9, 1 2 6 ;
Moreau, L e reglement administratif ( r 9oz ) , p . 325 ff.
m The commissaire du gouvernement admitted the equal validity of a theory
which denies that an "incomplete" statute may be administratively supple
mented, because the guarantee of liberty and property must be the paramount
consideration. On the other hand, the commissaire insisted that in France the
postulate of the separation of powers implicitly demands that laws shall not
be left unenforced. Nevertheless, he recognized the necessity of well-defined
limitations upon direct administrative sanctions, for "One cannot overlook the
serious disadvantages which 'forced administrative execution' presents. On one
hand
. . direct execution by the administrative, 'by default,' without
judgment, without opportunity of defense .
aside from being contrary
to our customs, may in certain cases foster arbitrary action and cover up illegal
ities. On the other hand, the administrative courts are not equipped to pro
tect effectively private rights which might be violated in a flagrant manner
through abuses of acts of direct execution ; they do not have local judges for
the purpose ; they do not dispose of inj unctive relief [refire] and the slow
ness of their intervention can often render their efficacy illusory." S. 1 904·3·1 7
at z x :z.
•

.

•
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champions of the doctrine that laws should never be permitted
to remain unenforceable32 have been keenly aware of the
danger to private rights from abuse of the requisite powers.
They have stressed the necessity of strictly limiting those
powers of the administrative department.33 Hauriou's note84
on the decision seems to suggest that certain restrictions35
proposed by the commissaire du gouvernement would not
fully satisfy the exigencies of the situation. The author in
sisted at the time that, although there may be occasion for
direct execution by administrative agencies, these agencies
should always conform to customary administrative methods,
and should not resort to extraordinary measures. On the
other hand, the doctrine has been vigorously condemned
by Berthelemy36 on the ground that the paramount principle
of public law demands that the administrative "exercise only
those powers which have been expressly conferred upon it by
statute."37
82

p.

Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p.
Waline, Manuel, p . 452·

79,

uth ed., p.

5 7 91

Jurisprudence, Vol. r ,

99 ;
13

Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 79, uth ed., p. 5 8 2 ; Waline, Manuel, p.
See also Waline's note in D. 1 9 35·3·25 at 26.
"' S. 1 9 04·3 · 1 7 ; Jurisprudence, Vol. r , p. roo {quotation, supra, chap. IX,
note 6 8 ) . However, the point seems to have been abandoned later on. Cf.
Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 79-80, uth ed., pp. 5 8 1 - 5 8 2 .
80 See note 3 8, infra.
'"' "De l'exercice de la souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 2 1 R. D. P.
( 1 9 04) 209 ff.
"' Ibid., p. 2 1 6. The same writer also states : "The administrative cannot
touch our property, put its hand upon our persons, except in pursuance of
express statutory authority. Wherever the statute is silent the function of the
administrator terminates.
the legislative intent may not be presumed
if it has not been expressed." Ibid.
It is worth noting that in the country which has sponsored administrative
autonomy some of the foremost authorities are constantly pointing out and mili
tating against the danger of opening the door to arbitrariness. Berthelemy
sees "behind the independent exercise of sovereign power the spectre of ad
ministrative tyranny.
. . the administrative may act only to insure the
execution of the laws, only in the forms specified by statute, only to the extent
indii:ated by the statute." Ibid., p. 2 1 4. And again, further on, "While one
cannot overlook the disadvantages arising from leaving a statute temporarily
devoid of all sanction, this disadvantage is not commensurate with the danger
45 1 .

•
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In the Saint-Just case, the commissaire du gouvernement
argued and the court found that in sealing the premises the
prefect had acted within his powers. It was further held that
the enforcement of the statute in question was accompanied
by all the circumstances38 necessary to justify direct admin
istrative execution. Thus, the act of the prefect was strictly
administrative and, since there had been no trespass, the
court had violated the differentiation of agencies by declar
ing itself competent in the matter.39
presented by the introduction into practice of arbitrary administrative pro
cedures not sanctioned by law." Ibid., p. 22.3. The author concludes that "the
actor to whom the program assigns no part must not appear upon the stage."
P. 22.7. See also the same writer's Traite, p. 349 ff.
Cf. Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( I 92 3 ) , Vol. 3, pp. 7 I I7 I 3 ; cf. also Dareste, p. 8 6 ; and the unsigned note in D. I 903·3·4 I .
38 " I . The administrative object for which exc:cution i s necessary must have
its sources in the express language of a statute ;
"2. There must be cause for forced execution because of resistance to a
law or to a sovereign command [acte de puissance publique] ;
"3· The necessity for direct administrative execution must spring from the
absence of a penal sanction ;
"4· The means of forced execution must tend solely to realize the imme
diate administrative object envisaged by the statute." Opinion in the case, S.
I 904.3.I 7 at 2 I :3.
Hauriou (see supra, chap. IX, note 68) at that time insisted that the fourth
limitation be further qualified, and he interpreted the decision as satisfying the
double requirement. Through an interesting review of the earlier instances
of sealing localities as a method of administrative execution, he shows that
this has been a means "habitually" employed. Consequently, in the present case
it was not an "extraordinary" means which would deprive the act of the prefect
of its administrative quality and would remove it from the administrative juris
diction. (The instances referred to are the suppression of the prerevolutionary
system of courts, and the administration of the estates of emigrants and the
royal family and of religious associations under the legislation of the years
I 7 89-I 792..) See Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I 1 p. I oo ff.
80 The commissaire du gouvernement, whose reasoning was adopted by the
court, viewed the question of j urisdiction from still another angle. Application
to the civil court for an injunction had been made, not by the evicted congre
gation, but by the owners-lessors of the building. These parties, although they
did not do so, might have insisted upon the civil jurisdiction for the pro
tection of their property rights. To meet this implied objection to the exclusive
competence of the administrative court in the case, the court pointed out that
"to seal the premises and to keep them temporarily sealed" did not amount to
"an act of dispossession" such as would automatically confer jurisdiction upon
the civil courts. S. I 904·3· I 7 at 24 :3.
The civil jurisdiction in the case of expropriation (supra, p. I 35) has by anal
ogy been extended to dispossessions by the administrative. See the conclusions of
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The Saint-Just decision became a milestone by establish
ing the rule that direct administrative sanctions may be em
ployed in order to give effect to a statute which is unenforce
able because of a deficiency in its terms. But the decision,
through the underlying opinion of the commissaire du gou
vernement, also indicates the further and probably far more
frequent necessity for such sanctions in case of "extreme
emergency in the sense of immediate danger to the general
security, public health, or public order."40 The picturesque
phrase coined by Commissaire Romieu in the case has often
been quoted : "When the house is on fire one does not apply
to a court for an order directing the firemen to extinguish it."
The Conseil d'Etat, since its decision in the recourse Sure
main,41 has adhered to the principle stated in the Saint-Just
case in several decisions of more recent date. 42 These cases
hold that administrative agencies may take measures directly
affecting persons or property whenever public interests are
seriously and immediately endangered, and whenever, under
the commissaire, S. I 904·3.23 :3 ; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. r, pp. 95, 1 07,
Precis, I 2th ed., p. 347· It seems extremely difficult in this particular instance
to maintain a clear distinction between a dispossession and a trespass upon pri
vate property. In the present case, assuming there had been a dispossession, the
civil court obviously would have been held competent although the act re
mained administrative. But the dispossession of the private owner of real
property by an administrative act may very well present all the characteristics
of a trespass. The outward guise of a dispossession incidental to an otherwise
legal act may conceal a virtual expropriation without the requisite formalities.
The complete disregard of procedure combined with the fact of dispossession
unquestionably would result in a voie de fait. See Laferriere, Vol. I , p. 542 ff. ;
Hauriou, Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 869 ff. ; Bannard, p. 459 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p.
468 ff., 529 ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 69 8 ff.
40 S. I 904·3·I 7 at 2 I : 1 . Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 79, 1 2th ed., p. 5 8 I ,
takes the position that the absence of a statutory sanction must coincide with
emergency. Cf. Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 8 ; Waline, Manuel, pp. 450, 453· See
also Dareste, pp. 84, 8 6 ; Appleton, note under Monpillie v. Gruet, D. I 9 2 I .
1 .4I-42. Cf. Matter o f Gilibert, Rec. I 9 33·930-3 I .
" Decided i n I 907, Rec. I 907.345 ff . (see the conclusions of commissaire
Romieu, ibid., p. 347) .
'" In I 9 I J (Matter of Societe fran�aise d'industrie chimique, S. I 9 I 6.J.I,
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I , p. 1 20) a manufacturer of chemical products
complained of the action of a prefect who had served notice to discontinue the
unauthorized and dangerous manufacture of certain products, and to suspend the
previously authorized production of other chemicals on account of changed con-
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these circumstances, the terms of a statute cannot be adequately
enforced by applying the sanctions which it provides.43
2.

The Saint-Just Rule and the Action Franyaise Case

The conflict in the Action franfaise case could be resolved
only by determining whether or not the seizure involved
was a trespass in the sense of an unjustified application of a
direct administrative sanction. According to the opinion of
the commissaire du gouvernement, the action taken by the
prefect, although it was in the nature of a direct execution,
was not illegal per se. The prefect was under a legal duty to
maintain order; an emergency existed, and the sale of printed
matter inciting to violence would have seriously and imme
diately endangered the public safety. These circumstances
called for prompter action than could have been obtained
through the intervention of the judicial department. Neverditions and considerations of public health, and who also had sealed machinery
used in the manufacture. The Conseil d'Etat held that the notice constituted a
definite prohibition ; however, it condemned the sealing of machinery. The de
cision on the second point was interpreted to rest implicitly on the ground that
there had been no emergency. (See Hauriou's note, S. 1 9 1 6.3.I, Jurisprudence,
Vol. r , p. 1 20.) But it seems more likely that the sealing as a means of execu
tion was inappropriate because adequate statutory sanctions were not lacking as
in the Saint-Just case, inasmuch as art. 4 7 1 1 § 1 5, Code Penal, was operative.
This meets the criticism of Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 7 1 3, who insists that the
solution in both cases should have been the same. See also Berthilemy, Traiti,
pp. 3 5 5-356, note.
In a cause of action which arose during the war of 1 9 1 4, the Conseil d'Etat
approved the action of a prefect who destroyed all advertising signs and their
supports in his district, although a government order prescribed the removal
of "suspicious" signs only. The ground of decision was "extreme emergency."
Matter of Cotte, Rec. 1 924.839. The Conseil d'Etat in Matter of Societe Laitiere
Maggi, D. H. 1 924.1 7o, held that the mayor would have been j ustified in con
fiscating in plaintiff's plant foodstuffs unfit for consumption, in direct execution
of art. 9 7 of the law of 1 8 84 (Municipal Code) , only if this had been necessary
because of the imminence of grave danger. In the Anduran case (D. 1 925.3·43 ) ,
supra, note 1 9, it was held that the mills could not legally b e sealed for contra
vention of certain statutes by the owner, because there was no emergency and
immediate danger, and there were various statutory sanctions with which the
prefect could have effectively enforced the infracted rules.
411 The majority of writers is in agreement on this question. However,
Berthelemy adheres staunchly to the theory that under no circumstances may
the administrative proceed by way of direct execution. Traiti, p. 356, note.
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theless the commissaire concluded that the seizure was a
trespass on account of the obj ect towards which it was ulti
mately directed. Due to the broad scope of the prefect's order
"to seize the newspaper A ction franfai.s-e at all places where
held for sale in Paris and suburbs," the seizure was not lim
ited to designated places within the area where the sale of
that newspaper would actually have become a menace to the
public order and safety. The apparent purpose of the order
therefore was not merely to forestall the potential effect of
such sales, but to prevent the distribution of the newspaper.
In the language of the opinion, the seizure under the cir
cumstances appeared not as a means to an end but as an end
in itself. On the basis of this construction, the commissaire
du gouvernement suggested/4 and the Tribunal des con:flits
held, that the act of seizure constituted a trespass and that
the civil court had jurisdiction in the case.
Quite obviously the Action franfaise decision suggests new
and important considerations in the analysis of administrative
trespass. Although the Tribunal des con:flits in principle ap
proved an extension of the police powers in regard. to the
freedom of the press, and by implication in regard to all civil
liberties, it indicated at the same time the value of the tres
pass doctrine as a means of checking administrative discretion.
In this respect the decision vindicates Hauriou, who defended
the doctrine of voie de fait as necessary to confine adminis
trative activity within its constitutional domain.411
" "What we ask you [the court]
is that you confirm the existence of a
police power to restrict, or paralyze temporarily, civil liberties which are
guaranteed and regulated by law, be it the freedom of the press, or the freedom
of assembly, whenever exceptional circumstances justify it. You should not dis
arm the authority of the police by a decision to the contrary. But if, upon con
firming this principle, you find that the circumstances in the present case were
not such as to render legal a measure as general as the one taken, it is unim
portant from the doctrinal point of view
" D. 1 9 3 5·3·25 at 3 1 :1 .
40 See Pricis, nth ed., p. 26. Blaevoet (D. 1 9 3 8.x . I o6 at 1 1 4 :2 ) says that
"the recognition of administrative trespass is a means of protection against, and
sometimes even of prevention of, arbitrariness."
.

.
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Professor Waline,46 in evaluating the decision, did not ac
cept the final conclusions of the commissaire du gouverne
ment in their entirety. The latter saw in the general nature
of the scope 47 and purpose 48 of the impeached order the
element of illegality which deprives an act of its adminis
trative character. Thus the act could be denounced as a tres
pass upon the freedom of the press, subject to redress by
a civil court. There is nothing in the language of the Tri
bunal directly suggesting an adoption of this construction,
and Professor Waline arrived at a somewhat different in
terpretation. 49 According to this commentator, the trespass
arose from the fact that the seizure, "ordered in such a
general manner," was not necessary for the maintenance of
order and security. In other words, under the limitations
established by the Saint-Just case,50 the circumstances did
not justify the direct sanction resorted to by the prefect. This
suggests that the decision must be taken to hold 51 ( I ) that
under the circumstances, though not per se, the act of the
prefect was illegal, ( 2 ) that the act tended to violate a civil
liberty, and ( 3 ) that the invasion of the freedom of the press
which actually resulted from the seizure of the newspaper
was sufficiently serious to constitute a trespass.
C. A TH IRD ELEMENT OF TRESPASS

EXTENT OF INVASION

-

The necessity of measuring the extent of illegal encroach
ments upon civil liberties and property rights for the purpose
of determining the presence of a voie de fait had never been
'" Note in D. 1 9 35·3·2.5 at 2. 7 .
41 "To seize the newspaper in all places where held for sale in Paris and
suburbs." [Italics supplied.]
'" To seize certain property without exclusive regard to the immediate concern of maintaining public order.
411 D. 1 935·3 ·2.5 at 2. 7.
"" Supra, note 2.4.
11 See Waline's note, D. 1 9 3 5· 3 ·2.5·
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emphasized prior to the A ction franfaise decision. Further
more, there is nothing in either the opinion or in the tenor
of the decision in the case that points to this requirement. On
the surface, the only outstanding fact in the A ction franfaise
case is that an invasion of the freedom of the press for the
first time was treated as a trespass. Nevertheless, it is appar
ent that the Tribunal des con:flits did not stigmatize the act of
the prefect as a trespass because of the sole fact of invasion
of a liberty, but rather because the invasion assumed the
drastic form of a seizure. Viewed in the light of this quali
fication, the precedents disclose a general tendency of the
courts to apply the trespass doctrine only in case of serious
violations. 52 So where property rights are involved, a dispos
session 53 seems to be requisite, and this rather as to real prop
erty than as to personalty. 54 Corresponding to dispossession
•• Waline, ibid., thinks that the presence of a trespass may also depend upon
the severity of the formal illegality of the act, citing as an illustration, Lacombe
v. Perrier, D. I 8 76·3·5 I . In that case the Tribunal des conflits, resolving a
negative conflict, found a trespass because the mayor had violated a criminal
statute by causing graves and corpses to be disturbed in locating the foundations
for a church building .
.. Cf. the introductory notes preceding the report of the decision of the
Tribunal des conflits in Montlaur v. Balmigere, Maire de Tournissan (Rec.
I 904.888 at 8 89) : "So long as the administrative stays on its own ground, does
not invade private property, but reaches it from without only and does not
put its hand upon it, the impairment of the owner's enjoyment, no matter how
great, is not for judicial cognizance ; on the other hand, the judicial courts
have exclusive jurisdiction if there is a trespass, i. e., if there is on the part
of the state [personne publique] an encroachment, taking, seizure, or usurpa
tion in respect to private real property whose protection is specially entrusted to
those courts."
•54 See the cases discussed above (p. I 6o) . Note in particular Monpillie v.
Gruet, supra, chap. VIII, note 7I (emphasized in Waline's note, D. I 9 3 5·3·zs ) ,
where even the Cour de cassation denied the j urisdiction of the ordinary courts
in a case involving the removal of noninspected meat from stores over the ob
jection of the owners. There was procedural irregularity which in this country
would have provoked at least an allegation of want of due process. However,
the act was held to be administrative, very probably on the ground that the dis
regard for procedure was comparatively slight. But again, it may be, as Waline
seems to suggest, that the holding was influenced by the fact that only personal
property was involved. Evidently the case of Bailly v. Carques, supra, note I 6,
concerning a procedurally irregular military requisition of cattle and grain,
is susceptible of analogous interpretation, and both cases can on the same ground
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as the standard for determining trespass in regard to property
rights, 55 are unlawful detention where persoaal liberty is in
volved, 56 illegal deprivation of the use of property devoted
to a cult where religious freedom is concerned, 57 and seizure
or equivalent interferences 58 in the case of freedom of the
press. 59
D. VOlE DE FAIT DISTINGUISHED FROM FAUTE PERSONNELLE

The A ction franfaise case, in addition to contributing greatly
to the clarification of the concept of administrative trespass,
is authority for the important proposition that a voie de fait
is not necessarily accompanied by a faute personnelle on the
part of the administrative official. 60 In other words, the act
be contrasted with the contrary holding in the Union Villeneuvoise case, supra,
chap. IX, note 5 I , where the Tribunal des conflits was concerned with the occu
pation of an entire factory by the military. Cf. also City of Mende v. Roussel,
supra, chap. IX, note 48, where the Cour de cassation found in favor of the
jurisdiction of the civil court because of a trespass resulting from the destruc
tion of a private water conduit ; and De Gaste v. Hospices, supra, note I 6, where,
on the contrary, the Tribunal des conflits declared the administrative courts
competent in a somewhat similar situation. There was neither a dispossession
nor a trespass upon plaintiff's property ; furthermore, no property right in the
bed of the watercourse but only a right to the water being at stake, compensa
tion for any permanent damage sustained had to be sought in the Conseil de
prefecture because it resulted from the construction of a public works. Law of
2 8 Pluviose, year VIII (Feb. I 7, I 8oo) , art. 4·
However, it should be observed that Waline himself seems to take a different
view in his Manuel (I 936) . There he says (p. 56) : "The j urisdiction belongs
to the civil courts in all cases of trespass, even though there is no dispossession."
It would follow that in the foregoing cases where there was no dispossession,
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts must be attributed to the absence of
a sufficient degree of illegality. Cf. Matter of Fremy, Rec. I 9 3 3. I 1 59, uphold
ing a Conseil de prefecture which had declined to take j urisdiction in a matter
of "irregularly taking possession of private property" in connection with the
construction of an electric power line.
.. Waline, D. 1 9 3 5·3·25·
08 Cf. Labadie v. Gaillardon, supra, chap. IX, note 3 8.
57 Cf. Cure de Realmont v. Mayor, supra, chap. IX, note 40.
08 See Waline, D. 1 93 5·3·25 at 2 8 :I .
•• L'Action fran-;;aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, supra, note I .
80 Jeze, Les principes giniraux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 925), p . 79,
note 2, has taken the view that there can be no trespass without a personal
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of an administrative official may be nonadministrative with
out being personal. Thus, trespass by no means precludes
good faith and need not involve the personal liability of the
administrative agent. Voie de fait, therefore, has been ap
propriately described as a notion objective, as distinguished
from faute personnelle, which is a notion subjective.61 It is
eminently the "impersonal" aspect of the trespass concept
upon which attention must be focussed in appraising its value
for comparative purposes.
E. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE

As a first impression it might seem that the doctrine of
administrative trespass bears but a remote relation to the
degree of autonomy which under the French conception of
the separation of powers the administrative department has
enj oyed in the past. Taken at its face value, the oft-employed
phrase "a trespass can never be an administrative act" 62 ap
parently means that the concept of voie de fait envisages only
acts which are so palpably nonadministrative that the juris
diction of the ordinary courts follows as a necessary conse
quence. In other words, it may seem that the trespass doctrine
contemplates only usurpations of the most obvious kind and
as foreign to proper administrative activity as are fautes
personnelles. However, the adjudicated cases at once reveal
that administrative trespass is not a simple but a com
plicated and multi-faceted concept. In its application, de
grees of illegality and shades of invasion of constitutional
fault of the public officer. See also Duguit, Traite (1 92.3 ) , Vol. 3, p. 7 1 5 ;
Appleton, p . 2.33. But see Hauriou, Precis, x oth ed., p . 3 61 note, who recognized
that "in the case of trespass there is frequently malfeasance on the part of the
functionary," engaging his personal liability. See also the note by Blaevoet,
D. 1 9 3 8.1 . 1 06 at 1 1 3 :X o
"' Waline, D . 1 935·3·2.5 a t 2. 7 : 1 ; Blaevoet, D . 1 93 8. x . x o6 at 1 1 3 :1 .
.. See the opinion in L'Action fran(;aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1 93 5·3·2.5
at 31 : x .
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rights which are destructive of the administrative quality of
an act have been distinguished.
It may have been well enough to hold that an act is non
administrative where an agency clearly overstepped the bor
ders of the domain constitutionally belonging to the admin
istrative department. However, the courts have stigmatized
administrative acts as trespasses even though there was color
of authority and a legitimate administrative objective pur
sued in good faith. Moreover, acts clearly authorized and
only procedurally irregular have been condemned in the
same sense. It is evident, therefore, that the term "nonad
ministrative" has been useful only as a convenient formula
and has concealed the actual function of the trespass doctrine.
Manifestly the trespass doctrine has served as a device to
overcome the unwieldiness of the principle of the differenti
ation of agencies. No sweeping modification of this funda
mental precept was desired, but there was an obvious and
stringent need for a means by which greater play could be
given to concerns more pressing than historical considerations.
In its operation the doctrine of administrative trespass
proved sufficiently flexible to fill the need it was called upon
to supply. Administrative acts affecting private rights were
not indiscriminately exposed to the scrutiny of the civil courts.
Machinery was available by which the administrative depart
ment might seek to vindicate its action whenever it found it
desirable to do so. Whenever redress for an alleged voie de
fait was sought in the ordinary courts, the department could
insist upon the administrative character of the act and could
claim j urisdiction before the Tribunal des conflits. On the
other hand, the alleged error could be tacitly conceded. Sim
ilarly, where relief was sought in the administrative courts,
these courts might either assume jurisdiction or they could,
of their own accord, denounce the act as a trespass and refer
the complainant to the j udicial courts.
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The manifold implications surrounding the trespass doc
trine indicate that out of a seemingly simple rule of jurisdic
tion grew a complex device permitting sporadic modifications
of the principle of the differentiation of agencies and facilitat- . ing the reconciliation of that principle with the "unwritten"
rule of ordinary court protection for the constitutional rights
and liberties of the people.

C HAPTER XI

I

N

Comparison and Conclusions

the comparison of the French and American systems
of reviewing administrative action, the final conclusions
must depend upon the relative significance of the doc
trines which circumscribe the review powers of the ordi
nary courts of France and the doctrine of judicial review in
the United States. It is unquestionably important that not
withstanding the differentiation of agencies the ordinary
courts of France have full power of interpretation in regard
to administrative regulations and a substantial amount of
control over their legality. Account must further be taken of
the doctrine of the nonexistence of executory administrative
orders which have been the outgrowth of usurped authority.
Adding finally the full weight of the power of the civil
courts to grant affirmative relief from flagrantly illegal ad
ministrative acts, the striking similarity of the French and
American systems becomes evident. In France, as in this
country, administrative acts directly affecting persons or prop
erty, in order to escape the scrutiny of the judicial courts,
must be both constitutional and legal, and the administrative
procedure must have conformed to prescribed forms. Thus
the postulates of the rule of law and of due process of law
in regard to personal liberty and property have been as com
mon to the conception of justice in France as they are today
in the United States. The unqualified inference, suggested
by the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association,1 that France has never had a pol
icy of supremacy of the law must be rejected. The judicial
courts of France have had at their command means of control
1 63 Rep. A .

B. A . (1938) 3 3 1 at 341.
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over administrative action comparable to judicial review in
the United States. This power effectively reached admin
istrative policies and was a strong bulwark against the ad
vances of administrative absolutism. The evolution of the
system was characteristic of French democracy, and the droit
administratif of democratic France did not provide a pattern
suitable for administrative absolutism.

Judicial Review in the United States
The manifest resemblance which, during the reign of the
droit administratif, existed in the relation between the ad
ministrative and judicial departments of the two countries
can best be illustrated by pointing out the essential features
of judicial review of administrative action in the United
States. The complexity of the maze of procedural devices
by which judicial relief from administrative action can or
must be obtained 2 need only be mentioned incidentally in
this connection. On the other hand, specific inquiry must be
made as to the right to judicial relief which determines the
fundamental nature of judicial review. The content of this
right, which exists only in the presence of a legally protected
interest3 adversely affected by administrative action, is of
. course no greater than the power of the courts to intervene.
The courts, in turn, have indicated the extent of their review
powers, i. e., their jurisdiction over acts of administrative
agencies in terms of constitutional limitations.4 Accordingly
• See Stason, "Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action," 24
A. B. A . J. ( 1 93 8 ) 274; see also "Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies
in New York," 33 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 93 3 ) 1 0 5 ; Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Ad
ministrative Findings," 3 0 Yale L. J. ( 1 92 1 ) 7 8 1 ; Freund, Administrative
Powers over Persons and Property ( 1 9 2 8 ) , p. 234 ff. ; Dickinson, Administra
tive Justice and tlte Supremacy of the Law ( 1 9 2 7) , p. 39 ff.
• See Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, ( 1 9 2 3 ) 263
u. s. 143·
• Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, ( 1 89o) 1 34 U. S.
4 1 81 discussed by Dickinson, pp. 1 9 0-9H Freund, ThQ Police Power ( 1 904) ,
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they cannot review, 5 except for the question of constitution
ality, acts which are legislative or administrative and not ju
dicial in nature, because in reviewing the policies embodied
in such acts they would themselves exercise legislative or
administrative functions.6

Procedural Due Process
The prerequisite that an administrative act must be "ju
dicial" 7 in nature in order to be cognizable by the constitu
tional courts is twofold in meaning. The very courts which
derive from it their jurisdiction to review at other times re
quire administrative agencies to employ judicial methods so
as to afford constitutional due process of law.8 Thus juris
diction to review, and consequently the right to j udicial re
lief, enlarges. For this right exists not only where ( I ) the
pp. 3 9 1-3 9 3 ; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, ( 1 9zo) 253 U. S.
z8 7 ; United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., ( 1 9 2 7 ) z 7 3 U. S. 299 ;
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1 930) z 8 1 U. S. 464 ;
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer, ( 1 936) z96 U. S.
so6; Hodges v. Public Service Commission, ( 1 9 3 1 ) I I O w. Va. 649· See also
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., ( 1 855) 1 8 How. (59
U. S.) z7z at z84.
• Relief from administrative action in many cases calls for review of the
injurious and impeached act upon a statutory appeal or direct attack through
the common-law methods of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto. But the act complained of, if it is wholly void, can be
collaterally attacked in an action for damages, application for equity injunction,
or by way of defense to prosecution for an alleged violation. See Stason, Z4
A. B. A. J. Z74 ff.
° Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1 930) z 8 1 U. S. 464
at 467, 469 {see chap. V, note 7, supra) . Cf. Hodges v. Public Service Commis
sion, ( 1 9 3 1 ) 1 1 0 W. Va. 649 at 655. The rule does not apply in the state
courts, which in many instances have been given administrative review powers
by statutes. However, if an appeal lies from the state court to the federal courts,
the latter cannot take j urisdiction if the state court has acted legislatively or ad
ministratively. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) z 1 1 U. S. z 1 o ;
Bacon v . Rutland R . Co., ( 1 9 14) Z J Z u. s . I J4. See chap. v, supra.
• More commonly the function of the administrative agency in this case
is referred to as quasi-j udicial, both because it is not truly, not wholly, judicial,
and because it cannot be j udicial under the separation of powers.
8 Cf. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, ( 1 890) 1 34
u. s. 41 8.
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primary object of the administrative act is adjudication,9 but
equally where ( 2 ) the method of pursuing an administrative
or legislative 10 end (a) is judicial or (b) violates the due
process requirement by failing to be judicial.11 Much de
pends, therefore, upon the types of administrative activity12
which the courts have actually treated as j udicial and upon
the extent to which they have insisted on procedural due
process.
The acts of administrative agencies are essentially adju
·dicative if they are concerned with the determination of ex
isting legal rights and duties. In this case the administrative
tribunal virtually performs the function of a specialized
court of justice, e. g., in making awards under workmen's
compensation statutes, in condemnation proceedings, in ·ad
j udicating claims against the government, in determining
rights to pensions, patents,13 or to land under government
grants, or again in exclusion or deportation cases, particularly
where the issue of citizenship is involved. However, the
requisite j udicial element is also considered to be present in
various types of actions of nonjudicial tribunals which are
directed toward clearly administrative ends.14 This is true,
•

E. g., the making of awards by workmen's compensation commissions.
E. g., rate-making.
n Cf. the similar English approach--Gordon, " 'Administrative' Tribunals
and the Courts," 49 L. Q. Rev. ( 1 9 3 3 ) 94 at 1 0 1 , note 1 5 : "In other cases, the
point is rather the implied obligation of a tribunal to adjudicate, so that if it
acts without adjudicating it is liable in trespass for depriving the party of a
hearing." P. I I 8 : "The powers expressly given to a tribunal may be clearly
legislative, but their exercise conditional on a state of facts, ascertainment of
whose existence as clearly requires judicial powers. Then doubt may arise
whether the tribunal has by implication the judicial power to adj udicate on
this question, or whether the validity of its orders depends on the finding of a
Court of law that the conditions were first fulfilled." See also Part II of the
same article, 49 L. Q. Rev. 4 1 9 at 428 ff.
lll I. e., activities entrusted to, and carried on by, administrative agencies.
m It is interesting in this connection to follow the opinion in In re Barratt's
Appeal, ( 1 899) 1 4 App. D. C. 255 at 2 5 7 ; but cf. Federal Radio Commission
v. General Electric Co., ( I 93o) 2 8 1 U. S. 464 at 467.
u Cf. chap. V, supra.
10
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for instance, in regard to the revocation of licenses, abate
ment of nuisances, removal of officers, and in the classic ca.Se
of public utility rate-making. The courts have never indicated
the exact meaning of the term "judicial" as applied to ad
ministrative action; indeed, an attempt to do so is scarcely
to be expected in view of the complex tasks with which ad
ministrative agencies have been and may hereafter be charged.
The extent of the right to, and the inherent purpose of,
judicial review as conceived by the courts is further reflected
in its scope. This scope varies according to the respective
weight of the public and private interests which must be bal
anced. Unless designed for the purpose of pure adjudication,
administrative action unavoidably brings these interests into
conflict, and the reviewing power of the courts-the probable
extent of their intervention-may be measured by the in
tensity of the conflict.15 Provided administrative action, so
called, is of the adjudicative type and therefore predomi
nantly judicial both as to object and form in that it is con
cerned solely with the determination of correlated private
rights and duties/ 6 the power to review attaches without
hindrance.17 On the other hand, where giving effect to a gen
eral legislative-administrative policy directly affects rights
of persons or property, it is only the process/8 as distin"' As to the concurrent operation of the doctrines of administrative finality
and of prior resort to administrative agencies, or exhaustion of administrative
remedies in the interest of administrative expertness, see chap. V. See also
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., ( 1 9 3 z) z 8 4 U. S. 474 ;
cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) zu U. S. z 1 o ; Palermo Land
& Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, (D. C. Cal. 1 9 1 5) zz7 Fed. 708. And
see the dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 9p) z85 U. S. zz at 65.
"' As, for instance, in the case of awards in industrial accident cases and ad
judication of claims against the government. In the second instance it is imma
terial that one of the parties is the government, since the questions before the
tribunal are of a purely private nature arising from contractual or quasi
contractual relations.
11 Cf. Borgnis v. Falk Co., ( 1 9 u ) 147 Wis. 3z7.
28 The common use of the term "function" in this and similar connections
is believed to be inaccurate and misleading.
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guished from the object, which can be termed j udicial. Con
sequently in such instances judicial review is confined to the
administrative mode of procedure. However, here the due
process requirement has proved capable of being stressed to
such an extent that review by the courts effectively reaches
the administrative objective whenever it is deemed desir
able to afford protection to large proprietary interests which
may be at stake.19

The Supremacy of Law
The right to judicial review thus far appears primarily
in the light of a guarantee of procedural due process. Broad
as it may be because of the freedom of the courts to define
due process in relation to specific needs, the right to court
revision of administrative action is by no means limited to
the scrutiny of procedural errors. Indeed, the area as well
as the efficacy of judicial relief is greatly increased through
the power to test the jurisdiction of administrative agencies
whose acts are the subject of complaint. This power imple
menting the postulate of the supremacy of the law is a com
prehensive one. If administrative action exceeds constitu111 The cases involving public utility rates are outstanding illustrations, par
ticularly because the issue of confiscation, when raised, must be finally de
termined by the courts in order to afford due process. See the famous case of
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1 920) 253 U. S. 2 8 7. Rate
making in the United States has variously been held to be a legislative or ju
dicial "function.'' This is obviously due to the failure to distinguish between
ultimate objective and method of procedure. In Village of Saratoga Springs v.
Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., ( 1 908) 1 9 1 N. Y. 1 23, the Court of
Appeals of New York was clearly aware of the distinction, though, strangely
enough, it seems to have escaped the same court in People ex rel. Central Park,
N. & E. River R. Co. v. Willcox, ( 1 909) 1 94 N. Y. 3 8 3 .
Protection o f civil liberties i s exemplified by the attitude o f the courts in
matters of exclusion and deportation of persons alleging citizenship. In ex
clusion cases a fair hearing before the administrative authorities is sufficient.
United States v. Ju Toy, (1 905) 1 9 8 U. S. 253 ; Chin Yow v. United States,
( 1 908) 208 U. S. 8. But in case of deportation, due process seems to require that
the administrative finding be subject to redetermination in the courts. Ng Fung
Ho v. White, ( 1 922) 259 U. S. 2 76.
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tiona! or statutory limitations, the courts, because of the
usurpation, can redress potential and actual injuries through
preventive or restitutional relief, without reviewing the act.
Nor is the power of the courts to intervene in this case re
stricted to acts which are judicial in nature. In regard to the
latter, jurisdictional grounds for relief can be tested upon
direct attack.20 However, the available collateral methods
of attack, particularly applications for injunctions/1 allow
j udicial inquiry into jurisdictional defects in a much more
general sense. The possible extent of judicial protection in case
of usurpation or excess of power depends entirely upon the
content given by the courts to the term "jurisdiction."22
The flexible limits of due process of law and of jurisdiction
embrace a large area within which the right to judicial relief
in the United States can be asserted against illegal and arbi
trary administrative action.23 This remains so even in the
face of the recent declaration of the United States Supreme
Court that "the range of issues open to review is narrow,"
and that "Only questions affecting constitutional power,
statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can
be raised." 24
In the comparison of ordinary court control of adminis
trative action in the destroyed French democracy and the
United States, the similarities of the two systems should
""

Certiorari or statutory appeal if appropriately worded.
"' The remedy of injunction is of especial importance in the federal courts,
which do not have power to grant common-law certiorari.
22 How it may affect the scope of review is well illustrated by the doctrine of
j urisdictional facts, chap. V, p. 70. Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 932) 2 8 5 U. S. 2 2 ;
cf. Borgnis v. Falk Co., (1 9 1 1 ) 1 4 7 Wis. 3 2 7·
28 Cf. Albertsworth, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Fed
eral Supreme Court," 3 5 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 922) 1 2 7, suggesting in the con
clusions that review may be narrowed ( 1 ) to cases of the violation of the
minimum of due process of law, and (2) to action occurring "outside the
sphere of jurisdiction."
"' Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939) 307 U. S. 1 2 5 at
r 3 9-1 40·
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not be permitted to eclipse obvious dissimilarities. Never
theless it may at once be observed that the latter are differ
ences in degree and method rather than in principle. Un
doubtedly the power of the ordinary courts of France in
regard to administrative action was less general and less
broad than the corresponding power of the American courts.
In France this power was always subject to be tested and its
scope to be redetermined in the Tribunal des conflits, while
in the United States courts are guided by self-imposed limi
tations under elastic constitutional precepts. In this respect
the French system has had the advantage of machinery spe
cially designed for the weighing of conflicting public and
private interests by an impartial umpire. Procedurally, the
methods of securing relief through the judicial courts under
- the French system were limited to collateral attacks.
Executory administrative orders could be disregarded by
the courts if clearly ultra vires, while redress for injuries
sustained was available through actions for damages and
restitution or injunctions against continuing administrative
· trespass. Direct attacks upon administrative acts in the ordi
nary courts of France were precluded because of the peculiar
interpretation of the separation of powers.
Bearing in mind that administrative law developments in
the United States and in former France have been over
shadowed throughout by the respective conceptions and in
terpretations of the separation of powers, one of the recent
demands voiced by the American Bar Association deserves
analysis and rectification within these conclusions. In 1 93 6
the Special Committee on Administrative Law o f the Associa
tion, championing the separation of powers doctrine,25 ob
j ected vehemently to the so-called commingling of powers
in administrative agencies. Relying upon language of
20 6 r Rep. A. B. A. ( r 9 3 6) 7 2 0 at 7 2 5 . See also Ballantine, "Administrative
Agencies and the Law," 24 A . B. A . J. ( r 9 3 8 ) r o9 at I I I .
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O'Donoghue v. United State.s-,26 a Supreme Court decision,
the Committee insisted that "it is precisely this forbidden
commingling of the essentially different powers of govern
ment in the same hands that is today the identifying badge
of an administrative agency."27 However, it should be noted
that the Supreme Court in that case had before it the questions
of "permanent tenure of office and the undiminishable char
acter of the compensation of j udges."28 Relating the issue
to the separation of powers, the court made reference to "oc
casional
conferring upon a given department [ of]
certain functions, which, by their nature, would otherwise
fall within the general scope of the powers of another."29
The particular instance envisaged was the enstrusting by
Congress to the District Court of the District of Columbia 30
of certain administrative functions that did not require the
district court to act simultaneously as administrator and judge.
The effect of the act of Congress on the contrary was that the
court might act as the one in a given matter, and as the other
in a different and unrelated cause. The evil thus referred to
by the Supreme Court was not at all the same as the one em
phasized by the American Bar Association Committee. For
the latter complained about the commingling of "powers" in
an administrative agency for purely administrative ends, that
is, the exercise of differentiated "powers" for the accom
plishment of a single administrative objective. Therefore the
Committee's objection to the commingling of powers is open
to criticism if it is given the general interpretation of which
it is certainly susceptible.
.. ( 1 93 3 ) 2 89 u. s. s x 6 at 530.
"" 6 1 Rep. A . B. A. at 727. [Italics supplied.]
28 O'Donoghue v. United States, (x 9 3 3 ) 289 U. S. 5 1 6 at 529-5 30
.. Ibid., 289 U. S. at 530.
80 See Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 930) 894 ;
supra, chap. V.
•
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Except in the case of official action only nominally admin
istrative and in fact judicial in nature,31 original adminis
,/{trative action, i.e., the administrative process, is necessarily
complex. It has, unavoidably, qualities closely resembling
the traditional legislative and judicial processes. But, are
these qualities "functions" or "powers"? Are they not merely
different aspects of one of the essential forms of govern
mental activity, so that any permanent dissection must in
evitably disintegrate and cripple that activity? Perhaps the
viewpoint taken by a French writer is helpful in this con
nection. Hauriou,32 distinguishing the acts of the adminis
tration active from those of the juridiction administrative,
has said that private persons, even though their rights may
·{pe affected, are third parties as regards original action by
administrative agencies. Expressed in terms more familiar
j to the American lawyer, original administrative action that
! (""collides with private rights does not for this reason alone
... present a "case or 'controversy." 33 Consequently an admin
istrative agency engaged in fact-finding for the purpose of
determining a course of action ultimately affecting private
interests does not exercise "judicial functions or powers."34
Its action, in certain phases, indeed resembles or must con
form to the methods customarily employed by judicial bodies :,
however there is no usurpation of powers which should be
restored to their constitutional recipient.35 The individual
'·

81 For instance, the action of a workmen's compensation tribunal or the
judicially conducted review by an "administrative court" such as the Board
of Tax Appeals, Court of Claims or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
12 See Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, I oth ed. ( I 9 Z I ) , pp. 36-3 7,
J 6 I , 363. Cf. Jeze, Les principes generaux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 925),
pp. 7, 2 5 ff., 48 ff., making the distinction between actes juridiques and actes
juridictionnels.
83 See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( I 908) 2 I I U. S. 2 I o at 2 2 7-22 8 ;
Upshur County v. Rich, ( I 89o) 1 35 U. S. 46 7 ; Postum Cereal Co. v. California
Fig Nut Co., ( I 927) 2 7 2 U. S. 693.
"' Cf. People ex rei. Steward v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, ( I 899)
I 6o N. Y. 202 at 206-7.
86 Cf. Norwalk Street Railway Company's Appeal, (1 897) 69 Conn. 5 76 at
594-595·
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phases of action are but integral parts of the administrative
process ; the fact that they follow a pattern common to other
governmental activities does not automatically convert them
into functions constitutionally belonging to another depart
ment. Therefore, as a necessary consequence of the separa
tion of powers these so-called judicial functions could not be
imposed upon the courts.36 Nevertheless, the danger of "ad
ministrative absolutism" is remote. For, if the composite ad
ministrative act is in any sense or phase illegal, judicial re
view and relief will effectively protect adversely affected
private interests.
These considerations are important because of their bear
ing upon administrative law reforms proposed in the United
States. Clearly, the administrative process is essential to
modern government and must not be disintegrated. Where
safeguards are needed to preserve our constitutional form of
government they should first be provided in the adminis
trative process itself. In other words, the administrative proc
ess must be constructed so as to conform uniformly to the
constitutional due process requirements. The formulation of
satisfactory procedure for the guidance of properly manned
administrative agencies is the most important step towards
judicious rather than judicial administration. Th<;! large ex
tent to which judicial vetoes of administrative acts have sig
nified an insistence upon due process has actually resulted in
shifting the focus of interest from judicial review and its
scope to administrative procedure.37 However, it must not be
assumed that the institution of judicial review of the com
pleted administrative act may thus lose importance. The
80 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1 930) 2 8 1 U. S. 464;
(see chap. V, note ·7, supra) . Cf. Hodges v. Public Service Commission, ( 1 9 3 1 )
1 1 0 W. Va. 649 ; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (1 855)
18 How. (59 U. S.) 272 at 284; Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo
American Administrative Law Theory," 4 7 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 3 8 ) 5 3 8 at 553 ;
61 Rep. A. B. A . at 728 ; chap. V, supra.
:n See the monographs prepared by the Attorney General's Committee on Ad
ministrative Procedure.

1 88

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

scope may indeed contract38 and administrative activity may
flow more freely. But judicial protection of constitutional
rights and liberties must continue as an indispensable part of
our existing form of government.

The comparison of the French and American adminis
trative systems can be summed up with a concluding observa
tion which current events have endowed with unforeseen
significance. Not only in this country, but also under the
droit administratif, as it has evolved, administrative action
directly encroaching upon private rights and liberties was
normally subject to ordinary court review and control. In its
final setting the function of the French administrative courts
- was to accord expert treatment to intrinsically administrative
problems rather than to subtract from the powers customarily
belonging to the judicial courts.
Thus, in order that the circle may close, this inquiry must
turn once more to the separation of powers. Both in the
United States and in France a century and a half ago the
establishment of a democratic form of government occurred
under the auspices of the separation of the departments of
government. However, the events following in the wake
of widely diverging interpretations show that the precept
was too vague to be depended upon for the preservation of
the system it had helped to create. Each system developed
within itself and of its own strength the far more reliable de
vice known as judicial review. It is not difficult in this country
88 The proposal in the new Administrative Law Bill, S. 9 1 5, H. R. 4236,
76th Cong., 1st sess. ( 1 939), favoring a considerable extension of j udicial
review of administrative orders and decisions undoubtedly exaggerates the func
tion of j udicial review. Section s (a) of the bill provides seven grounds upon
which decisions may be set aside. Briefly stated, they are : ( 1 ) erroneous findings
of fact, ( 2) insufficient evidence, ( 3 )'> absence of facts to support the decisions,
(4) lack of due process, (5) lack of jurisdiction, (6) unconstitutionality and
illegality under federal laws, and ( 7) other illegality.
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to mistake the shadow for the substance, since the separation
of powers as originally conceived placed no serious obstacle in
the path of judicial control over administrative action. How
ever, in France, where its corollary, the differentiation of
agencies, had guaranteed autonomy to the administrative de
partment, the struggle of "judicial review" to regain and
maintain its place throws into high relief the reasons for such
review, that is, the preservation of democratic institutions and
the protection of civil liberties and private enterprise.
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Constitutional facts, doctrine of, 6971.
Constitutionality of administrative
acts, I 5 I, I 7 7, I 8 2- I 8 3 . See also
Administrative trespass ; Usurpa
tion of power.
Constitutionality of laws, French
courts without power to deter
mine, 8 3 .
Constitutional limitations on review
powers of American courts, I 7 8I 79•
Contentieux de l'annulation, 3 I. See
also Recourse for excess of power.
Contentieux de la repression, 3 1 .
Contentieux de !'interpretation, 3 I .

Contentieux de plet'ne juridiction,
3 I . See also Ordinary recourse.
Contracts, j urisdiction in case of
contracts pertaining to public serv
ice, 5 I , 5 6 ; when "administra
tive," 5 3 ; when made by central
government, 5 3 , 5 5 ; predeter
mination of j urisdiction by special
clauses, 56. See also Jurisdiction.
Cormenin, L. M., de, on administra
tive protection of officers, 99-IOO.
Cour de cassation, 26, 43, 79, 86,
88, I03, I 04·
Court control of administrative acts,
see Administrative courts ; Judicial
review ; Jurisdiction.
Curia regis, 9·
Damage to land, I 4 5 · See also Ad
ministrative trespass.
Damages, actions for, against admin
istrative officers, see Administra
tive officers ; Collateral attack.
Dareste, P., on judicial protection
of civil liberties and property, I 34,
I35·
Decisions executoires, annulment
upon recourse for excess of power,
3 6 ; defined, 3 6 ; requirement of
notice, 3 6 ; requirement of pro
ceeding by way of, sanctions, 3 7·
Declaratory j udgments, determina
tion of questions prejudicielles in
France, 8 9 ; on validity of regula
tions, proposed in America, 9 I .
Delegation of legislative power,
theory of, rej ected in France, So ;
j udicial invalidation of in Amer
ica, 90.
Differentiation of agencies, admin
istrative and j udicial, in France,
a corollary of the separation of
powers, I 2 ; object, I 2-I 3 ; con
stitutional and statutory pro
visions, 1 3- I 4 ; strict interpreta
tion held not practicable, I 9 ; at
tenuation of principle, 20-2 I , 2 3,
39; sanctions of principle, 2 5-27,
8 9 ; administrative expertness a

INDEX
factor in interpretation, 4 I ; non
statutory exceptions to principle,
7 7 ; statutory exceptions to prin
ciple in case of reg.ulations, 7 880 ; interpretation in regard to
j udicial control of administrative
regulations, So, 88, I 7 7 ; inter
pretation in regard to j urisdiction
over public officers, 94 ; effect of
repeal of "administrative guaran
tee" of officers, I o 2 ; re-affirmation
of principle, 1 0 5-I 07, I I I , I I 8 ;
faute personnelle doctrine not a
limitation, I 30, I 3 I ; conflict
with doctrine of j udicial protec
tion of civil liberties and prop
erty, 8 9, I 3 3-I 3 7, 1 3 8 ; prin
ciple deemed not violated by ordi
nary court review of "non
administrative" acts, I 4 I , I 4 3 ;
violation of principle by unau
thorized application of adminis
trative sanctions, I 64 ; circumven
tion of principle by doctrine of
administrative trespass, I 7 5 , I 76.
See also Separation of powers.
Direct attack on administrative acts,
3 I , I 8 3. See also Judicial review ;
Recourse for excess of power.
Dispossession, I 67-I 68, I 7 2-I 7 3 ·
See also Administrative trespass.
Droit administratif, see Administra
tive systems, French.
Ducrocq, Th., on Montesquieu's
conception of the separation of
powers, 7 ; on duty of courts to
verify legality of administrative
regulations, 7 8 ; on j udicial pro
tectorate over property rights and
liberties, I 3 4·
"Due process of law," I 3 3 ; com
mon to both American and French
conception of j ustice, I 7 7 ; re
quirement of procedural due proc
ess, I 7 <J- I 8 2, I 8 7.
Duguit, 1., on the two-fold nature
of administrative regulations, 8 I ;
on l'exception d'illegalite, 8 2 ; on
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effect of superior order on per
sonal liability of officers, I 2 3I 2 4 ; defining faute personnelle,
I 24- 1 2 5 ; on j urisdiction in case
of faute incluse, 1 2 5 .
Emergency, see Administrative ex
ecution.
Encroachment on private property,
I 46. See also Administrative tres
pass.
Evocation, withdrawal of j urisdic
tion from courts, I I , 2 5 , 95·
Exception d'illegalite, 78-So. See
also Administrative regulations.
Exces de pouvoir, see Excess of
power.
Excess of power, what constitutes,
3 4 ; recourse, see Recourse for ex
cess of power.
Exhaustion of administrative reme
dies, not a prerequisite to recourse
for excess of power, 3 5 ; Amer
ican doctrine, 68-69, I 8 I ; pur
pose of doctrine, 6 8 ; distinguished
from "prior resort" doctrine, 68.
Expropriation, I 6 7-I 6 8 .

Faute de service, and faute person
neUe, distinction, 47, IOO.
Faute detachable, see Faute personneUe.
Faute incluse, see Faute personnelle.
Faute lourde, see Faute personnelle.
Faute personnelle, distinguished
from faute de service, 47, I OO,
I I 2 ; deprives official act of ad
ministrative quality, 48 ; j uris
dictional implications, I I 2, I I 3 ;
liability of administrative officers,
I I 3 ; definition, I I 4 ; negligence,
when faute personnelle, I I 5- I I 6,
I 2 7, I 2 9, I 3 I ; abuse of power,
I I 6-I I 8 ; bad faith, I I 9, 1 26 ;
faute lourde, I 2o-I 2 I , I 2 6 ; "de
tachable," distinguished from "in
closed," I 24, I 2 5 ; "intellectually
descernible," I 2 5 , I 2 6 ; illegal
act of enforcement not per se
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Faute personnelle (Continued)
faute personnette, 1 26 ; "third de
gree," I 2 8 ; inaction, I 3 0 ; doc

trine has not broadened ordinary
court control over administrative
acts, I 30 ; culpable intent chief
element of concept, I 3o-I 3 I ,
1 5 7 ; distinct from trespass, 1 4 5 ,

1 5 7· 1 73-1 ]4.

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, pro
visions for j udicial review of regu
lations, 91-92.
Freedom o f the press, illegality of
restrictive regulation, 79; curtail
ment of, deemed administrative
error, 1 I 8 ; violation of, held a
trespass, 1 4·7• 1 5 5-1 5 6, 1 7 21 73 ; violation of, by administra
tive seizure (of newspaper) , 1 56,
I 70 (of printed matter and print
ing equipment) , 1 5 7-1 5 8 .
"Fundamental rights," protection by
constitutional courts, I 3 3 .
Hauriou, M., o n decision executoire,
3 6 ; on gestion publique, 4 2 ; on
rule of j urisdiction in matters of
public service, 48 ; on jurisdiction
in matters of contract, 5 6 ; on the
"supremacy of the law," 8 3 ; on
protection of administrative of
ficers, 98 ; on repeal of "adminis
trative guarantee," 103 ; defining
administrative trespass, I 5o-1 5 I ;
on administrative rule-making
power and procedure, I 5 1 ; on
administrative execution,
1 66,
I 6 7 ; on function of trespass doc
trine, 1 70 ; on original adminis
trative action, 1 86.
Illegality of administrative acts, basis
of ordinary j urisdiction in France,
77, 96 ; degrees, 1 3 8, I 3 9 ; does
not automatically render act
"non-administrative," I 3 8-1 3 9,
1 74-I 75 ; an element of tres
pass, 1 47-1 48, 1 50-1 5 3 · See also
Administrative regulations ; Ad-

ministrative trespass ; Usurpation
of power.
Inj unction, against illegal adminis
trative execution in France, 1 6 3 ;
not available in administrative
courts, I 63, I 6 5 ; in America, a
method of collaterally testing ad
ministrative j urisdiction, I 8 3 .

Intendants, 9·

Interest, adversely affected, basis for
recourse for excess of power, 3 3 ;
reasons for requiring, 34·
Interference, j udicial, with ad
ministrative action, in France,
I o-I I ; in America, 2 3-24. See
also Parlements.
Jacquelin, R., on effect of repeal of
"administrative guarantee," I02,

I 07, I 09 ; repudiating doctrine
of ordinary j urisdiction for pro
tection of civil liberties and prop
erty, I 34·
Jeze, G., on prestige of French
civil courts, 49 ; defining faute
personnelle, I I 9-I 20.

"Judicial," term, used to differenti
ate administrative court review
and administrative review, 20 ;
meaning relative to administra

tive action, I 79-I So, I 8 I .
Judicial control, see Court control.
Judicial power, Montesquieu's con
ception, 8 ; Montesquieu's con

ception favorable to aims of
French Revolution, 8, I 3 ; Amer
ican constitutional conception,
2 2-23, 6 2-64 ; American doc
trines of limitation upon,

63-69;

normal scope, revival of interest
in France, I 3 8.
Judicial relief from administrative
action, see Judicial review.
Judicial review, of administrative
regulations, 8 8-9 2 ; of adminis
trative acts, comparable with rules
governing
review
powers of

INDEX
French civil courts, I 77-I 83,
I8 8; procedural devices in Amer
ice, I 78, I 79• I S 3 ; right to, con
tent, I 78-I 79, I 8 2 ; limited by
"j udicial" nature of act, I 78I 79, I 8 I ; scope, defined by pur
pose, I 8 I ; determined by inter
pretation of "due process" and
"jurisdiction,"
I 8 2-I 8 3 ; and
the "supremacy of the law," I 8 2 ;
American and French methods,
differ in degree only, I 8 4 ; ad
vantage of French system, I 8 4 ; in
the sense of protection of consti
tutional rights, essential to Amer
ican form of government, I 88 ;
indispensable to preservation of
democratic institutions, I 8 8-I 89.
Juridiction administrative, distinct
from administration active, 20,

·

2 I-22.

Jurisdiction, exclusive, of Conseil
d' Etat to annul administrative
acts, 3 I-3 3 ; in case of ordinary
recourse, 3 9-42 ; in case of actions
for damages, 42-50 ; in case of
actions on contract, 5o-5 6 ; in
case of "administrative" contracts,
5 3-5 5 ;
distribution
among
French courts, controlled by
familiar ideas, 6 2 ; factors com
plicating, where administrative
regulations involved, in France,
8o-8 3 ; of American courts over
regulations, 9o-92 ; of French
courts over actions against of
ficers, 94, 98 ; in case of faute
personnelle, I I 2 ; in case of tres
pass,
I 2 2-1 23, I 4 I · I 4 3 ; of
French civil courts in matters of
constitutional rights and property,
I 3 3-I 3 7 ; statutory, declaratory
nature, in case of liberties and
property, I 3 6 ; in case of illegal
administrative
acts,
I 3 8-q :o,
I 7 7 ; in case of "non-administra
tive" acts, 1 4 1 , I 42-I 43, I 47-
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I 48, I 74-I 7 5 ; in case of illegal
acts of execution, I 62-I 6 3 ; of
American courts to review admin
istrative acts, I 78-I 8 3 .
Jurisdictional concepts, purpose of
formulation in France, 6 I-62.
Jurisdictional conflicts, see Conftit;
Tribunal des conflits.

Jurisdictional facts, American doctrine, 69-7 I .

Justice deleguee, I 5- I 6.
Justice retenue, I I , I 5, 3 2.

Laferriere, E., on jurisdiction in
case of ordinary recourse, 40, 52 ;
on "administrative guarantee,"
I OO, I O I ; defining faute person
neUe, I I 4 ; concerning violations
of the freedom of the press, I I 8 ;
on j udicial protectorate over con
stitutional rights and liberties,
I 3 5, I 4 7 i on illegality of admin
istrative acts, 1 3 8-I 3 9 ; on usur
pation of power, I 3 9-I40.
Laroque, P., repudiating doctrine of
administrative trespass, I 48.
Law schools, necessity of integrating
public law curriculum, 74·
Legality of administrative acts, see
Declaratory j udgments.
Legislative courts, federal, may per
form nonj udicial functions, 64,
7 2 ; proposed "consolidation," 72.
Lettre de jussion, see Registration of
royal ordinances.
Liability of administrative officers, a
j urisdictional problem in France,
94, I I 2 ; established by Bill of
Rights, 9 5-96 ; effect of "admin
istrative guarantee" of officers, 97 ;
complemented by state liability,
I I l-I 1 2, I 3 I ; effect of superior
order, 1 2 3 ; not involved in case
of trespass, I 74·
Lit de justice, I I . See also Registra
tion of royal ordinances.
Locke, J., on the separation of pow
ers, 5 ·
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Logan Bill, federal administrative
courts proposed, 72.

Maitres des requetes, I 7, 4-3·

Mandamus, precluded in France by
d ifferentiation of agencies, 3 7·
See also Judicial review, methods
of.
Marches de fournitures, 5 3 , 5 5 · See
also Contracts.
Military requisition, irregular, I 4-5 ·
Ministre-juge, doctrine of, I 6.
Mirabeau, H. G. R., comte de, I .
Montesquieu, Ch. L. de S., baron de,
conception of separation of powers
re-examined, 4--8 ; reception of
doctrine, in America and France,
5 ; recognized only two govern
mental "powers," 6 ; first to
postulate distribution of govern
mental powers, 7 ; did not recog
nize a coordinate j udicial power,

6-8.

Moreau, F., on interpretation of the
differentiation of agencies, 84--

85.

"Negative order" doctrine, 6 5-66 ;
repudiation of, as a criterion of re
viewability of administrative acts,

65.

Negligence, see Faute personnelle.
"Nonadministrative" nature of acts,
a j urisdictional formula in France,

I 3 8, 1 4- 1 , I 4-2-I4-3> I 4-7-I4-8,
I 5 8, I 63 , I 74-> I 75 ·
"Nonexistent" acts, 1 4-0-1 4- 1 , 1 77·

See also Administrative acts.
Notice, 36. See also Decisions

ecutoires.

ex

Notice and hearing, see Procedural
irregularity.
Officers, see Administrative officers.
Ordinary courts, French, assertion of
j urisdiction over administrative
acts, 77, 8 8 . See also Jurisdiction.
Ordinary recourse against adminis
trative acts, in France, requisites,

38.

Parallel recourse, what is, 3 5 . See
also Recourse for excess of power.
Parlements, powers, 9; interference
with executive by, <)-I I .
Personal error (fault, mistake ) , see

Faute personnelle.

Personal liability, see Liability of
administrative officers.
Personal liberty, administrative in
terference, 14-3, I 73·
Police power, exercise of in conflict
with civil liberties, not trespass
per se, 1 5 <)-1 6 1 , 1 70, 1 7 2 .
Prior resort t o administrative action,
68-69 ; distinguished from "ex
haustion" doctrine, 68.
Private interests, protection not in
issue at inception of French ad
ministrative system, 1 4-.
Procedural due process, see "Due
process of law" ; Judicial review.
Procedural irregularity, a form of
administrative trespass, I 50-1 5 3 ,

1 75 ·

Property rights, see Civil liberties
and property rights.
Public liberties, what are, 1 54-·
Public service, j urisdictional impli
cations of concept, 4-0-4-2, 59, 6 1 ;
definition, 4- 1 ; applied to damage
actions, 4-2-5 o ; applied to con
tract actions, s o-5 6 ; distinction
of commercial and non-commer
cial, 5 6-6o.
Quasi-judicial action, see "Judicial."
Questions prejudicielles, doctrine
of, differentiation of agencies,
sanction, 89, 14-5, 1 48-1 5 0. See
also Declaratory judgments.

Rechtsuberzeugung, j udicial protec

tion of liberties and property, in
France, 1 3 7·
Recours de pleine juridiction, see
Ordinary recourse.

Recours gracieux, 3 3 ·
Recours hierarchique, 3 3 . See also
Administrative appeals.

INDEX
Recours paraltele, see Parallel re
course.

Recours pour exces de pouvoz'r, see
Recourse for excess of power.
Recourse for excess of power, ex
clusive j urisdiction of Conseil
d'Etat to receive, 3 1 , p, 3 6 ;
significance, 3 1-3 3 ; evolution,
3 2-3 3 ; nature of remedy, 3 3-3 5 ;
originally an administrative ap
peal, 3 3 ; j udicial aspect, 3 3 , 3 7,
49 ; grounds, 34; is a proceeding
in rem, 3 4 ; informal and inexpen
sive, 3 5 ; not available if parallel
recourse open, 3 5 ; "executory de
cisions" subject to, 3 6 ; does not
normally arrest administrative ac
tion, 3 7 ; evasion of by adminis
trative, 3 7.
Rejere, see lnj unction.
Registration of royal ordinances,
power of parlements to refuse, of
Crown to compel, I Q-1 1 .
Regulations, see Administrative reg
ulations.
Religious freedom, administrative
interference, I 44, I 7 3. See also
Administrative trespass.

Remonstrance, see Registration of
royal ordinances.
Sanctions, administrative, See Ad
ministrative execution.

Section du contentieux, I 5 · See also
Conseil d' Etat, judicial section.

Segregation of j udicial functions, see
American Bar Association.
Seizure, administrative, see Admin
istrative trespass.

Separation des autorites administra
twe et judiciaire, I 2. See also Dif

ferentiation of agencies.
Separation of powers, historic po
litical meaning of doctrine, signif

3-4, 23 ; function, 8, 1 2,
22, 2 3 , 2 8 ; adoption in France,
two-fold object, I 3- I 4 ; elasticity
icance,
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of doctrine, I 9 ; difference in
American and French conceptions
of Montesquieu's theory, 2 I-23,
6 2-63, 90 ; changing content of
doctrine, 23-24 ; implementation
of, 2 s-2 7 ; interpretation by
United States Supreme Court, 6368 ; instrumental in establishment
of American and French demo
cratic governments, I 8 8. See also
Differentiation of agencies ; Montesquieu.
.
Service public, see Public service.
State liability, adoption in France,
I I I ; basis, I I I-I I 2 ; advantage,

I I 2.
Supersedeas, 3 7.

"Supremacy of the law," the, I 3 3 ;
postulate common to American
and French administrative sys
tems, I ] ] ; American Bar Associa
tion, inference, concerning, re
j ected, I 7 7 ; implementation with
judicial review, I 82.
Torts, see Administrative officers ;

Faute de service; Faute person
neUe.

Trespass, see Administrative trespass.
Tribunal des conflits, organization
and function, 26 ; establishment,
I O S ; respect enjoyed, I 08.
Usurpation of power, what consti
tutes, I 3 <J- I 4 I ; distinct from
excess of power, I 40 ; a form of
trespass, I 5o.

Voie de fait, see Administrative tres
pass.
Waline, M., defining administrative
trespass, I 5 4 ; defining "public
liberties," I 5 4 ; on administrative
execution, I 62, I ] I .
Walter-Logan B ill, provisions for
intra-agency review, 7 3 ; pro
posals concerning review of ad
ministrative regulations, 9o-9I ;
proposals concerning j udicial re
view, I 8 8.

